DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 170 231 SO 011 689

AUTHOR Carter, John E., Ed.; Angello, Richard, Ed.
TITLE Philosophical Studies in Education: Proceedings of the 1978 Annual Meeting of the Ohio Valley Philosophy of Education Society.
INSTITUTION Ohio Valley Philosophy of Education Society, Terre Haute, Ind.
SPONS AGENCY Ohio State Univ., Columbus.
PUB DATE 79
NOTE 112p.; For a related document, see ED 164 426 ; May be marginally legible due to small type
AVAILABLE FROM Ohio Valley Philosophy of Education Society, School of Education, Indiana State University, Terre Haute, Indiana 47809 ($2.50)

EDRS PRICE MF01 Plus Postage. PC Not Available from EDRS.
DESCRIPTORS Beliefs; Educational Needs; Educational Objectives; *Educational Philosophy; *Educational Policy; Educational Practice; Educational Psychology; Elementary Secondary Education; *Ethical Instruction; Futures (of Society); Higher Education; Learning Processes; *Philosophy; *Policy Formation; Relationship; Religious Education; Socioeconomic Influences; Student Evaluation of Teacher Performance; Teaching Methods; Tenure

ABSTRACT

The proceedings consist of the presidential address, papers, responses, and dialogue presented at the annual meeting of the Ohio Valley Philosophy of Education Society. Papers emphasized several themes: 1) appraisals of professionalism, 2) obligations of teachers in the areas of ethics and morality, 3) historical arguments relating to the oligarchy of educational expertise, and 4) philosophical views on the nature and scope of professional authority. In the presidential address, Gerald M. Reagan of the Ohio State University examined the growing concern in colleges and universities over evaluation of faculty members by students. Reagan suggested that peer review and evaluation of faculty members would be more appropriate. Other papers focused on the need to establish goals for teaching ethics, social influences on moral education, a critique of values education, socializing functions of schooling, a revisionist interpretation of John Dewey's social and political philosophy, coercion by educators to prepare people for a democratic society, teaching about ethnic diversity in a culturally pluralistic society, the relationship between teaching and learning, and the pre-socratic roots of Western education. (DB)

****
* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *
* from the original document. *
****

ED170231

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REPRODUCED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED FROM THE PERSON OR ORGANIZATION ORIGINATING IT. POINTS OF VIEW OR OPINIONS STATED DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT OFFICIAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION POSITION OR POLICY

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL IN MICROFICHE ONLY HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

John E Carter

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC) AND USERS OF THE ERIC SYSTEM."

philosophical studies in education

PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE OHIO VALLEY PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY-1978

Stouffer's Towers Hotel
October 20-21, 1978

University of Cincinnati,
Host Institution

Published for the Society by
The School of Education,
Indiana State University,
Terre Haute, Indiana 47809

Copyrighted © 1979 by the Ohio Valley Philosophy of Education Society. All rights reserved.
ISSN 0160-7561

Indexed in *Philosopher's Index* and *Resources in Education* of Education Resource Information Service. Microfiche copies available thru ERIC Clearinghouse, 855 Broadway, Boulder, Colorado 80302. Back copies in paper and microfilm (1968-present) are available thru University Microfilms International, 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106.

SP 011 689

The Society accepts papers which treat philosophically a topic that is clearly related to an educational question. Papers read at the annual meeting are reviewed for publication by the program committee. Papers must follow style guidelines published by the University of Chicago, Turabian, or the proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society, *Philosophy of Education 1973*, pp. 356ff. Papers should not exceed 15 pages in length. They are submitted to the program committee for consideration during the summer preceeding an October or November meeting. Inquiries concerning submission guidelines, deadlines, and meeting dates may be addressed to the editors.

Philosophical Studies in Education is published annually during the spring following the fall meeting of the society. Subscription rates to individuals and institutions can be obtained at a cost of $2.50 and $6.50, respectively, by writing the editors or the secretary-treasurer. Foreign subscribers will have a small postage fee added.

The publication of this edition was made possible by a financial contribution from The Ohio State University and the technical support of the School of Education, Indiana State University. Special acknowledgment is extended to Frederick R. Cyphert, Dean of the School of Education, The Ohio State University, and to the following individuals of Indiana State University: Richard L. Willey, Dean of the School of Education, and John C. Hill, Assistant Dean for Research and Services, for administrative arrangements: Linda Sanning, who served as copy editor; Dorothea Nelson, who served as consulting editor; Sue Lightfoot, who typed the manuscript; and, Robert Schacht and Ray Hedges of the Division of Printing, Indiana State University. Laura Snider designed the cover.

CONTENTS

Official Program of the 1978 Annual Meeting iv

INTRODUCTION 1

PART I
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

PEERS, EXPERTS, AND FAIR JUDGES: SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT THE EVALUATION OF PROFESSORS
by Gerald M. Reagan. 8

RESPONSE TO REAGAN: PEERS AND COLLEAGUES
by Keith L. Raitz. 18

PART II
PAPERS DELIVERED AT THE GENERAL SESSIONS

OBLIGATIONS OF THE TEACHER OF ETHICS
by Bernard Rosen 24

WE CAN'T LEAVE MORALITY TO THE EXPERTS
by Clinton Collins 31

JOHN DEWEY AND PLOYS OF REVISIONISM
by Joe R. Burnett. 42

RESPONSE TO BURNETT: PRINCIPLES AND POWER
by Richard LaBrecque 55

RESPONSE TO BURNETT
by Robert Wilhoyte 60

PART III
PAPERS DELIVERED AT THE CONCURRENT SESSIONS

CULTURAL PLURALISM, CATEGORIES OF IDENTITY, AND DEFINITIONS OF ETHNICITY IN EDUCATIONAL DISCOURSE
by Robert J. Skovira 64

'TEACHING' AS A SUCCESS-CONCEPT
by Dennis M. Senchuk 72

SOME COMPARISONS BETWEEN GESTALT EDUCATORS AND PERSIG'S VIEW OF PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHERS
by Conrad Pritscher. 81

COPING PATTERNS AS KEYS TO UNDERSTANDING KNOWLEDGE: AN ESSAY IN EDUCATIONAL THEORY
by Irvin K. Rice 87

PART IV

MINUTES AND TREASRUER'S REPORT FOR 1978 99

MEMBERSHIP LIST 101

OFFICIAL PROGRAM
OF THE
OHIO VALLEY PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY
1978 ANNUAL MEETING
OCTOBER 20-21, 1978
STOUFFER'S TOWERS HOTEL
CINCINNATI, OHIO
HOST INSTITUTION
UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI

FRIDAY MORNING, OCTOBER 20

REGISTRATION: 9:00 - 10:00

OPENING SESSION: 10:00 - 12:00
COMMODORE ROOM

Chair: David Engel (University of Pittsburgh)

Welcoming Remarks: Hendrik D. Gideonse, Dean of the College of Education (University of Cincinnati)

Presidential Address: Gerald M. Reagan (Ohio State University) "Peers, Experts, and Fair Judges: Some Questions About the Evaluation of Professors"

Response: Keith L. Raitz (University of Louisville)

Discussion

Lunch: 12:00 - 1:30

FRIDAY AFTERNOON, OCTOBER 20

GENERAL SESSION: 1:30 - 3:15
COMMODORE ROOM

Chair: Everett Jarboe (Indiana University)

Paper: Bernard Rosen (Ohio State University) "Obligations of the Teacher of Ethics"

Paper: Clinton Collins (University of Kentucky) "We Can't Leave Morality to the Experts"

Discussion

GENERAL SESSION: 3:30 - 5:00
COMMODORE ROOM

Symposium: "Can 'Equality Before the Law' Perpetuate A Social Injustice? Some Axiological Considerations Growing Out of the Bakke Decision."

Panel: Marvin Berlowitz, Chair (University of Cincinnati)
Greg Orr (University of Cincinnati)
Gene Grabiner (SUNY - Buffalo)
William Russell (University of Cincinnati)
Michael Washington (University of Cincinnati)

Discussion

Dinner: 5:00 - 8:00

FRIDAY EVENING, OCTOBER 20

GENERAL SESSION: 8:00 - 10:30
COMMODORE ROOM

Chair: Malcolm D. Campbell (Bowling Green State University)

Paper: Joe R. Burnett (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)
"John Dewey and Ploys of Revisionism"

Responses: Richard LaBrecque (University of Kentucky)
Robert Wilhoyte (University of Toledo)

Discussion

SATURDAY MORNING, OCTOBER 21

COFFEE HOUR: 8:30
(Provided by host institution, University of Cincinnati)

CONCURRENT SESSION: 9:00 - 11:00

Session A - Cabana Room A

Chair: Lane F. Birkel (Ball State University)

Paper: Robert J. Skovira (University of Virginia) "Cultural Pluralism, Categories of Identity, and Definitions of Ethnicity"

Paper: Dennis M. Senchuk (Indiana University) "Teaching as a Success-Concept"

Discussion

Session B - Cabana Room B

Chair: Bonnie Hume (Eastern Kentucky University)

Paper: Conrad Pritscher (Bowling Green State University) "Some Comparisons Between Gestalt Educators and Persig's View of Pre-Socratic Philosophers"

Paper: Irvin K. Rice (Louisville Male High School) "Coping Patterns as Keys to Understanding Knowledge: An Essay in Educational Theory"

Discussion

GENERAL BUSINESS MEETING: 11:15 - 12:00
CABANA ROOM A

EXECUTIVE BOARD

EDITOR

JOHN E. CARTER, *Indiana State University*

ASSISTANT EDITOR

RICHARD ANGELLO, *University of Kentucky*

PROGRAM COMMITTEE

JOHN E. CARTER, *Indiana State University*
THOMAS J. MINTER, *University of Toledo*
RICHARD PRATTE, *Ohio State University*

PRESIDENT

GERALD M. REAGAN, *Ohio State University*

PRESIDENT-ELECT

DAVID ENGEL, *University of Pittsburgh*

SECRETARY-TREASURER

ELEANOR K. ROEMER, *Bowling Green State University*

IMMEDIATE PAST PRESIDENT

J. CORDAN CHAMBERLIN, *Pittsburgh Theological Seminary*

MEMBERS AT LARGE

WALDEN CRABTREE, *University of Akron*
RICHARD LABRECQUE, *University of Kentucky*
EVERETT JARBOE, *Indiana University*

INTRODUCTION

That family of concepts which clusters around notions of "profession" and "professional," around "the expert" and his "expertise," has never been as preeminent within our vocabulary, or our way of life, as the *agathos* or his *arete* were to that of Homeric Greece. But this family of concepts has figured prominently for several generations in what is by now a rich tradition of aspiration and appraisal of American civic life, in general, and its provisions for formal education, in particular. Within this tradition we can find a wide variety of disagreement distributed on either side of one of two broad assumptions about the nature of professional authority.* Confining our attention here to the last twenty years or so and to the first of these assumptions, we can trace without difficulty a common line which runs through works as diverse as, say, Myron Lieberman's *Future of Public Education* (1959), Paul Goodman's *New Reformation* (1969), and the document prepared by the Bicentennial Commission of the AACTE, *Educating a Profession* (1976). To be sure, the range of articulate disagreement represented here is substantial, but all of these texts insist nevertheless that bona fide professionals wield substantive knowledge of the nature of things. In education, then, just as in other domains of compelling public interest such as health care, law, or engineering, on this view we can look for [illegible] to substantial improvement in our civic welfare if we insure that an adequately professionalized corps is on the job exercising its rightful prerogatives.

While this line continues to generate its own characteristic disputes in some quarters (e.g., Which of the aspiring occupations have a legitimate claim to professional status and which are merely putting on airs? What are the best means, educationally and politically, to promote development of the immature professions?), a different line has been developing around a second assumption. We can conveniently, if not altogether accurately, mark the beginning of this second line with the appearance of Ivan Illich's *Deschooling Society* (1970)--a view which has been refined in his subsequent efforts and paralleled if not echoed by studies like Edgar Friedenberg's *Disposal of Liberty and Other Industrial Wastes* (1975), Burton Bledstein's *Culture of Professionalism* (1976), Christopher Lasch's *Haven in a Heartless World* (1977), or the policy proposals urged by Kenneth Keniston under Carnegie Commission auspices in *All Our Children* (1977). Once again the areas of disagreement are substantial, but the common line here is that the unlimited ministrations of professionals of all sorts actually harm those they are meant to serve. In the view of at least some of these writers, moreoever, the proliferation of these professional services not only aggrandizes the professionals themselves but also acts as the vehicle by which state power and control are augmented and deployed. Thus if the assumption in the first, and perhaps more classical, instance enjoins us to expand professional services in the name of an improved quality of life, the second urges us to limit those services for the same reason.

As is customary, this year's meeting of the OVPES did not go forward under the banner of an announced theme. Given the wider tradition of argument we have just sketched, however, it is fitting and not particularly surprising that we find several of these papers reckoning at close quarters with the kind of philosophical problems that are bound to be kicked up in social and institutional circumstances in which the concept of the "professional" and its cousins are potent. As the title of Gerald Reagan's presidential address indicates, "Peers, Experts and Fair Judges: Some Questions About the Evaluation of Professors" takes up the collegial aspects of these matters within the intermural context of the university itself. He begins by asking "How clear are we about who is and who is not to be counted as a professional

---

*This point is developed in the context of the 18th and 19th century in Daniel Calhoun's *Professional Lives in America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965).

peer?" Reagan goes on to distinguish five conventional replies which range from those who would potentially include the entire faculty of an institution to those who seek to limit the concept of "peer" in various ways--by pointing to specific organizational units perhaps, or to those who "share expertise" only, to those who are "working colleagues," or to those who are "external experts." But to what extent can any of these peer groups be depended upon to render "expert judgment" as well? That depends, Professor Reagan argues, not only upon which peer group we select, but also upon which of the three customary professorial functions is being scrutinized. And, finally, he asks, What do we make of the fact that being a knowledgeable peer capable of *expert* judgment in no way guarantees a *fair* judgment of professorial competence? At bottom, in Reagan's view, our practices suggest that we are unclear about "the extent to which we want our peers to be experts and the extent to which we want them to function as fair judges." Failing to adequately differentiate between these two kinds of judgments, the proper scope of each, and who is in the best position to render them, he concludes, our collegial appraisals of the total question of professorial competence are characteristically more truncated than they ought to be. In his reply, Keith Raitz, although generally applauding Reagan's effort, goes on to raise some questions: first, about how stable the distinctions between teaching, research, and service are in practice, and second, whether Reagan's account overworks the notion of a "peer" and thereby obscures the fact that "sometimes we want *colleagues* to review a candidate . . . knowing full well they are not *peers* in important respects." He concludes with an argument designed to show that the best candidate for "peer" is the one who fits the broadest of the five definitions reviewed by Reagan--the one Reagan himself seems to think least appropriate of all.

When we turn to Bernard Rosen's "Obligations of the Teacher of Ethics" and Clinton Collins's "We Can't Leave Morality to the Experts," the familiar intermural ground remains, but the immediate focus shifts from collegial to pedagogic authority and, by implication at least, to questions about the relationship between that authority and the civic life that circumscribes it. If we are disposed to think of the classroom as that site where life-giving pedagogic authority mediates between the curriculum and the ignorant, confused, or underdeveloped in the name of that most indispensable of cultural transactions--a transaction in which learning essential to a civilized and responsible life beyond the classroom walls is either secured, jeopardized, or squandered--then it is of considerable theoretical and practical moment to ascertain as much as we can about that classroom situation in order to insure success. Pushed hard enough, of course, on this view good pedagogy (which is to say effective pedagogy) comes to be identified with good technique responsibly and prudently applied. It is in this mood, so characteristic of that first phase of professional aspiration and appraisal that we delineated at the outset, that Rosen approaches the question of obligation.

He begins by recognizing that while we have many legitimate goals in the teaching of ethics, depending at least in part on who is being taught (the requirements of medical students are different from those of undergraduates, and so on), there are certainly some common goals as well. It is these fewer common goals that Professor Rosen identifies and sets clearly before us, along with the curricular and pedagogic strategies he thinks are most likely to secure them. The common goals in his view are two: first, "to provide a general means for each person to arrive at justified moral judgments; a means applicable to personal and professional moral problems"; second, "to work out a strategy of teaching that makes it likely that action on the basis of the decisions arrived at will occur." These goals of the teacher of ethics also define his obligations, and together they work on behalf of what Rosen calls "the dispensability criterion." In the teaching of ethics, that is, just as in all education, "we want the student to do it, whatever it is, without the aid of the teacher." Under the heading of "means," the first of these two goals, he then turns to a brief review and appraisal of three curricular possibilities: "the case method" (one ignores theoretical considerations); "the Buddhist method" (one studies neither cases nor theoretical matters but studies *with* a master); and "the historical method" (one studies the methods of reasoning displayed by recognized thinkers). In the end, Rosen recommends

an augmented version of the historical method, arguing that it alone among the three satisfies the pedagogic aim of dispensability while also being most consonant with the political principles of democracy under which we "call upon everyone to enter into decision-making." The paper concludes with a diagnosis of the obstacles to achieving the second goal of "action" and a review of some of the remedies that Rosen has successfully applied in his own classroom--the use of questionnaires, of fiction, and of historical examples.

Of course in a very real sense, like Clinton Collins, Rosen too believes "We Can't Leave Morality to the Experts." The "Buddhist method" is suspect, and the "dispensability criterion" is so essential precisely because, as Rosen puts it, "we do not have it as one of our ends that persons . . . submit to the expertise of a person or an authority on moral matters." But what we are anxious to secure on Rosen's account is, first, that everyone makes moral decisions which are rationally justified, and second, that we have the kind of professional intervention necessary--i.e., official teaching by adepts of ethical theory under the authority of the school--to equip people to make those kinds of decisions. However, these prove to be but two of several assumptions that we find the Collins paper militating against in cadences characteristic of the second type of arguments about professionalism. He begins by observing that "moral education is probably the basic form of commerce between people, the hidden agenda of all our social relationships," and that the instrument of this moral education is storytelling. For Collins, then, that which goes on all the while, officially untutored and therefore quite naturally as it were, bears the burden of moral education in the culture. Consequently, he worries about how these resources might be preempted or drained of their vitality, either by institutions like television outside the school or the curricular proposals for moral education within the school like Kohlberg's "cognitive-developmentalism," the "value clarification" movement, or "behavior modification." Collins provides us with a critique of each of these proposals, arguing that they share a common ancestry in both the social policy assumptions of Progressivism and the explanatory ideal of a genuine science of psychology. Thus, all three are fueled by the conviction that "public policy is necessary to insure proper moral education" and that the expert, as an instrument of that policy, should set the goals of instruction. Collins locates his opposition to these proposals and the assumptions which license them in the Socratic tradition, arguing that "good moral education requires only these two essentials: that we tell each other stories, and that we criticize for each other [as equals] the messages we read into the stories we have told."

As the Collins paper vividly reminds us, historical argument is no stranger to appraisals of professionalism--historical argument which in its effect, if not its intent, either binds us in the present to the authority of the past or releases us from that authority. With Joe Burnett's "John Dewey and the Ploys of Revisionism," we are invited to examine in detail the argument enunciated with emancipatory force by some revisionist historians: that Dewey's social and political philosophy displays those congenital defects of modern liberalism responsible for spawning and rationalizing, in the name of democracy, a coercive state power based on an oligarchy of expertise. Burnett's rejoinder to the revisionist charge is in four major parts. He begins by outlining what he believes would be required to convict Dewey of such a charge, and then he goes on to show that if we approach characteristic passages in a work like *Democracy and Education* with certain assumptions about the relationship between social and political philosophy, we might very well be led to conclude that Dewey was something less than an ardent democrat. Burnett's second move is to argue that those assumptions (e.g., that "political theory is basic . . . to social philosophy" or that "political forms" like representative government are basic) "do not in fact 'connect' with Dewey's theory," and what is more, we can see that clearly if we only take the time to look. In his third move, Burnett considers the arguments in Walter Feinberg's *Reason and Rhetoric* as illustrating the types of misunderstandings of Dewey outlined for us more generally at the outset. The paper concludes with a challenge to

the revisionists to square off with Dewey's mature formulation of his social and political views in *The Public and its Problems*. On Burnett's account, then, the revisionists are not only guilty of looking incorrectly, but of looking in the wrong place.

In reply, Richard LaBrecque's "Principles and Power" seconds the spirit and a good deal of the substance of the Burnett piece, arguing that the revisionist effort to depict Dewey as an undemocratic proponent of a "scientific meritocracy" not only fails to be persuasive, but what is perhaps worse, it "distracts us from the real weakness in Dewey's theory and strategy for social change." However, LaBrecque also takes pains to show that had Burnett limited his attention to Feinberg, he probably would have succeeded in filing a more compelling brief against him, while acknowledging at the same time "at least some of the real strengths of . . . *Reason and Rhetoric*." In LaBracque's judgment one of those strengths lies in Feinberg's critique of some revisionists' understanding of the dynamics of social control. But the serious weakness in *Reason and Rhetoric*, he argues, is implicit in "Feinberg's endorsement of Rawls's principle of social justice"--a principle which at bottom proves to be "functional to the needs of technology and the maintenance of the status quo." In the second reply to Burnett's paper, William Wilhoyte takes a different tack. Both Burnett's paper and LaBrecque's reply to it go forward on the basis of a particular diagnosis about the source of the dissonance between their own reading of Dewey and that of the revisionists, and it is precisely the accuracy of that diagnosis that Wilhoyte calls into question. On Wilhoyte's view, the kinds of misunderstandings that fuel the revisionist argument are not to be explained or clarified by pointing to potentially faulty assumptions about the relationships between the social and political aspects of Dewey's philosophy, but by recognizing that the revisionists have brought a "substantial" or "referential" understanding to what are essentially "process" concepts (like "democracy") in Dewey's writing. Their misunderstanding, then, he suggests, is not unlike that of youngsters who understand numerals well enough but somehow find operations like "subtraction" confusing.

Not all of the papers at this year's OVPES meeting fit neatly into these intermural, pedagogic, or historical quarrels over the nature and proper scope of professional authority, and this is undoubtedly a good thing. Dennis Senchuk's "Teaching as a Success Concept" picks up once again and extends in lively fashion that kind of analytic debate over the concept of teaching which B. O. Smith and Israel Scheffler's work inaugurated in the late 50s. Taking account of not only the classic formulations, but some of the most recent entries into these lists as well, Senchuk argues that "'to teach' does seem to meet most if not all of the informal criteria for a success-verb." He then charts what he terms a "modest course in the direction of giving some sense to the claim that teaching is a success concept." With Robert Skovira's "Cultural Pluralism, Categories of Identity, and Definitions of Ethnicity," we are treated to a review of the conceptions of "ethnic identity" and "ethnicity" that seem to be at work not only in policy formulations but in a variety of scholarly literature as well. Unhappily enough, Skovira argues, "the meta-criterion of victimization" appears to be guiding our selection of group names and hindering our understanding of what a cultural group itself is--what its identity can be properly said to consist of. In conclusion he offers an empirically useful conception of ethnicity which is devoid of the typical circularities he finds in the grammar of cultural pluralism.

With the last two papers in the collection, the philosophical idiom shifts from the fist of mainstream British-and American-style analysis to the open hand of the phenomenological tradition. In Conrad Pritscher's view, contemporary "Gestalt educators" can be understood as sharing with the ancient pre-Socratics a particular conception of the proper relationship between "awareness" and "rationality." He aims to spell out that conception in his paper, along with some appreciation of the epistemological and existential consequences of overlooking it, all with an eye toward elaborating some "conclusions that may tend to promote effective teaching." And finally, convinced that teachers "need a new educational skill" grounded theoretically

in a "concise, yet adequate description of the lived experience of human development," Irvin Rice sets out to provide us with such a theory as he addresses himself to the question: "Are Coping Patterns the Key to Understanding Knowledge?" Answering affirmatively, his "theory proposes that the search for control or power is the uniting element in cognition, will, adaptation-learning-development."

In conclusion, to borrow a phrase from LaBrecque's piece, if it is not "a faith in the efficacy of a philosophical principle to move society in a more humane direction" that these papers reveal, then perhaps they reveal a faith in the efficacy of reasonable and spirited exchange. As Edmund Wilson once put it:

> The only thing that we can really make is our work. And deliberate work of the mind, imagination, and hand, done, as Nietzsche said, "notwithstanding," in the long run remakes the world.

THE EDITORS

PART I

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

PEERS, EXPERTS, AND FAIR JUDGES: SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT THE EVALUATION OF PROFESSORS

Gerald M. Reagan
The Ohio State University

It is, I am sure, belaboring the obvious to even mention that there is a growing concern in colleges and universities with the evaluation of faculty members. One specific focus of this concern is with that evaluation leading to the promotion and/or tenure decision. A related matter receiving a great deal of attention is the evaluation of *tenured* faculty members, and, indeed, tenure itself. Critics of current practices, some within the professoriate but many outside, offer a number of reasons for concern. We hear about the "graying of the professoriate," the need for accountability in institutions of higher education, the "surplus" of Ph.D's and the decline of professorial positions, the loss of public confidence in higher education, the possibility of (some would say need for) tenure quotas, the need for "young blood" and new ideas in our institutions, and about the possibility that the tenure system has come to function less as an encouragement to open scholarship than as a set of procedures used to protect the incompetent. For reasons such as these, critics are saying, it is crucial that we become more careful and rigorous in evaluating professors.

As professors many of us are understandably uncomfortable with these concerns and criticisms. One reason for discomfort is that we fear a chilling effect on academic freedom and scholarship, that "more careful and rigorous evaluation" might well produce a new "pall of orthodoxy" in higher education. Now this is not to say that professors believe they should not be evaluated. Few, if any, would make such a claim. Indeed many argue that there *does* need to be more, and more careful, evaluation. But they argue also that the evaluators and those who set the criteria for evaluation should themselves be, in most cases at least, professors. That is, a common response by faculty members, a response which we all recognize and most of us have sympathy with, is the assertion that primary responsibility for the evaluation of professors should rest with peers. The appropriateness of colleagial authority rather than hierarchical authority is likely to be insisted upon, and we are all familiar with the general arguments given to support this view, e.g., those who *are* authorities should be *in* authority in professorial evaluation; one should be judged by his peers because they are the ones with the appropriate training, knowledge, and understanding needed in order to make justified evaluative judgments.

Now even in such skeletal form, arguments for peer review and evaluation have some *prima facie* appeal. From the faculty member's point of view, much of this appeal probably results from what one can infer about who should *not* have the primary responsibility for evaluating faculty members, e.g., (1) those who are external to the academic enterprise and who do not understand what is involved, (2) those who do not have the experience and training to make informed judgments, and (3) those whose position or role is such that the evaluative judgment is likely to be based upon or take into account criteria or pressures which are non-academic.[1] (Perhaps this should be made more explicit. It might be argued that (1) above is represented by laymen or non-academics from outside the institution, that (2) could be students, and that (3) might be those in major administrative roles.) Certainly we want the evaluative judgments to be informed and to be arrived at in a fair and just manner. And many of us may believe that informed, fair, and just decisions are most likely to be arrived at by peers.

But if we accept this belief, just what is it that we are accepting? And just what sort of arguments would warrant our accepting this belief? These are the general questions which will be dealt with in the remainder of this paper. More specifically I will attempt to deal with the following issues. First, just how clear are we about who is and who is not to be counted as a professorial peer in the academic enterprise? Second, what is the relationship

between concepts such as "peer review" or "peer judgment" or "peer input" (a horrible term) or "peer evaluation," on the one hand, and notions such as "expert testimony" or "expert judgment" or "expert evaluation" on the other? (We want our judgments to be properly informed, but it is not obvious that we can expect "peer judgment" to be "expert judgment" as well.) Third, is the "expert" testimony or judgment which is needed a single sort of thing (e.g., knowledge about a subject matter field) or are various sorts of expertise needed? Fourth, what is the relationship between the informed and knowledgeable peer, on the one hand, and the "fair judge" on the other? Again, it is not obvious at the outset that being a "knowledgeable peer" is either a necessary or a sufficient condition for being a wise or fair judge.

Who Are One's Academic Peers?

What are we likely to mean by the use of the term "peer" when speaking of "peer review" or "peer evaluation?" More specifically, given a question such as, "Which of Professor X's peers are properly involved in a peer review of his work?" what sort of answers might be offered? Now for those who hope for help in answering such questions by appealing to dictionaries, disappointment awaits. *Webster's Unabridged* gives the following entry: "Peer, n. 1. an equal; one of the same rank, value, quality, ability, etc.; as, he was tried by a jury of his *peers*. 2. a companion; a fellow; an associate; a compeer. (Archaic.)" The first entry is probably the relevant one, but given our concern here the definition begs the question. In the case of Professor X, just who *are* those who fulfill the criteria of being equal, of the same quality, ability, etc.? So let us close our dictionary and look instead at the sort of answers we might expect if we asked our question about a real Professor X at a real institution.

1. The "We're all in this together" answer: Our question could conceivably be answered by saying that all faculty members at Professor X's institution are his peers. A variation of this answer would be a specification of some institution-wide sub-set, e.g., all tenured professors or all full professors or all faculty members holding equal or higher rank.

2. The organizational unit answer: Another response would be that Professor X's peers are the other professors in his department (or division or college or some other academic unit). Now, again, there could be a number of variations of this answer, i.e., X's peers might be identified as tenured members of the department or members of the department with equal or higher faculty rank, etc. For our purposes here what is important is that the answer suggests a universe from which the peers are to be selected, and that universe is some organizational unit within the institution.

3. The "shared expertise" answer: Certainly one of the most common answers to our question would be that Professor X's peers are other professors at her/his institution who share her/his field of subject matter expertise. Thus it is often claimed or assumed that the *academic* peers of a history professor are other professors of history; that the peers of a civil engineering professor are other professors of civil engineering, etc.

   But as common as this answer is, it is also somewhat puzzling; for it provides not a specific answer but a general category which admits of a number of substantially different answers. Suppose that our Professor X is a professor of astronomy. We can accept the "shared academic expertise" criterion and yet expect a number of different answers, e.g.,

a. Professor X's academic peers are other professors of science.

b. Professor X's academic peers are other professors of *physical* science.

c. Professor X's academic peers are other professors of astronomy.

And of course this might be made even more complex by specifying some sub-set within any of the above groups, such as tenured professors of astronomy or professors of science with academic rank equal to or higher than that of Professor X.

Perhaps we should note here that a *particular* answer may be made more or less likely by factors such as institutional size (professors of astronomy are unlikely to be identified as the "peer group" at an institution which has but one astronomer) and organizational arrangements (professors of physical science may be more likely to be identified as the peer group if astronomy is located in a department of physical science).

4. The "working colleague" answer: Our question could be answered by saying that Professor X's peers are those colleagues with whom X works closely and/or who are in a position which makes them especially knowledgeable about X's work. This group could, of course, be the same as that picked out using either the organizational unit criterion or the shared subject matter speciality criterion, but it need not be. And it could be a sub-set of one or both of these groups, but again this is not necessarily the case. The "working colleague" criterion at some institutions might lead us to include as X's colleagues those who have worked with him in interdisciplinary studies or on committees, etc.

5. The "external expert" answer: Some might assert that Professor X's academic peers are those who share or excel in his field of subject matter expertise but who are *not* necessarily institutional colleagues. Thus it might be claimed that X's academic peers are other professors of astronomy, not necessarily at X's institution but wherever they may be found. (And perhaps we should note here that at many institutions there seems to be a growing conviction of the need for evaluation by "external peers," especially in judgment of the scholarly work or scholarly reputation or scholarly "promise" of the person being evaluated.)

Now these five possible answers to the question, "Who are Professor X's peers?" are not intended as exhaustive. They *are* intended as common possibilities. And a judgment made by the group identified in each answer may be seen and defended as an instance of the exercise of colleagues' authority. The reasonable extent to which each identified group could be expected to render not simply peer judgment but expert judgment as well is not clear. Let us now turn to this matter.

Peers and Experts

Both the second and third questions mentioned earlier will be discussed in this section, i.e., the question concerning the relationship between peer judgment and expert judgment and the question of the sorts of expertise needed for evaluating professors.

What is the relationship between peer review, evaluation, or testimony, on the one hand, and expert review, evaluation, or testimony on the other? Given the preceding discussion of possible answers to the question, "Who are

Professor X's academic peers?" it appears that this relationship will depend heavily on whatever definition of "academic peer" we have in mind. But a second factor also seems crucial. Professors serve not one, but several, functions. Although the functions differ from institution to institution, let us deal here with the three jewels of the academic Triple Crown: teaching, research or scholarship, and service. The point I wish to argue is simply that the extent to which the academic peer can be considered expert depends not only on the particular group of "peers" selected but also on the particular professorial function being evaluated.

Let us now return to each of our hypothetical answers to the question, "Who are the academic peers of Professor X?" For each group we will deal briefly with the following questions:

1. What expert knowledge could the identified group be expected to have?

2. Which of the professor's functions require for their evaluation the sort of expertise likely to be found in the peer group?

3. What needed expertise is unlikely to be found in the identified group?

Our first possible answer was the "We're all in this together" response which defined X's peers as an institution-wide set of colleagues. Does a college or university faculty have *any* common expertise? I'm not at all sure about this, but it seems to me that if an affirmative answer is to be given, it is likely to be supported by arguments pointing out that such a collection of peers will have a sympathetic understanding of the trials and tribulations of a professor's life, an appreciation of some shared academic values, an awareness of the difficulties of excelling in all professorial functions, a shared knowledge of the general institutional conditions which reinforce or discourage professorial activities, etc. It is less likely, I think, that compelling arguments can be given to support the notion that this general peer group has "expertise" in the evaluation of the three standard professorial functions.

Let us look first at scholarship/research, (the function for which, someone has said, we are granted the leisure of the theory class). Now it may be the case--indeed I think that it is--that a group of professors selected at random would be better able to judge the quality of the research of a colleague than would a group of laymen, even if the laymen were generally well-educated. But this is not so because professors are Renaissance Men (persons?), or experts in general. Rather, I think, it is because professors almost habitually engage in various forms of appeal to authority. (Is the journal in which this article appears refereed? What did reviewers say about X's book? What do X's departmental colleagues think about him? What do his colleagues in other institutions say? Does X's work seem to be compatible with what we know about his own and related fields?) Thus in the case of research/scholarship, it seems doubtful that a *general* peer group has the direct expertise to evaluate X, even though the group members *may* have expertise to identify and consult those who *do* have the expertise.

But let us turn to teaching. Although few in X's general colleague group will be fellow astronomers, most or all will be fellow teachers. Does this mean that the colleague group has the expertise to judge teaching? Given the notorious difficulties and the highly subjective nature of teacher evaluation, some may be inclined to assert either that there is no identifiable expertise to be used in evaluating teaching or that what expertise there is can be found in the general peer group.

It seems to me, however, that it *is* possible to identify appropriate, although perhaps not non-controversial, kinds of expertise for the evaluation of teaching, and it appears further that the general colleague group may not have the needed expertise. There are, of course, *some* aspects of teaching

which probably can be evaluated adequately by this group, e.g., teacher popularity and "factory virtues" such as dependability and punctuality. Students also can provide adequate evaluation of these things. But there are additional aspects of praiseworthy teaching. For example, it is likely that most of us consider knowledge of subject matter as a necessary condition. And to evaluate this, the expertise needed seems to be roughly the same as that needed to evaluate scholarship/research. Finally, and this is more controversial, I believe it possible to identify expertise in such areas as principles of teaching/learning and teaching techniques, and it is clear that simply being a teacher does not ensure such expertise.

A parallel argument can be given in terms of the service function. Although members of the general colleague group may engage in service, this fact alone does not guarantee the needed competence for the *evaluator* of service activities. Some part of the evaluation may require a particular subject matter expertise. And the evaluation of other aspects of service activities may require expertise guaranteed neither by subject matter expertise nor by the mere fact of having participated in similar activities. Members of the general colleague group simply cannot be expected to share the needed expertise for expert evaluation.

But all of this may seem a little foolish since the "We're all in this together" answer is probably much less likely in the case of evaluation of professors than are the "organizational unit" answer and the "shared expertise" answer. Let us consider these in order.

The "organizational unit" answer is that X's peers are colleagues in the department or division or other organizational unit.[2] What generalizations can be drawn relatively safely about the expertise of members of the organizational unit in evaluating the three standard aspects of the professor's work? Beginning with the research/scholarship function, it seems likely that peers in X's organizational unit will tend to have a better, and perhaps a more sympathetic, understanding of X's field than will colleagues from other organizational units. Yet "peer review" of X's scholarship by these organizational unit peers, although certainly involving some "expert review," appears likely to fall far short of being a review by "academic expertise peers."[3] (Organizational units *may* be based on common or related areas of scholarly expertise, but this is not always the case.)

In the case of the teaching function, we would again expect *some* knowledge and understanding on the part of organizational unit peers which would be superior to that which could be expected from peers in other units. They should, for example, have a better understanding of unit-specific problems and of subject-matter specific aspects of X's teaching. But beyond this the comments made about the institution-wide peer group seem to apply here as well. There may be expert teacher evaluators within the group who have direct knowledge of X's teaching, but it is unlikely that every organizational peer group member has either such expertise or such knowledge.

And does the organizational unit peer group have the expertise to judge X's service activities? It does not seem obvious that they do, for many of the same reasons that they cannot be assumed to be expert evaluators of teaching. And there may be a further problem here: in many cases, service activities are performed for an external clientele, and hence direct knowledge of the professor's service work is rare.[4]

Let us move now to the "shared expertise" peer group. This seems to be a clear case of the judgment of scholarship/research as an expert judgment. And the more subject-matter specific the definition of the peer group, the more clear it is that the judgment is an expert judgment, e.g., if the peer group for X is professors of astronomy, the judgment is more expert than if the peer group is professors of science. And to the extent that teaching and service are subject-matter specific, judgments of these functions are also more expert. But as I have tried to suggest earlier, it appears that expert evaluation of teaching and service require more than subject-matter expertise:

subject-matter expertise may be a necessary condition, but it is not sufficient. We could, for example, have a pack of competent astronomers, none of whom could either teach well or evaluate the teaching of others in any defensible way. In short, the "shared expertise" of this peer group is a shared subject-matter expertise which clearly provides expert evaluation of the research/scholarship function but promises much less in terms of expert evaluation of the other two functions.

Let us turn briefly to the "working colleague" answer, the answer which identifies Professor X's peers as those with whom X works closely and/or who are in a position which makes them especially knowledgeable about X's work. Now if this group coincides with one of the groups discussed above, e.g., the "shared expertise" group, it will share the advantages of the other group. And in addition we could expect members of the "working colleague" group to have more direct knowledge of the various aspects of Professor X's work. But the simple fact that a group of colleagues have worked closely with Professor X does not make members of the group expert in evaluating any of the three functions. Working closely with X may provide very useful information/knowledge about X's work, but such knowledge does not imply expertise in evaluating that work.

What about the "external expert" peer group? To the extent that this group constitutes an academic expertise group, it promises truly expert evaluation of X's scholarship/research.[5] And given the way "external reviewers" are generally selected and utilized, it might be clearly inappropriate even to ask for an appraisal of teaching and service, i.e., external peers as generally selected and used seldom have the direct knowledge or information needed to make a warranted appraisal of the person's teaching and service activities.

It does seem worth pointing out here that "external experts" *could* be identified by using not just the single criterion of academic expertise or reputation but *also* expertise in evaluating service and/or teaching. To put this in a slightly different way, external peers are picked because someone sees them as expert in something--they are not selected because they happen to be in some group, such as Department A. And if persons are selected on the basis of demonstrated expertise, then such selection could focus on expertise in evaluating the various professorial functions.

But what is the point of this entire section? It is simply that there is a distinction between peers and experts, that how "peer" is defined in an institution will largely determine the extent to which peer judgments are based on expertise. It also seems that the clearest instances of peers' expert judgments are those dealing with research/scholarship rather than teaching/service. And it has been suggested, although not carefully argued, that these latter functions do admit of expert evaluation even though our common identifications of peer groups do not adequately take this possibility into account.

Peers as Fair Judges

Some may grant much of what has been said above and yet argue that it is, for the most part, irrelevant. The importance of peer review or peer evaluation, they may say, is not so much that it provides expert appraisal but that peers are in a position to judge fairly. And intuitively, this seems, to make a great deal of sense. Some of the "peer groups" discussed earlier may have little to say as experts and yet may be excellent candidates for the "fair judge" role, e.g., an institution-wide group of colleagues or the close-working colleagues of the professor to be evaluated. This "fair judge" notion also reinforces the earlier statement about who should *not* evaluate professors, i.e., professors should be judged by their peers, not by those external to the enterprise. And what is required, it might be argued, is not narrow sorts of expertise but a general understanding and appreciation of the academic life.

But let us examine at least some aspects of the "peer as fair judge" a little further. I suspect that in many of our discussions about peer review/evaluation we rely at least in part on a legal metaphor.[6] Perhaps a brief examination of some aspects of this metaphor is in order here.

Taking one layman's not-too-well-informed view of the jury trial as a "trial by peers," suggests some interesting parallels with the academic review/evaluation process and some interesting differences. Among the differences is the fact that the legal presumption of innocence until adjudged guilty in a criminal trial does not translate into "competent until adjudged otherwise" in the academic review process. In *some* cases of academic review this may be assumed, but often it is the competence which has to be exhibited. In still other cases the review group may assume neither.[7] Another obvious difference, I hope, is that when a professor is being evaluated, there is no charge of wrong-doing.

One similarity between trial by jury and peer evaluation is that the jury, like the peer review group, is not necessarily expected to be composed of experts in any technical sense.[8] A second similarity is that the academic review group, like the jury, is generally expected to take into account any and all relevant expert testimony. A third similarity is that both jury and academic review group are to make a judgment, to render verdicts. And certainty is not a mark of judgments. If a jury judges that the prosecution has not proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, this does not entail certainty that the defendant did *not* commit the crime. If a jury judges the defendant guilty, this entails a stronger claim (no *reasonable* doubt exists), but it is still less than certainty. Now with academic judgments, because of their very nature, the judgments may fall even shorter of certainty.

And now what seems to me to be an interesting point. In the jury trial we ideally begin with jurors whose minds have not been made up. We attempt to exclude both those convinced of innocence and those convinced of guilt. Indeed it could be argued that the desirable jury is one that is, at the outset, ignorant of the particular case. Now we seldom do this with academic evaluations. Indeed our academic "juries" seem frequently to be composed of those who are closest to the person, those most likely to have made up their minds, those most influenced by "pre-trial" publicity, experience, etc. Now I'm not sure what should be made of this. Should we, for example, attempt to have "impartial" academic review groups in the same sense that juries are expected to be impartial? Should we develop a system whereby members of the review group are subject to challenge just as are prospective jurors? Should members of a "review board" attempt to remain ignorant until the review process begins? Most of these things seem to me to make little sense in the academic review process.

There is another way of viewing the preceding point. It is that the "open-mindedness" criterion *does* make sense and is generally followed in the academic review process, but may not appear to be followed because we fail to mark a distinction between the "academic review process" and the "formal academic decision-making process." For example, we can and should expect open-mindedness of one another when a junior colleague joins a faculty. The academic review process could be said to begin at that time, and may culminate in the formal tenure-review decision process. Now different persons may of course become convinced at different points in the process just as jurors become convinced at different points in the jury trial. Although we can expect both to continue to weigh evidence, to be willing to entertain doubts, etc., until the final decision is to be made, we would not expect them to remain ignorant throughout. The point here is simply that one's colleagues may be in the process of judging him for a long time prior to a peer review decision-making process. And of course if it can be shown that a person was not open-minded even at the outset, perhaps we should then find a way to disqualify him.[9]

In short, even a brief examination shows that there are both similarities and differences between the legal notion of "trial by a jury of peers" and the academic notion of "professional evaluation by peers." The legal analogy is used appropriately to suggest hypotheses about judging professors, but these hypotheses are to be checked out in the academy, not just in the courts.

Peers as Experts and Peers as Judges

Let us look again, in summary fashion, at the relationship between "peer as expert" and "peer as fair judge." The following points seem to be in order. First, as we tend to use the term "peer review" in higher education, it is ambiguous, sometimes meaning "peer as expert" in the narrow sense of specific academic expertise and sometimes meaning "peer as fair judge" where "fair judge" is defined as a relatively knowledgeable academic colleague who does not necessarily share a specific academic expertise. Perhaps even more common is the tendency to identify as the "peer group" a collection of varying membership, some fellow experts and some colleagues who do not share the academic expertise of the person being judged. Now this may work fairly well since it provides for some "expert testimony" as well as some judgments based on a broader view. But the two sorts of judgments may remain undifferentiated, and this seems to invite certain problems.

First, it results in a single judgment, the basis of which may be quite unclear, especially to the person being judged. Second, some persons may fail to recognize that they are in a position where they can, and perhaps should, perform two functions rather than one, i.e., they can themselves provide specific expert testimony and also judge the person based on the total expert testimony. Third, different sorts of "expert testimony" may be relevant but incomplete. To put this another way, our most common notion of academic expertise has to do with scholarly or subject-matter expertise. Now it is at least conceivable that there is also expert knowledge about such things as teaching and service--expertise which is not a necessary part of subject-matter expertise. (Although subject-matter expertise may well be necessary for the evaluation of these functions.) Experts in these matters are less likely to be included in the judgment process than are the subject-matter experts. It may be argued, of course, that these areas are dealt with adequately by the "fair judges," but it is nevertheless the case that expert testimony could be used here but is less likely than is the testimony of subject-matter experts.

Now perhaps we should mention that just as the "fair judge" may not be the expert, the expert may not be the "fair judge," i.e., his expertise may equip him to judge fairly those matters about which he is an expert; but the general judgment of competence, merit, etc., is not about those matters alone. And the expert may lack the experience or understanding to fairly judge the other matters. An example of this would be the "external" expert, the subject-matter peer from some other campus. This external expert may know nothing of the particular teaching and service contexts within which the person to be judged works. Indeed it is conceivable that, although the person to be judged is to be judged on teaching, service, and research, the subject-matter experts who are used to judge the research may not themselves engage in either service or teaching. In such a case it hardly seems that the experts are in the position to judge fairly the *total* question of the professor's competence.

In summary, most of us believe that a central part of the evaluation of professors should be evaluation by peers. Our practices, however, suggest that we are less than clear on the matter of the extent to which we want our peers to be experts and the extent to which we expect peers to function as fair judges. And it is not that we need one rather than the other. I hope that it is clear by now that I believe that we need much more "expert evaluation" or "expert testimony" than we generally use--expert testimony which includes subject-matter expertise and also expertise in the areas of teaching and service. And I hope that it is equally clear that I believe we need fair judges. What we should avoid, it seems to me, is both expertise at the

expense of fairness and fair judges in the absence of expert testimony. Judgments which are informed but unfair and judgments by those who judge fairly but are uninformed seem equally pernicious. We need fair judges who give proper attention to expert testimony. This is a great deal to require of professors as they judge their colleagues, but anything less than this will render suspicious claims that professorial evaluation is at its best evaluation by peers.

NOTES

1. My concern here is with the academic aspects of evaluation. I recognize that there may be instances when some non-academic criteria may be important and that peers may not be in the best position to develop or apply these criteria, e.g., budget considerations. I think we should be concerned, however, about instances where such considerations are allowed to replace appropriate academic criteria. For example, if three persons in a department are recommended for promotion and one of the three is told that he/she cannot be promoted simply because funds available will allow only two promotions, the needed academic evaluation appears lacking. Budget may dictate that only two of the three can be promoted, but *which* two of the three should be promoted seems to me to be a decision which could and should be made on academic grounds.

2. We should note here that the group selected by this criterion may be the same as the group identified by the "shared expertise" criterion. This is probably most likely at larger institutions *or* when shared expertise is broadly defined, e.g., professors of science. In many cases, however, it is likely that some persons in the organizational unit will share X's field of academic expertise while others will not.

3. This is not to say that the organizational unit peers do not have academic expertise equivalent to that of the person being reviewed; it is only to assert that the academic expertise of the evaluators is likely to be expertise on matters somewhat different from those in which the person evaluated is expert.

4. There is another problem here since the definition of "service activities" seems generally much less precise than that of teaching or scholarship/research. What counts as "service" may be more institution specific or organizational-unit specific than all teaching and research.

5. I am not talking here about simply having friends at other institutions. Too often, it seems to me, external evaluation becomes a farce because that evaluation is done by having the person being evaluated select the persons who are to do the evaluation.

6. I am concerned, as are many others, both about an uncritical use of the legal metaphor in discussions about higher education and about the willy-nilly transplatation of legal procedures into academic institutions. In occasional wild day-dreams during committee meetings I have envisaged a future higher education in which there would be no contact between faculty and students, in which all interaction and communication would take place between our lawyers and their lawyers.

7. This needs further examination. It is not the *jury* that is to presume innocence; it is that the *proceedings* are to presume innocence, that what must be demonstrated is guilt rather than innocence. The jury is to decide on this, but if the jury members were really to presume *either* innocence or guilt they might be disqualified for this reason alone.

8. Indeed peer review in colleges and universities, no matter *how* peers are defined, is likely to be more expert in a technical sense than trial by jury. Peers in the academic review are almost always other academics. (I recognize that students, administrators, and alumni may be involved in academic review, but they are not generally considered peers.) And it is simply not the case that in our courts plumbers must be tried by other plumbers, accountants by other accountants, or thieves by other thieves. To put this another way, in the academic enterprise our notion of judgment by peers seems not just to honor the legal notion of "peer" but to surpass it.

9. It seems to me that there are such cases. Some faculty members may hold that everyone should be granted tenure that everyone is meritorious in his/her own way, etc. Others may be prejudiced against all those in certain fields or to all of certain ideological persuasions, etc.

RESPONSE TO GERALD REAGAN: PEERS AND COLLEAGUES

Keith L. Raitz
University of Louisville

In their book entitled *Higher Education as a Field of Study*, Paul Dressel and Lewis Mayhew write, "Philosophy has contributed virtually nothing to the understanding of higher education; indeed, only one or two philosophers have actively cultivated the field."[1] The metaphor troubles me slightly, but I bring this unfortunate lack of philosophical inquiry to your attention only to say that it's good to see Jerry Reagan out working in the field, clearing away the underbrush in peer review, plowing new furrows in peer evaluation, and separating the wheat from the chaff in peer judgment, as it were. It is truly unfortunate that more of us in philosophy of education have not joined Jerry in doing the chores of examining the concepts, claims, and issues in higher education. Jerry's paper, I hope, will encourage more educational philosophers to direct their energies toward higher education, where philosophical inquiry is so badly needed. Now to Jerry's paper.

It seems to me that what Jerry has to say in his paper is deceptively complex. If I understand his argument correctly, it goes something like this: Only a peer can perform a peer review; however, peers are not necessarily experts, and experts are not necessarily peers. Still, recognizing that there are many ways to be a peer and many ways to be an expert, it seems possible to identify a class of expert peers, or peer experts, although the members of this class will not necessarily be fair judges. Ideally, we are after the fair, expert, peer judge, although such a person would be rare indeed. In all likelihood, the best we can do is to make sure that everyone participating in the review process is able to distinguish clearly between the function of the expert and that of the fair judge.

Jerry's conclusions seem to be sound advice: We should distinguish clearly between expert testimony and the function of the expert, on the one hand, and fairness and the function of the fair judge, on the other; and we should at all costs avoid "expertise at the expense of fairness" as well as the use of fair judges who function without expert testimony. However, although I applaud Jerry's work and endorse his conclusions, I want to raise a few questions about some of the things he does--or, I should say, some of the things he fails to do--along the way to his conclusions.

Let me begin with a small thing that Jerry fails to do. I wish he had said more about the "three jewels of the academic Triple Crown." I am sure that he means to poke fun at the tired old categories of teaching, research, and service--considering the hyperbole in his metaphor. But then he goes on to use them and, I must assume, to take them seriously during the rest of his paper. It strikes me that this is what we all do in higher education. We are all aware (or should be) that, although all distinctions break down, these involving teaching, research, and service all but disintegrate when they are applied to faculty members in today's colleges and universities. We do research about teaching itself and put it under the category of teaching at the University of Louisville. We also teach about research, and we teach and do research as services. Moreover, because some of the things we do fit none of the three categories, assigning our activities to one category or another is very often an exercise in arbitrariness. We know it. But we do it nevertheless. Perhaps I am wrong in faulting Jerry, though; at least he makes fun of the categorization. Too many of us reserve our most respectful tones when we invoke the Trinity.

A second thing Jerry fails to do, I believe, is to make a distinction between a peer and a colleague. Now "colleague" is a high-sounding word we use instead of "fellow worker" or "associate." For example, I might introduce a person who has been newly appointed to the department as "my colleague, Dr. Smith," or as "Dr. Jones, my new colleague in the Foundations Department."

In this way, perhaps, I attempt to make the new person feel good about belonging to the department. However, when I have occasion to introduce the member of the department who is universally respected at the university, I introduce him as "my good friend and colleague, Dr. So-and-so," hoping to bask in the sunlight of his presence even if it is only reflected sunlight. Now, the point I want to make is that in neither introduction would I introduce the person as my peer: to do so would be to give more credit to the unproven Jones and Smith than they deserve and, in the case of the respected Dr. So-and-so, to elevate myself unjustly to his status.

The problem, of course, is that "peer" implies "equal," whereas "colleague" does not. This is also shown by the fact that "senior colleague" and "junior colleague" are common and acceptable uses, but "senior peer" and "junior peer" are not. If "senior" and "junior" refer to rank, as they do when they are joined with "colleague," then it is a contradiction to use "senior peer" and "junior peer." It is also obvious that if I am in a department having five other faculty members, then necessarily I have five colleagues even though I may have no departmental peers.

I mention the distinction between peers and colleagues because it seems to me that sometimes Jerry is discussing colleagues and other times he is discussing peers. Unfortunately, he uses the word "peer" almost exclusively throughout the discussion, a use which helps to obscure the fact that in some cases we want *colleagues* to review a candidate for promotion or tenure, knowing full well that they are *not* peers in some important respect. For example, the senior faculty (probably the tenured ones) are frequently called upon to evaluate the performance of their junior colleague who is seeking promotion or tenure. We normally do not have a junior professor's peers in rank, i.e., other junior faculty members, evaluate his performance.[2] And, by definition, the senior faculty members cannot be peers of the junior faculty member with respect to rank. There is a sense, however, in which the senior members may be called peers of the junior member; but in this sense, which I shall turn to presently, the senior members represent only a subset of the junior member's peers.

If I am right so far, then Jerry is probably overworking the word "peer" in his paper. He is making it do more work than was ever intended for it by those of us in higher education who use such phrases as "peer review," "peer evaluation," and so on. As Jerry suggests in his paper, however, the use of "peer" by higher education faculty is largely unexamined. What might we have in mind when we use the word "peer?"

Granted that the notion of a peer entails the notion of equality, if two people were to be peers in every respect, then I would say they would have to be clones. Usually, when we use the word "peer," we use it eliptically: we actually mean "peer with respect to x," x being some single quality or characteristic. The question, then, is, What quality or characteristic do we have in mind when we talk about peers in higher education? In the remainder of my response, I will consider three candidates for x which Jerry suggests in his paper. What I hope to show is that the best candidate for x is one that Jerry seems to think is least appropriate. In other words, I will argue that we're all in this together.

First, I want to consider the "organizational unit answer" or, more specifically, a possible variation of this answer that seems to be commonly found in practice, namely, the answer that identifies one's peers as the tenured members of the organizational unit who have equal or higher rank. The respect in which these people are equal to a candidate for promotion or tenure is that they "belong equally" to the same organizational unit; most of these people probably will not be peers with respect to rank and/or tenure. We ought to recognize this fact because it is important to ask why they should not be peers in rank and tenure. The answer, I suppose, is that we mean to include as reviewers those people who have themselves been judged competent and deserving of tenure or promotion; and we mean to exclude those people who have not formally been so judged. (I say "formally" because there are ways

for a junior faculty member to be judged informally by his colleagues and as a result of such informal judgment to be allowed to participate in the review process in the capacity of a reviewer. For example, a junior faculty member may be elected to the college personnel committee by his colleagues because of their judgment that he is competent to make the necessary decisions.) The point is that, although we talk about peer review, there is a sense in which we do not want peers to make judgments. We want the best people to be judges. And, because of an interesting quirk of logic, the best people cannot qualify as peers of a candidate for promotion or tenure until the candidate is certified to be among the best himself, i.e., until a positive decision has been made regarding his promotion or tenure.[3]

Next, I want to consider Jerry's "'external expert' answer," which, it seems to me, can be viewed in the same way as the "organizational unit answer." The external expert who is asked to judge the work of a candidate for promotion or tenure is a peer of the candidate only in the sense that he is "equally in" the same subject matter field as the candidate. Being an expert, though, he cannot be a peer of the candidate with respect to subject matter expertise, which is unproven in the case of the candidate. Again, we want the best people to make the needed judgments regarding the candidate's subject matter competence, and it seems that those people cannot be peers with respect to the expertise they are evaluating.

Now where does all this leave us? One interpretation is that, aside from the fact that we have organizational and subject matter colleagues, we are all peerless. This interpretation may please some people. There is a better one, however, and it first occurred to me when I was reading Jerry's discussion of the legal analogy. Jerry is right; there are many interesting parallels between the jury trial as a "trial by peers" and the academic peer review process. One parallel that Jerry did not mention may help to understand the notion of peer in peer review.

The sense in which members of a jury are peers of the accused person is that they are "equal before the law." Part of the meaning of this phrase, I take it, is that they have the same rights and duties and are subject to the same general process of review and judgment as the accused person.

At this point, without further study, I do not know whether I want to claim that this notion of "equal before the law" *is* intended by those who use the phrase "peer review" or that it *ought* to be. The safest course, I suppose, is to claim that it makes a lot of sense. For if the peer group for purposes of peer review is identified as that containing all faculty members who have the same rights and duties and who are subject to the same general process of review and judgment, then a group of *potential* reviewers is identified. We may want to exclude some peers or some groups of peers from participation in the academic reivew process for many reasons that we believe ought to disqualify them. Nevertheless, those who are not excluded will be peers in the sense being discussed. Perhaps they would be the best peers; possibly they would be fair judges and experts. If they were not experts, however, they would be able to make the distinction that Jerry has drawn for us, that is, they would seek expert testimony. Whether the expert is a peer seems irrelevant to me. I am more concerned with his expertise than with whether he is subject to the same process of review and judgment as university professors. It is at least conceivable that experts may be found outside the university. Moreover, they might have the advantages of impartiality and fresh perspective.

I will conclude by saying that, if we are to take seriously the word "peer" in "peer review," then we probably ought to understand it in the sense I have discussed in the paragraph above. It is true: we are all in this together. Although this fact is often used as an excuse for back scratching and other similar kinds of disreputable practices, it may also be thought of as a good reason for demanding the very best of our peers.[4]

NOTES

1. Paul Dressel and Lewis Mayhew, *Higher Education as a Field of Study* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1974), p. 100.

2. I mean that we do not have junior faculty members as a group evaluate another junior faculty member who is being considered for promotion or tenure. It is true, of course, that a junior faculty member may sit on a school or college personnel committee and from such a position be asked to pass judgment on another junior faculty member.

3. I am speaking here about being certified via the formal procedures we have in higher education for determining who is and who is not worthy of tenure and promotion. That is not to say that some of these decisions are not made *pro forma*.

4. In this paper I have tried to determine the intentions of those people who use the word "peer" in higher education; primarily, I have tried to determine who is meant to be included in the peer group. It occurs to me, however, that the word "peer" may be used, not so much because of who it includes, but because it obviously excludes certain kinds of people from the process whereby professors are evaluated.

PART II

PAPERS DELIVERED AT THE GENERAL SESSIONS

OBLIGATIONS OF THE TEACHER OF ETHICS

Bernard Rosen
Ohio State University

At one level most people agree that there are many goals in teaching ethics. In different sorts of courses some of these are emphasized over others; what is emphasized in an advanced ethical theory course should be different from what is emphasized in a medical ethics course taught to medical students. In turn, what is taught in primary and secondary schools cannot be what is taught in universities. Perhaps adult and professional groups are from yet another distinct category which has its own characteristic concerns that require a different curriculum. In this paper 'student' is a general term; it applies to anyone who receives instruction--in this instance moral or ethical theory instruction.

For a realistic assessment of the goals of teaching ethics, multiplicity is necessary. On the other hand, if we are to plan how we are to achieve the goals of teaching ethics, it helps to have a small number of goals before us. In what follows, I shall try to draw attention to some common elements shared by many goals. This is not, it should be emphasized, to suggest that the teaching of ethics is to be "reduced" to the few elements discussed or that other elements are to be ignored. The fewer elements are to be tools that will enable us better to handle the multiplicity of elements and make use of common elements in different teaching contexts.

As a first step in stating the goals the following four are offered. These are suggested by a reading of Derek Bok's article in *Change*, "Can Ethics Be Taught,"[1] and from the Hastings "Proposal to the Carnegie Corporation for the project on the Teaching of Ethics."[2]

1. Expose students to rigorous means of examining moral problems and and the judgments concerning them.

2. Provide students a means of arriving at moral judgments concerning personal moral problems.

3. Provide students a means of arriving at moral judgments concerning problems they will encounter in their present or future professions or roles.

4. Increase the likelihood of action on the basis of moral judgments, whether personal or professional, once those judgments are arrived at.

Before anyone has time to wonder, what some of the crucial terms in this shortened list mean, let me risk putting you further off balance by cutting this short list in half. After that, though, I promise to begin explaining what is set out so baldly.

1. Means: Provide a general means each person can use to arrive at justified moral judgments; a means applicable to personal and professional moral problems.

2. Action. Use a strategy of teaching that makes likely action on the basis of the decisions arrived at.

In (1) are included, I think, the concerns of (1) - (3) as provided on the first list. In addition, though, something that is only implicit, the requirement that it be the *student's* means, is made explicit. One desirable result of education, in whatever area and whatever the subject, is the dispensability of the teacher. We want the *student* to be able to function, whatever the function is, without the aid of the teacher. Henceforth this will be referred to as the dispensability criterion.

We need now to present a fuller explanation of the categories and to show their relation to the goals of teaching ethics as conceived in their multiplicity.

Some might claim that we can avoid providing students with a general means for arriving at justified moral judgments by using the case method. We can, so the suggestion goes, examine a number of problems, work out specific solutions to those problems, and then stop. We do not, on this view, consider theoretical ethics--talking about the categorical imperative, the original position or whatever is presently turning philosophers on. Instead we just "see" what is right after examining a certain number of cases.

There is a problem with this method, though the problem does not prevent it from being successful, even given the previously stated goals of ethics. It is difficult to believe that we think that arriving at moral judgments is like sexing chicks or tasting wine. Such enterprises have, I suppose, a subject matter that is so basic or simple that no cognitive instruction can be given. Cognitive instruction makes use of a series of procedures, in a step by step fashion, arriving finally at the result. Here, it is supposed, we have only one step--a "taking in" of the problem or viewing of the situation, and then the judgment on the basis of it. In this approach, we apprentice the willing student and hope that under correction s/he will finally be able to do what we do.

Fortunately, or unfortunately, ethics seems not to be a simple subject matter. This is not only because it is sometimes difficult to reach a decision, for that may be true of tasting a glass of wine or checking out a chick. There are arguments and reasons that are relevant for supporting moral judgments, which arguments are of many different types. While we may be able to use the same kind of arguments when we talk about abortion and euthanasia, we apparently need a different set when we talk about the moral problems in business and government.

If the case method is used, I maintain, we must supplement it with some instruction about what we are looking at and what we are looking for. This method is often used with spectacular success in teaching ethics as well as law and medicine. It can even work without the instructor's drawing attention to general features or developing a general strategy. This is due, I suggest, to the difficult to resist tendency of human beings to generalize. This is a tendency that small children exhibit when all adults are "mother." However, it is when we *restrict* our generalizations, not when we simply generalize, that we have the greatest success. When we teach ethics most would agree that it is best not to trust that students, by themselves, will arrive at the proper generalizations or method that will enable them successfully to arrive at justified moral judgments.

It has been supposed in this discussion that some moral judgments are justified and others are not. Should this not be so, much of the concern in teaching ethics would disappear. To say that a judgment is justified is not, of course, to say what its justification is. Such a concern is certainly of great interest, especially to philosophers. Here, the claim that some moral judgments are justified should be taken to be the same kind of claim about justification as is usually made in any other area. When we say that the diagnostic claim, "this person has Hodgkins disease," is correct we do not mean that the physician has infallibly reached a conclusion. We do not mean that other opinions should not be checked or that we ourselves are immune from doubt. We do suppose that a group of persons similarly equipped and trained will arrive at a similar judgment--whether moral or medical, whether legal or economic. There is, as we know, disagreement in all areas. We do not let the disagreement stop us from making judgments and acting on them, for the needs, again, whether medical or moral, are frequently pressing. We do our best, gather what evidence we can, consult others when it seems necessary, and then go ahead. This is the kind of justification we are (or should be) satisfied with in morality. The more interesting purely philosophical question of the nature of justification will not be taken up.

Some might think that we can escape the question of justified judgments and how to arrive at them by sticking to practical matters. According to this view one does not study ethics at all, nor does one present reasons that apply to particular instances. Rather, one studies with a master who makes judgments in particular circumstances. The master does not discuss how this is done in terms of the subject matter, though it is common to discuss one's state of mind when making judgments. The strategies, if there are any, concern how to put oneself into a certain state, not any information about the subject matter. After a time the apprentice arrives at the same judgments as the master and is declared to be a journeyman. It does sometimes happen, in some traditions, that after this stage the master tells the student more about how the judgments are arrived at.

There are philosophers, not all Buddhists, who hold a view something like this. We all probably know persons who accept a view very much like it. One of the problems with this view is that it goes contrary to the view that judgments should be checkable within a community of rational inquirers. Most of us do not advocate that people, whether in the role of physician or citizen, submit to the expertise of a person or authority on moral matters. This may indeed be an end of Buddhism, but it is not one of our ends. Most of us, in short, disagree with the Buddhist about the value of individuals making their own judgments. In most instances we suppose people should rely primarily on their own resources in arriving at moral judgments. This is a judgment, a moral judgment of sorts, made here. It has been defended in a variety of ways by philosophers, but it will be assumed here without argument.

The historical method is frequently used in teaching ethics. One way to use this method is to expose students to methods of moral reasoning presented by various thinkers and have them pick one as their own. Most people pick from one of the following: Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Hobbes, Kant, Mill, Ross, Dewey, and Moore. This is not a bad method because in a particular instance, no matter which author we choose as guide, we are very likely to arrive at the same decision. (This is not surprising; most competitors on a final list can handle most problems. Think of the geocentric and heliocentric theories as a clear example.) When this method is used we often forget that the choice of who is put on the list is important. If it contained Chairman Mao, Ayn Rand, Adolph Hitler, and Richard Nixon, we would have severe doubts about its usefulness. When we make up such a list we have some responsibility to the students to indicate why we have chosen these authors and not those. When we meet that responsibility we are attempting at the same time to meet the criterion of dispensability. In order to make ourselves dispensable, we want students to know not just the "correct" method, but we want them to have a good idea of *why* that is the method that is being recommended.

This is an appropriate place to say more about dispensability, for I claim it is one of the aims of teaching anything and is presented here as a very important aim of teaching ethics. The highest state of dispensability is reached when your student not only does not need you to reach justified judgments, but does not need you to suggest the method that is used to reach justified judgments. Accomplishing dispensability is recommended here most strongly. Following this, one teaches students how to find an ethical theory that will enable them to choose a moral judgment in particular circumstances. This method can't be used if you think of the student as studying under the master, whether you consider the ethical theory or the means whereby one chooses the ethical theory.

Some of you at this point, the philosophically inclined, I suspect, will be a bit annoyed. "Look," such persons are apt to say, "you can teach a theory or you can teach students how to pick out a theory. What you can't do is teach them to pick out the theory that is best for picking out theories. Even if you did that, since your requirement seems to be that they do it themselves, this seems to commit you to some regress of methods. The teaching of ethics would never get started let alone be finished." I must confess to guilt concerning the method for picking out theories. I assume that we all agree to consistency, the requirement that any theory not reject most of the

specific judgments we hold (Slavery is wrong, being unkind on the whole is bad, etc.), that the theory be usable, and so on. When I teach, those who might have different criteria for choosing theories are urged in class to put them forward so that we might consider them. If someone does have a different criterion I try to show an overlap agreement to reach whatever decision about theory is required. This has always turned out to be adequate.

It is relatively easy to disagree fruitfully with philosophers about what test to use for ethical theories, for the moves in the game are fairly well-known. On the other hand, it is easier to get on with non-philosophers because they almost always are more reasonable than philosophers in what will count as a test of theories.

This is a good place to consider other objections. We often hear people in the professions say things such as: "We are practical people who have truth to impart, but philosophers do not. Philosophers are still arguing about the problems they were arguing about twenty-five hundred years ago, whereas physicians and physicists have rejected many views and accepted many others." However, there are some problems that physicians and physicists are arguing about now that they were arguing about twenty-five hundred years ago. Philosophers too are in general agreement about many things, but there are always some who disagree.

It is now much more common for the sciences to be taught in the way most philosophy courses have been taught for twenty-five hundred years. Instead of trying simply to impart what you think is true, you try to teach students the methods for arriving at whatever is true. Among other things this method is much more likely, finally, to uncover the truth, whatever it is, because we are likely to increase the number of persons looking for it.

In a democratic society we suppose that political decisions are not the province of experts, that all people are capable of making such decisions. It is a collective decision on a large number of important matters that determines what policy is to be adopted, what official selected, and so on. Teaching enough ethical theory to allow each person to select the method or theory that will enable that person to reach justified judgment is another instance of that kind of reasoning. This kind of reasoning is not to be adopted because it is another instance, but it and democratic political decision-making are both instances of calling upon everyone to enter into the decision-making. As Mill pointed out in *On Liberty*, the value of persons both to themselves and to society is increased insofar as they are capable of making decisions on their own.

So far only the first general category, the general means each person is to use to arrive at justified moral judgments, has been covered. The means should, according to the view here presented, allow the student to pick out the theory or general method that will enable him/her to arrive at the specific judgments in specific situations. If one should accept this goal, it would require that any teaching of teachers should produce teachers competent to carry this out. Such competence, in turn, would require that any teacher of ethics, applied or otherwise, have a firm grounding in ethical theory. The part of ethical theory instruction that is most important is the one that concerns choosing the best ethical theory. (If you don't like to call this ethical theory, by the way, call it meta-philosophy or philosophy of method. It is not, though, meta-ethics as usually practiced by philosophers.)

The second item on the short list is *action*--the aim of working out a strategy of teaching that will make likely action on the basis of whatever decision is arrived at. A preliminary problem with action is that students, in contrast now with adults, frequently believe they will act in certain ways on the basis of decisions when we are certain they won't. The following is a common occurrence. "Well," I say to an eager college student, "a consequence of your adopting this form of ethical egoism is that if you would benefit to the tune of $ .25 by killing your mother and you had good evidence you would get away with it, then your obligation is to kill your mother. Doesn't this

show that your view is deficient?" The student frequently responds, "No, it just shows that I have an obligation to do my mother in. If I thought I could get away with it I would do it." Since many students in class are at this point nodding agreement with our budding Raskolnikov I have to take this seriously and move on to some other proposed counter example. However, it shows that for some students there is no such thing as a *reductio* for they are willing to embrace any consequence no matter how much it seems to the rest of us that the student will never act in the way the theory requires.

This phenomenon is explained, in large part, by the excessively theoretical framework in which the teaching of ethics occurs in most philosophy departments. This is a complaint made by those who teach applied ethics from other areas--a complaint that is generally justified. How is this kind of problem to be overcome, whether in philosophy departments or by those who accept the desirability, as argued in the first part of this paper, of teaching students enough theory to pick the one they will use in arriving at singular moral judgments? A variety of techniques, each having some success, can be used.

One can show students (of almost all ages but especially from high school age on) that they have theoretical positions and that they use those positions in making decisions. The first part of this task can be accomplished by using questionnaires that deal with various theories and ask for judgments about specific situations. One can use some of the existing questionnaires or devise a new one. (I have made a recent contribution to this area, a questionnaire is to be found in the first chapter of my recently published *Strategies of Ethics*, Houghton Mifflin.) Students are impressed by statistics from their own class showing agreements and disagreements on a variety of theoretical and practical questions. The statistics provide a common framework with which to begin discussion of theoretical questions and, if you design the questions well, of the relevant practical questions.

One of the difficulties of teaching ethics to students in secondary school and college is that they are unclear about actually having a moral life, that they make moral judgments and act on them. It is sometimes a shock to students to find that they morally disapprove of certain laws, actions of the government or to find they have set certain goals for themselves and have ways of acting they value and others they morally condemn. This is important to show, for otherwise students tend to think of morality as something done by "society" (the "others") and that they themselves just live. What problems you should discuss to get through the barrier of non-involvement depends on the students you have. Marijuana laws are a sure-fire source of moral indignation on the part of high school students and college undergraduates, and laws restricting the sale and consumption of pornography are reliable standbys.

What a good first step in making action on the basis of decisions more likely is to show students they have theoretical and practical positions, we certainly don't want to leave it at that. The reason is that the unreflective positions that enable them to arrive at the decisions and then to act are usually inadequate for the difficult problems that one faces in the professions and at crucial points in personal affairs. This inadequacy may come out in the questionnaire, but it may not.

As a supplement to the questionnaire and to revealing already existing involvement, here are four more suggestions. First, use fiction that sets up moral problems in an engaging manner. It is fortunate that humans do not have to be starved to realize the danger of starvation. We can make plans to secure a steady supply of food and escape starvation without the experience of starving. We can do the same thing for moral problems. We can read about fictional persons, those who are made to seem real and with whom we can identify, who have moral problems. Our moral education can take a giant step when we realize Yossarian in *Catch 22* could be us or that perhaps we suffer from Portnoy's complaint. Such works of fiction allow us to address moral problems in a realistic way because of the author's skill in making them appear real. Of course, many do not accept the reality of moral problems, or any problems, until the problems are upon them. Witness the present energy crisis, the balance of payments problem, and the high accidental death rate among teenagers.

Second, one can talk about actual moral problems that occur in that very teaching setting. "What shall we do with cheaters in this class?" "Suppose someone does not meet deadlines; shall we accept the papers and grade them without penalty?" "For this group topic should we assign the same grade (given to the group report) to everyone or should each member of the group grade each other member to add to the grading input?" Depending on the kind of course you teach, you can start a lively discussion on such questions. If you raise the questions at the beginning of the term and cannot reach a collective decision, that would show that you need a more "powerful" decision-making process. This, you can point out, is just what the course or this segment of it is intended to provide. If you do this, you had better be prepared to return to those same questions at the end of the term or face a revolt.

Third, there are a number of standard or recurring problems in every professional area, and equally standard problems that arise for all human beings. These problems, e.g., abortion, choosing between things that please you and those that please others, can be presented in fictional readings, in nonfiction reports, as a result of your presentation or as a result of field work. One technique that usually works is to choose a problem that is remote in time or space, e.g., slavery in the U.S. or the War in Vietnam, and then move closer to our time and location. These problems, e.g., what to do about someone known to be selling small amounts of marijuana or the faculty member who smokes in the *no smoking* classroom, are more difficult to solve.

Finally, one can use some kind of group discussion that involves students without the direct participation of the instructor. You can choose an actual moral problem about which there is disagreement in the class and instruct each side to present to the other the strongest case for their position. A few rounds of argumentation, where the teacher supervises and perhaps evaluates the quality of each side's arguments, is very helpful in showing the need for a method that will help in arriving at moral decisions.

What does this have to do with action? The general strategy of making action more likely is to make the students decide and to make more real the subject matter on which the decision is made. This sort of problem, action on judgments, is a problem not just in ethics but in all areas. It is a problem for those who have decided to lose weight and perhaps find themselves munching potato chips while watching TV. It is a problem for those who resolve to quit smoking and then "give in." What do we do in those areas? We ask our friends to help us; we join with others who hold the same kinds of views, remind ourselves of our determination and decision, and other such things. Whatever we do in those areas, we do them in ethics.

Will a course in nutrition or its equivalent lead medical students to eat better? Usually it does. Just as we find that dentists generally have well-cared for teeth, that philosophers reason correctly (except when they defend their pet theories), and that economists can balance their checkbooks. We should expect that learning more about some area will make action on the basis of decisions in that area more likely. We achieve this to a higher degree when those who make the decisions carry the means for making the decisions with them rather than when they carry only the decisions. (This brings us back to dispensability as a goal of teaching ethics.)

Suppose we have students with mistaken views? Do we want such students to act on the basis of their mistaken views? The likelihood of persons' acting on non-mistaken views is increased when we meet the dispensability test, not decreased. There are just as many professionals and philosophers as trainees with mistaken moral ideas. If we allow students to become the recipients of whatever theory the teacher imposes, we are going to find that the students act on the basis of that theory. One hopes there are few Hitlers around, but there are, no doubt, those whose moral views are equally dangerous. We minimize that danger if each student is taught to arrive at decisions concerning which *theory* or general means to accept.

A few concluding remarks will focus on what I consider to be some remaining problems. There is no guarantee with any method of teaching that we will reach the goals of imparting a means that allows the teacher to be dispensable and of making action likely on the basis of the decisions reached. With a talented teacher the worst method may succeed--even concerning the goals set out here. For undergraduates it is my view that a theoretical component is necessary, though if you teach say, medical ethics, a practitioner in the area is not. For teaching in professional schools, I think that a practitioner is indispensable, but until the practitioners become better trained in learning how to become dispensable, philosophers are indispensable.

NOTES

1. Derek C. Bok, "Can Ethics Be Taught," *Change*, October, 1976, pp. 26-30.

2. This is a proposal for funding a project submitted to the Carnegie Corporation. It may not be generally available, but no one need read it to follow what I say. I wanted to indicate my debt to those who wrote the document, though I may have gotten them completely wrong. So, the positions presented are suggested by this and other documents, but, as usual, I take full responsibility.

WE CAN'T LEAVE MORALITY TO THE EXPERTS

Clinton Collins
University of Kentucky

A Word About What Moral Education Is

Moral education is probably the basic form of commerce between people, the hidden agenda of all our social relationships. It is evident both in our concern for how to get others to coordinate their actions with our own and in our wish to know what others expect of us. The agenda of moral education is generally hidden out of fear that the learner's awareness that our lesson is a moral one will bring about his resistance to the message.

It is a long-standing phenomenon of human culture that most moral lessons are not explicitly presented as such. William S. Gilbert puts in the mouth of the jester, Jack Point, the words that could be Gilbert's own epitaph:

> When they're offered to the world in merry guise,
> Unpleasant truths are swallowed with a will.
> For he who'd make his fellow creatures wise,
> Should always gild the philosophic pill![1]

Moral lessons, those "unpleasant truths," have long been disguised as sugar-coated pills; and the principal form of sugar-coating has been the entertaining story so frequently supplied the young (and old) of this generation by the family television set.

Storytelling as Moral Education and the Problem of Television

A good case can be made that the fundamental medium of moral education in virtually all cultures is storytelling. The earliest examples in Western culture are the Greek myths and Homeric legends; but in particular we find this function in the stories told to children, for example, in fairy tales.[2] It is not the plot of these stories that is intended as a moral lesson--the plots are often fantastic, involving supernatural creatures in counter-factual situations. The plot holds the interest of the listener while the basic moral message of how things work in the social relationships between people is delivered.

It is widely reported that TV has interrupted family dialogue throughout our society. What it has taken over chiefly, however, is the storytelling function: Television has become the most effective moral educator in our age. That is not altogether malignant. TV has the possible virtue of binding a whole nation into a common pattern of storytelling and, therefore, of creating a common pattern of moral beliefs about the way things are supposed to be in the relationships between people.

When educators come to consider the impact of television on the moral education of our culture, however, there are some evident causes for concern. The concern about what schools are doing to retain and to enhance their role in moral education is widespread. The evidence is all around us in the spate of recommendations for moral or values education in recently published books and articles[3] and in recent yearly Gallup Polls on education which have shown an overwhelming majority of citizens favoring moral education in public schools.[4]

When moral education becomes a consciously undertaken activity of the schools, it begins to lose the character of storytelling and becomes instead a search for a means of creating in the learner a sense of moral obligation. Indeed, the most critical dimension of recent approaches to moral education concerns the degree to which schools should guide the young in overcoming self-interest in order to foster the social good.

The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral Education: A Critique

A case in point is the currently popular approach to moral education put forward by Lawrence Kohlberg and his associates at Harvard University.[5] It is their view that the natural, cognitive development of individuals leads them up a continuum from moral actions rooted in self-interest to actions based on those universal, rational principles outlined by Kant (the categorical imperatives). They see the task of the schools as twofold: to prevent retardation of this development by creation of a just community in the school and to facilitate individual development by challenging the student with moral reasoning at a higher level of development than his own.

Cognitive-developmentalists such as Kohlberg and his associates stand in opposition to approaches which take as their starting point the relativity of an individual's values.[6] This is the charge they frequently level against the equally popular approach called Values Clarification. The Values Clarification approach, in effect, invites individual students to tell their own stories, in the belief that they will thereby be motivated to make their actions consistent with their publicly avowed values.[7]

The danger which the cognitive-developmental theorists see in this approach is that it can result in encouraging a student in what may be a wholly idiosyncratic or culturally undesirable view of what is moral. Values Clarification provides no means for condemning the bigot who makes his actions consistent with his publicly avowed hatred of the culturally different. While there may be some educational value in reading Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, it is not likely to be regarded by the cognitive-developmentalists as a means of moral education.

What the cognitive-developmentalists are looking for, therefore, are a series of carefully structured "stories" which have been proven to stimulate desirable forms of development in the student. An example is the now famous Heinz's dilemma, in which Heinz's wife is dying of an illness for which a druggist has developed a possible cure but for which the druggist is asking an exorbitant price beyond the means available to Heinz. The story is left open-ended, and the student is asked if Heinz should steal the drug. More important, the student is asked to state reasons in defense of the course of action he prescribes for Heinz.

The open-endedness of the story is a mere device; the same moral lesson could be accomplished by completing the story with Heinz stealing the drug, in the manner of Victor Hugo's Jean Valjean. The Kohlbergian, cognitive-development approach provides the student with a truncated form of story-telling and attempts to structure rather tightly the way in which students can respond. The method is consistent with the underlying assumption that there is a desirable direction toward which the moral judgment of the child should be encouraged to develop and that only by developing in this way can the student overcome moral egocentrism or the desire to conform to community values simply for the sake of "getting along."

The cognitive-developmental approach to moral education can be seen as an attempt to specify a universal goal for moral education (the attainment of the highest level of moral reasoning) and to avoid, at the same time, the charge of indoctrinating specific moral codes which have less than the universal acceptance. Fearing the consequences of continuing to treat moral education implicitly (what Kohlberg, following Philip Jackson and others, has called the "hidden curriculum" of the schools), advocates of the cognitive-developmental approach have made explicit their judgment of what the goal of moral education should be if a learner is to overcome immature egocentrism. They have failed to address the problem that has traditionally rendered explicit moral education difficult, i.e., the tendency of the intended learner to refuse to grant the superiority of the teacher's morality.

It would appear that the cognitive-developmentalist approach can only succeed by keeping its goal hidden from the learner. The hidden curriculum would thus become explicit only for the educator. Were the student to become aware that the teacher had classified the student's moral reasoning at a stage of development lower than that of the teacher's own moral reasoning, the student's resistance to the teacher's efforts at moral instruction could be expected to increase considerably. There is, for reasons I shall consider presently, a general tendency for students to prefer to receive their moral lessons from equals rather than from experts.

The greatest difficulty cognitive-developmentalists face in their approach to moral education is the need to gain general acceptance that the qualities of mind they associate with the highest stage of moral reasoning are indeed the mark of moral maturity. It is a problem their approach shares with all strategies for moral education derived from the ethics of Aristotle, of Kant, or of the British and American Utilitarians. Without that agreement, it is difficult to gain consent to their proposals for moral education. With it, their proposals for explicit moral education would be unnecessary.

Psychological Outgrowths of Educational Progressivism

Both the cognitive-developmentalist approach and Values Clarification find a common intellectual precursor in the progressivism that dominated educational theory in America prior to World War II and, particularly, in John Dewey's philosophy of education.[8] Progressivism laid the groundwork for the overthrow of the earlier dominant elitist and literary-based education by a science-oriented curriculum which stressed the active participation of learners. The expanding body of research in scientific psychology held out the promise that means were available to structure the learning situation so that public elementary and secondary schools could provide children from the wide range of family backgrounds characteristic of American society with the basic knowledge and skills to be full participants in American social life.

Education for Values Clarification: A Critique

In addition to its roots in American progressivism, Values Clarification and the approach to moral education of humanistic psychology in general represent an application to schooling of one aspect of the Freudian revolution in psychology, viz., that changing a person's thinking doesn't necessarily change his actions, since actions are the result of nonrational as well as rational motivation. The assumption of humanistic psychology is that, to be successful, moral education must reach the affective as well as cognitive aspects of personality, i.e., that it must deal with the "whole person."

The recent upsurge in so-called "affective" education can therefore be understood as a counter to the tendency of participants in school, since they are part of an objective, third-person[9] world, to attempt to reduce the emotional content of interactions, particularly those involving exchange of beliefs. By increasing the emotional level of such interactions, one invites a more personal, long-lasting dialogic relationship. Values Clarification is an attempt, sometimes only superficial, to do this.

What Values Clarification is seeking is a means for dealing intelligently with beliefs which have the high feeling-tone generally associated with moral values. Given the premises of Values Clarification, the most effective form of moral education is likely to be one-to-one dialogue. This is so because face-to-face relationships tend to channel exchange of beliefs with high emotional loading into what is perceived by one person as direct, personal concern on the part of the other. That sense of sharing emotion-laden beliefs encourages a feeling of equality between participants in dialogue which is not duplicated in political or public life. The Values Clarification approach uses group dynamics techniques to simulate some of the qualities of dialogue in small-group situations. The group leader therefore seeks, often by

somewhat artificial means, to stimulate the open expression of affect-laden beliefs, thereby creating a feeling of group-belonging among participants.

The popularity of Values Clarification suggests that it is at least partially successful in its mission of creating a kind of community in the classroom where beliefs with high emotional loading are openly expressed. There is some question, however, whether the effects of establishing such a "we" feeling community carry over either to other political situations or even to one's dialogic relationship with individual members of the community. Also, for those (including most philosophers of education) who are desirous of developing an educational means of dealing rationally with highly emotionally charged beliefs, there is little evidence that the sense of group feeling created by Values Clarification exercises contributes to the rational treatment of values.

Behavior Modification as Values Education: A Critique

There is a third, and still more popular, approach to moral education that has its origins in a contemporary psychological theory and, like cognitive-developmentalist and humanist theories is linked to the progressive movement in education that preceded World War II. It is, of course, behaviorism, and its chief spokesman in contemporary debates on education is B. F. Skinner. Unlike proponents of the latter two theories, however, Skinner does not attempt to present his brand of schooling as moral or values education. It is, simply and straightforwardly, behavior education, which translates to behavior modification or behavioral engineering.

Skinner used the occasion of a critique of the Free School movement to offer a useful synopsis of his views on schooling.[10] He sees advocates of free schools as continually rewriting Rousseau's *Emile*. Emile is a product of Rousseau's imagination; yet today, says Skinner, students who have been taught *as if they were* Emile have reached graduate school, insisting on their rights and preferring the life of feeling emotion to that of intellect. As a consequence, claims Skinner, they are easily taken in by the mystical and superstitious. At home in a world of unprecedented domestic violence, they lack the discipline with which to be creative; and they don't even seem happy.

The mistake advocates of free schools have made, according to Skinner, has been to assume that if we remove the punishments from schooling, students will continue to study because they like to. Instead, Skinner notes, they come under the control of other conditions which tend to be anti-schooling.

The advocates of free schooling have attempted to bring the real world into the school (Dewey) and the school into the real world (Illich). But, says Skinner, the "real world" is a poor educator because it does not prepare students for the future. Instead we need a formal education that greatly increases what a person can learn. Skinner believes that educators need to be willing to say what they believe students will need to know in the future and to arrange current rewards to back up their plans for that future. "Only the educational policy maker who supplies [these rewards] need take the future into account," writes Skinner. "It is the teacher's function to contrive conditions under which students learn. Their relevance to a future usefulness need not be obvious [to the student]."

What is it that educational policy makers can say that students will need for the future? As Skinner has often said, these are values that are beyond controversy: "to prepare the student to produce his share of the goods he will consume and the services he will use, to get on well with his fellows, and to enjoy his life." This is *not* values education because no genuine choice is involved. Skinner's educational policy makers are expressing something like the Rousseauian general will, i.e., "a set of specifications which, so far as we can tell, will sometime in the future prove valuable to the student and his culture."

Nevertheless, Skinner's recommendations would substitute *in toto* for values education. They would effectively meet the concerns of parents and educators that the schools produce morally upstanding members of the community, the only necessary precondition being that there be a political consensus on who the educational policy makers should be. Skinner is saying that we no longer need to educate people to value; we need only to educate them to behave; and that is a very popular message today. The monkey wrench in the machine is this society's inability to find the political means to put the mechanism into operation.

The Role of the Expert in Moral Education

All three of these psychologically-based approaches to moral education have something in common; they interpose the expert into moral education. Such should be the expected outcome of approaches which are rooted in psychology, since psychology is a science and its findings are the province of its experts. Kohlberg claims to show how people do in fact develop in their moral judgments; Skinner, how behavior is shaped; Simon, how group interaction can produce changes in the affective life of students. Prior to the moral instruction of the student comes these or similar scientific experts who lay out the goals of their instruction; each of these experts' goals aim at reproducing that corner of "human nature" which their science has revealed. Philosophers of education are appropriately skeptical of such truths. I suggest that our skepticism is grounded in a tradition that offers an alternative view of moral education.

How Virtue Is Acquired: Protagoras and Socrates

When the great sophist, Protagoras, is challenged by Socrates[11] to explain how it is that there are no experts on the teaching of virtue, and some who are good themselves (e.g., Pericles) cannot teach their children to be virtuous, he responds by retelling the myth of the formation of human society. Protagoras says that thanks to the theft of Prometheus, mankind gained the wisdom and art necessary for the support of life prior to gaining political wisdom or virtue. Out of a desire for self-preservation, men gathered in cities but had no art of government. Zeus therefore sent Hermes to distribute *justice* as the ordering principle of cities. Hermes asked if justice should be distributed, as are the arts, to a favored few only. Zeus replied that cities can't survive if only a few share in civic virtue.

Mankind are therefore correct, Protagoras concludes, in admitting every person as a teacher of virtue and in punishing anyone who does not act virtuously. Rational punishment is not retaliation but provides a model and deterrent against future wrongdoing. Since virtue is basic to the existence of the city, it is a precondition for all other learning. So many are teachers of virtue that even a good father will not be the sole teacher of virtue to his children.

All people have a mutual interest in the virtue of one another. Therefore each teaches virtue according to his ability; and all ought to attend to those better able to promote virtue, even if the difference is ever so little. Finally, Protagoras confesses that that is how he expects to be recognized by his students, as one more skilled in civic virtue than most. Those who become his students and who subsequently find that his teachings were not worth their cost can, after taking an oath to that effect, get their money back.

Of equal importance to Plato's tale is how Socrates responds to the parable of Protagoras. "I used to imagine," he says, "that no human cure could make men good; but I know better now." Typical Socratic irony--but the emotion behind it is genuine. Protagoras has made an impressive speech; it is only of human knowledge itself that Socrates remains wary. He continues, "Yet I have still one very small difficulty . . . tell me truly whether virtue is one whole, of which justice and temperance and holiness are parts; or whether all these are only the names of one and the same thing." And thus,

we may imagine, began Socrates's life-long quest for the meaning of moral concepts that would not be satisfied by the persuasive definitions of the sophists.

If we were to ask what approach to moral education Plato recommends, I think we have seen the core of it in that rather brief exchange between the great storyteller and his critical gadfly. I submit that good moral education requires only those two essentials: that we tell each other stories and that we criticize for each other the messages we read into the stories we have been told. Plato was a dramatist who didn't approve of the moral message he found in many of the dramas of his day; and so he wrote his own dramas, telling the story of the most moral of all men, his mentor and hero, Socrates.

Therapy and Moral Education

The method of storytelling and criticism is not only good moral education; it is good therapy. The cognitive starting point for therapy is, typically, the autobiography of one of the participants. The artist Eleanor Antin writes that,

> people [have] a very deprived idea of what autobiography is . . . . It is everyone's novel . . . I decided that there was no reason, when I do my own autobiography, to have an underprivileged fantasy. It is all fiction anyway, since it is obvious that autobiography is not written by a dead person writing about his past. It is written by a passionate person living in the present. He has something to sell, an image of himself, which he considers adequate or which, for some reason, he wants to convince people is true . . . because the mind is literary and the soul is pragmatic.[12]

What is required to turn Antin's autobiography into therapy is for her to present it to others for their critique of the moral message they find within it. Such a practice is also, I submit, an effective means to moral education. The schools, however, are not in the business of providing individual therapy.

Moral Education and the Humanities

A more general, community-wide, cognitive starting point for moral education than personal biography is supplied by the study of literature, history, and philosophy--in short, by the humanities. Richard Ohman, a professor of English, has criticized the attempts of scholars in his field to emulate the research of scientists. "A scientific inquiry," writes Ohman,

> has a certain ethic--that of disinterestedness--but its *results* are morally neutral . . . . On the other hand, behind every teacher of literature lurks a moralist . . . . The experience of literature is quite inseparable from moral experience . . . . One of the functions of a literary culture is to extend our moral experience . . . . A critical book or article does not simply record a finding; it demands to be felt, argued, and assimilated into the moral lives of its audience . . . .[13]

Ohman's attempt to distinguish the kind of moral inquiry contained in literature from the value-neutral inquiry characteristic of science is not shared by Paul Feyerabend, the anarchist philosopher of science. In a provocative essay, Feyerabend uses Bertold Brecht's play, *Life of Galileo*, as an illustrative example of the embodiment of scientific argument.[14] According to Feyerabend, Brecht's Galileo is not a professional. His thinking is "libidinous"; his teaching of the young disciple Andrea is a form of friendship. Unfortunately, Feyerabend fears that scientific research has lost that link with the personal world. "Knowledge," he writes, "is a secret for professionals again." Scientific research seeks to make submission to laws a condition of humanity; it thereby loses its chance to reform society.

Feyerabend concludes, therefore, that theatre is a better way of dealing with philosophical problems than research; this was the key to Plato's philosophy, but it has been lost as the treatise has replaced the dialogue. For Feyerabend the only cure is the reintegration of philosophy and science with life. To do so, he believes that scientists, philosophers, and the rest of mankind must give up their overbearing concern for efficiency, truth, and empirical content, because, as he puts it, "all these things count little when compared with a happy and well-rounded life."

In a sense, Feyerabend's conclusion agrees with the sociologist Peter Berger's postulate of the "equality of all empirically available worlds of consciousness." "All of us," writes Berger,

> are moving around on the same level, trying to make sense of the universe and doing our best to cope with necessities of living. Some of us try to convince others that our *Modus operandi* makes more sense than theirs. Such efforts may or may not be laudable, but they are, in principle, transactions between equals.[15]

I would argue that such efforts to convince others of the rightness of our *modus operandi* are not only laudable, they are basic to moral education and that it is on the level of the moral education that occurs in dialogue that people's "worlds of consciousness" are equal. In the third-person world of objective fact there is, on the contrary, a clear distinction between expert and novice.

Scientific Expertise and Political Policy

Feyerabend has confused the act of scientific creation, which is speculative and open to dialogic critique, with the institutionalization of the expert which occurs in the political life of societies. The purpose of the latter is to gain general acceptance of public policy on the basis of its grounding in the facts. The three psychologically-grounded proposals for moral education which I discussed above are precisely of this nature. They are based on the assumption that public policy is necessary in order to insure proper moral education in society. As previously noted, the proposals seek to interpose the scientific expert between the act of scientific creation and the process of moral instruction.

Feyerabend wants to eliminate the middle man and bring everyone into dialogue with Galileo. That becomes possible vicariously through the instrument of Brecht's drama. Feyerabend has titled his essay on the teaching of philosophy of science "Let's Make More Movies." It suggests, I think, that it is more appropriate for philosophers to be engaged in film criticism than in debates on policy formation. Philosophy as such has no proper place in the institutional/political use of scientific expertise. The critical skills of the philosopher can help in clarifying some of the concepts used in policy debate;[16] but there is no clear evidence that policy makers need or can make use of that assistance.

Principled Utilitarianism and Public Policy

Let me make note of one exception. There is one line of philosophical argument that has proven to have clear use and applicability in present policy formation in our society. It is a clever amalgam of Kantian and utilitarian ethics (what might be called principled utilitarianism) for which the primary spokesman is the philosopher John Rawls.[17]

Rawls puts forward the principle that social justice requires the redistribution of social goods, if it can be shown to be to everyone's advantage, with the least privileged members of society benefiting first. Robert Nozick asserts the contrary principle of individual entitlement to all goods which are legitimately earned.[18] Claims of legitimacy, however, are always subject to appeal. A primary focus of Rawls's analysis is to find a way of disposing of such appeals which is grounded in ethical principle rather than merely in legal convention.

Nozick raises a perplexing question, viz., Is it ever *desirable* that the state be engaged in the redistribution of wealth? There already exists, however, a massive governmental bureaucracy in this society which is engaged full-time in the redistribution of social wealth. The clue to the widespread popularity of Rawls's theory is, I think, that he is speaking to the already convinced. The governmental policy makers accept Rawls's principles; they are reassured that philosophical grounding can be found for what they are attempting to accomplish.

The popularity of Rawls's theory at the level of governmental policy-making has tempted some philosophers of education to explore its possible application to moral education in the schools.[19] But the difficulty with any system of ethics which takes for granted that it is possible to determine what policies are of greatest benefit to the society is that its successful implementation requires a community of the already convinced (the point mentioned earlier in reference to Kohlberg's advocacy of principled morality). Were the public schools to attempt to inculcate in all children dedication to the principle of social utility, we would find, in fact have already found, that many students will part company with whatever happens to be the reigning vision of the socially useful.

Moral Education in the Socializing Function of Schooling

There is a kind of moral education that enables people to live in the world of politics and public policies, and a lot of that is learned in school. The teacher, for example, is typically an authority-figure in the political configuration of the classroom, and the students have a lot to learn in order to cope with that structure. Let us label that type of learning the socializing function of schools. As Durkheim writes, "respect for the rule can scarcely develop in the familial setting . . . . [School discipline] is the morality of the classroom."[20] Later on he notes that the school environment "is a more extensive association than the family or the little societies of friends . . . . In that respect it resembles political society," and he adds that, "On the other hand, it is limited enough so that personal relationships can crystallize."[21]

Moral Education in the Liberating Function of Schooling

I am suggesting that it is out of the crystallizing personal relations in schools that what might be called the liberating function of schooling, in contradistinction to the socializing function, emerges. It is the education that comes from dialogue with others who approach as equals rather than as experts. And it is, I submit, the most effective form of moral education available.

P. H. Nowell-Smith has written that,

> The most a moral philosopher can do is paint a picture of various types of life . . . and ask which type of life you really want to lead . . . . The question, "What shall I do?" and "What moral principles should I adopt?" must be answered by each man [read person] for himself.[22]

I think, however, that Nowell-Smith is here calling for an excess of even-handedness on the part of teachers, which might open him to the charge of moral relativism. It is enough for teachers to advocate the stance toward living which they believe in, provided they do so as equals and not as experts. The difficulty is that, as teachers, they are cast in the role of political authority, and therefore their moral messages are likely to be misinterpreted by students as political. For that reason it is best to tell a story, as Gabe Kotter so amply illustrates, or recommend a book, or make a movie and to encourage the student to engage in literary or artistic or historical criticism.

I am by no means alone in this recommendation for moral education, but some do it with a difference worth noting. John Schulte and Stanton Teal write:

> since respect for persons requires the ability to see things from the perspective of other individuals, a uniquely powerful tool for gaining that facility would be sensitive use of literature. The novel and drama are capable of involving students cognitively and emotionally in the life situations of others engaged in typically human predicaments.[23]

The reference to "respect for persons" indicates an underlying commitment of these authors to a version of the Kantian ethic. I mention this not to label the position; the label does not matter. What matters is the possibility that since they are seeking literature that conveys a *particular* moral message, they, like Plato, are likely to censor from their teaching literature which does not foster respect for persons, and even more so, literature which in their judgment discourages respect for persons (once again a possible example is *Mein Kampf*).

Unlike Plato, I do not think that it is necessary to censor literature in order to provide a proper moral education. Any story which elicits our response and criticism helps to do the job, and the more different kinds of stories we encounter critically, the larger our moral world becomes. The teacher's criterion for selection of assigned readings should be those works which provoked the most reflection on moral issues in his or her own experience.

Literary-Moral Critique of Television: A Proposal

To return to the problem with which I began, What as educators can we do about the usurpation of the functions of moral education by television? First and foremost I would urge that we bring back respect for the humanities as dialogic, as distinct from research disciplines. Inquiries in philosophy, history, and literary criticism do not produce findings that can then be applied on the political level, even in the form of policies for teachers to follow. Philosophical inquiry produces a thesis for further critique and dialogue. It cannot be applied outside itself to moral living; it simply becomes a part of moral living--the life lived critically. The implementation of policies is the task of politicians; the most appropriate stance for scientists, as well as philosophers, is generally polite skepticism.

As philosophers of education we need to be more conscious of the kind of moral education provided by the very nature of our subject area. As politicians, on the other hand, the most promising strategy might be to work for the inclusion of consciously philosophic teaching in the elementary and secondary schools. I do not believe, however, that philosophy in the public schools can be justified as a means of learning logical reasoning.[24] To me, a far more attractive approach is to stress philosophy as cultural critique. And I can think of no better starting point than the culture of television in which the young today are encapsulated. Literary-moral critique of the offerings of television is important even if it does not bear the name of instruction in philosophy. I've tried it in graduate classes on moral education, and the results can be exciting.

We cannot leave moral education to the experts (as Protagoras long ago explained). But neither can we leave it to TV, because most of us don't talk back to our TV's. And, who knows, introducing literary-moral critique of television programming into the schools may prove to be the moral equivalent of kicking the tube, opening the window, and shouting, "I'm mad as hell, and I'm not going to take it anymore!"

NOTES

1. *The Yeomen of the Guard*, Act I, *The Complete Plays of Gilbert and Sullivan* (New York: The Modern Library).

2. This is a major part of the message in Bruno Bettelheim's award-winning book, *The Uses of Enchantment* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1976).

3. To list only a few of the recent books on moral and values education:

Barry I. Chazan and Jonas F. Soltis, *Moral Education* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1974);

Edmund V. Sullivan, *Moral Learning: Some Findings, Issues and Questions* (New York: Paulist Press, 1975);

William Kay, *Moral Education* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1975);

Michael Silver, *Values Education* (Washington, D.C.: National Education Association, 1976);

John R. Meyer, ed., *Reflection on Values Education* (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfred Laurier U. Press, 1976);

Jack R. Fraenkel, *How to Teach About Values: An Analytic Approach* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977);

Charles R. Kniker, *You and Values Education* (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1977).

4. George H. Gallup, "Eighth Annual Pool of the Public's Attitude Towards the Public Schools," *Phi Delta Kappan*, (October 1976), 58:2.

5. Kohlberg's work appears in a large number of articles, sixteen of which have been compiled in Lawrence Kohlberg, *Collected Papers on Moral Development and Moral Education* (Cambridge, Mass.: Laboratory of Human Development, 1973).

6. See John S. Stuart, "Clarifying Values Clarification: A Critique," *Phi Delta Kappan*, vol. 56, no. 10 (June 1975), pp. 684-688.

7. Louis E. Raths, Merrill Harmin, and Sidney B. Simon, *Values and Teaching* (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1966).

8. See Lawrence Kohlberg and Rochelle Mayer, "Development as the Aim of Education," *Harvard Educational Review*, vol. 42, no. 4 (November 1972), pp. 449-496; see also Louis E. Raths, *Values and Teaching*, p. 7ff.

9. See Clinton Collins, "The Multiple Realities of Schooling," in David Denton, ed., *Existentialism and Phenomenology in Education: Collected Essays* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1974), pp. 139-155.

10. B. F. Skinner, "The Free and Happy Student," *New York University Education Quarterly*, vol. 4, no. 3 (Winter 1973).

11. Plato, *Protagoras*, trans. Benjamin Jowett (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1956).

12. Cindy Nemser, "Interview with Eleanor Antin," in *Art Talk* (New York: Scribner and Sons, 1975), p. 283.

13. Richard Ohman, *English in America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 16-17.

14. Paul Feyerabend, "Let's Make More Movies," in *The Owl of Minerva: Philosophers on Philosophy*, eds. Charles J. Bontempo and S. Jack Odell (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975).

15. Peter Berger, "Consciousness Raising: To Whom-By Whom?" *Social Policy*, (Sept./Oct. 1974), pp. 39-42.

16. This is the stance of a recent anthology, *Ethics and Educational Policy*, edited by Kenneth A. Strike and Kieran Egan (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978).

17. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971).

18. Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State and Utopia* (New York: Basic Books, 1974).

19. See, for example, Betty A. Sichel, "John Rawls' Theory of Moral Development," in *Philosophy of Education*, 1977, Proceedings of the Thirty-third Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society (Urbana: *Educational Theory*, 1977).

20. Emile Durkheim, *Moral Education*, rev. ed., translated by Everett K. Wilson and Herman Schnurer (New York: Free Press, 1961), pp. 146-148.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 230-231.

22. P. H. Nowell-Smith, *Ethics* (Melbourne: Penguin, 1954) pp. 319-320.

23. John M. Schulte and Stanton M. Teal, "The Moral Person," *Theory into Practice*, vol. 14, no. 4 (October 1975), pp. 224-235.

24. This I fear is the main thrust of the group at Montclair State College, New Jersey. See Matthew Lipman, Ann Margaret Sharp, and Frederick S. Oscanyan, *Philosophy in the Classroom* (Upper Montclair: Institute for the Advancement of Philpsophy for Children, 1977).

JOHN DEWEY AND PLOYS OF REVISIONISM*

Joe R. Burnett
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

This article discusses some of the ploys which might be used for arguing that John Dewey's social and political philosophy can be interpreted as an instance of revisionism needed in American thought.

What is meant, first of all, by "revisionism?" What I shall take it to mean is the modern tendency to reinterpret so-called liberal thinkers of roughly the first half of this century to show that they were in theory and/or practice illiberal. Specifically this would mean one or more of the following: that, while purporting or seeming to do otherwise,

(1) their work did not support any major structural shifts in the corporate democracy which prevailed during that time (and, indeed, this time);

(2) they supported an elitism, if not the traditional one; and/or

(3) they supported centralist social control of the great bulk of Americans--in short, they supported a formal or informal, centralized oligarchy.

Dewey was the nation's major liberal philosopher during the period, and he probably had the greatest intellectual influence of any liberal thinker. He is a tempting target for revisionists.

What it would take to show that Dewey *really* was a proponent of the structural status quo would be one or more of a number of things. One of these would be to show that his theoretical philosophy openly advocated the structural status quo. Another would be to show that the philosophy was so inconsistent or ambiguous that it could be used to almost any purpose. Still another would be to demonstrate that Dewey consistently took positions on practical issues which supported the structural status quo, even when his theory apparently required that he would act otherwise.

Now I think Dewey's theory is under attack on all three grounds; but, I further think that the revisionists are not aware that they should keep the attacks separate, for the attacks require different sorts of evidence and argument.

It is easy (but probably wrong), for instance, to view a few specific practices of Dewey, conclude that his theory must necessarily justify such practices, and then condemn his theory. Or it is easy (but wrong) to become impatient with the scholarship necessary to fully grasp Dewey's socio-political philosophy and "force" a rendering of it which leads to faulty interpretations of these practices.

Herein I concentrate particularly, but not exclusively, on what is necessary for a revisionist to take into account if he is to succeed in showing that Dewey's social and political *philosophy or theory* supports or even lends itself to corporate, elitist centralism. I do not think the revisionist can succeed, but let us look at the case.

I

Why might a revisionist think he could succeed? If the critic approaches Dewey's philosophy with the idea that a political theory is basic to Dewey's or anyone's social philosophy, he might think so. Dewey's political philosophy, his theory of the *forms* of political power, will certainly appear wishy-washy if that is all one looks to. With few exceptions, Dewey rooted his

political theory in a social theory of democracy. This is evident, although the reasons for it are not yet fully clear, in his early and middle works. There is, for instance, the classic passage in *Democracy and Education* in which he gives us the two criteria which he says can be "extracted" from instances of community:

> Now in any social group whatever . . . we find some interest in common, and we find a certain amount of interaction and cooperative intercourse with other groups. From these two traits we derive our standard. How numerous and varied are the interests which are consciously shared? How full and free is the interplay with other forms of association?[1]

Many student newcomers--but not only they, apparently--to Dewey's thought sense a major problem here: they notice that the criteria do not specify majority rule, a canon of democratic *political* thought. Dewey himself says that "democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated living."[2] And this makes it fair to ask if there cannot be modes of democratic community or associated living which do not abide by majority rule. There obviously could be for Dewey, e.g., the family with parents dominant, the extended community and neighborhood with elders dominant, occupational and professional groupings with knowledgeable and skilled craftspeople dominant. These ordinarily are not examples of majority rule, but, if and when they are consistent with the criteria, they can be examples of democratic community. The criteria simply are *technically* non-specific about political *forms*.

If, again, one is looking for political forms or power systems as basic, it can be noted similarly that the political form of representative government is not explicitly sanctioned. Obviously the criteria demand participation and openness, but the form is left unspecified.

A third thing can mislead the unwary, and that is Dewey's heavy emphasis upon inquiry, the method of intelligence, and science. Not infrequently Dewey speaks of the mission of science as being almost necessarily central to reconstructing a disintegrating American society. It is easy--and, I think, on a few occasions warranted--to interpret him as meaning by "science" the body of scientists and/or the social institution of science. If one makes this leap, and it *is* a leap in the context of the corpus of his writing, it seems easy to conclude that Dewey is advocating a scientific meritocracy.

There is another possible source for the view that Dewey really did not countenance more than a modicum of participatory democracy. He sometimes speaks of the role of the citizen in a manner which seems curiously unqualified to the ardent democrat. Thus, he writes that:

> The devotion of democracy to education is a familiar fact. The superficial explanation is that a government resting upon popular suffrage cannot be successful unless those who elect and who obey their governors are educated. Since a democratic society repudiates the principle of external authority, it must find a substitute in voluntary disposition and interest; these can be created only by education.[3]

II

These, I think, are the major ploys which can be used to argue that Dewey's theory really is not democratic in any new sense, but simply another rendering of classic, laissez faire liberalism--this time with liberal intellectuals replacing, as the elite, the captains of industry and the other traditional socio-political interest groups of corporate democracy.

These arguments do not in fact connect with Dewey's *theory*, however. Perhaps the most striking way of showing this is by giving his arguments against making absolute such political devices as majority rule and representative government.

About the latter, Dewey maintains that it suggests or "contains about all that is relevant to *political* democracy."[4] But he views this political notion as having arisen out of the push and pull of people seeking immediate redress of felt wrongs or needs rather than some cosmic sense of justice. The ethical defense of the notion cannot be made on the basis of an abstract, contrived philosophy of history. The ethical defense of the notion lies rather in its use, under proper circumstances, for obtaining the quality and fact of community.[5]

The argument which is relevant in the case of representative government is most succinctly and clearly made by Dewey in the allied case of majority rule. It, like representative government, is one of the things he refers to as a political *form* of democracy, which was devised at a particular time in history to protect the values of community. He refuses to make it anything more than that (an historical provision) for fear that it, *rather than what it is to protect*, will become the important object. To do otherwise would allow his philosophy to become a tool of what properly is called on occasion, "the tyranny of the majority." The more important thing is what comes before and after a vote:

> antecedent debates, modifications of views to meet the opinions of minorities, the relative satisfaction given the latter by the fact that it has had a chance and that next time it may be successful in becoming a majority.[6]

In a word, what is more important than majority vote and majority rule is that they are preceded and followed by community.

The emphasis upon, or de-emphasis of, majority rule and representative government as *forms* of democracy, then, hardly suffices to question the centrality of the democratic notion in Dewey's philosophy.[7]

What then of his emphasis upon science, the institution and scientists? Do they represent a meritocratic class which merely is to substitute for the businessmen-industrialists in a nonetheless centralized, corporate society? The question and its answers are so important to Dewey's social philosophy that I shall not apologize for quoting at length. In his discussion of an ideal society, which he referred to as the "Great Community," he did not foresee corporateness or centralization which could (i.e., *should*) dictate life in decentralized communities. The Great Community, he said,

> can never possess all the qualities which mark a local community. It will do its final work in ordering the relations and enriching the experience of local associations. The invasion and partial destruction of the life of the latter by outside uncontrolled agencies is the immediate source of the instability, disintegration and restlessness which characterize the present epoch.[8]

And, indeed, he traced part of the problem precisely to experts:

> No government by experts in which the masses do not have the chance to inform the experts as to their needs can be anything but an oligarchy managed in the interests of the few. . . . The world has suffered more from leaders and [expert] authorities than from the masses.[9]

Or again:

> Rule by an economic class may be disguised from the masses; rule by experts could not be covered up. It could be made to work

only if the intellectuals became the willing tools of big economic interests. Otherwise they would have to ally themselves with the masses, and that implies, once more, a share in government by the latter.[10]

Or, still again: "A class of experts is inevitably so removed from common interests as to become a class with private interests and private knowledge, which in social matters is not knowledge at all."[11]

This should put to rest the idea that Dewey favored a centralized form of interventionist, governmental control. It should put to rest the idea of corporate democracy. It should put to rest the idea of a meritocracy of experts or technocratic meritocracy.

The final part of this ploy, Dewey's occasional failure to qualify himself about the function of citizen determination of rulers and "rules," is easy enough to dismiss as unimportant in his total writings. Generally the qualification of necessary citizen control is present if one will but pursue the discussion. In the instance cited earlier, wherein Dewey speaks of those "who obey their governors," one finds the qualification eventually forthcoming:

> It is the aim of progressive education to take part in correcting unfair privilege and unfair deprivation, not to perpetuate them. Wherever social control means subordination to class authority, there is danger that industrial education will be dominated by acceptance of the *status quo*.[12]

And, speaking of citizenship, he says there is a required "ability to judge men and measures wisely and *to take a determining part in making as well as obeying laws*.[13]

Even stronger statements can be found, although perhaps few in *Democracy and Education*. But, if we turn to his greatest work on social and political philosophy, we read that,

> the current has set steadily in one direction: toward democratic forms. That government exists to serve its community, and that this cannot be achieved unless the community itself shares in selecting its governors and determining their policies, are a deposit of fact left, as far as we can see, permanently in the wake of doctrines and forms, however transitory the latter. They are not the whole of the democratic idea, but they express it in its political phase . . . . We have every reason to think that whatever changes may take place in existing democratic machinery, they will be of a sort to make the interest of the public a more supreme guide and criterion of governmental activity, and to enable the public to form and manifest its purposes still more authoritatively.[14]

This discussion of the ploy of attacking Dewey's social and political theory of democracy should not conclude without emphasizing the point of departure which mainly makes it possible. I take this discussion to be an erroneous construal of the political aspect of Dewey's thought primarily to inform the social aspect. It works just the opposite way for Dewey. The social concept of democracy is a necessary determinant of the political. Ultimately Dewey has his eye on the qualities of community associations which can meet the two criteria which were cited. Such qualities are not forms of democracy; they are the facts of democracy. As he says,

> Wherever there is conjoint activity whose consequences are appreciated as good by all singular persons who take part in it, and where the realization of the good is such as to effect an energetic desire and effort to sustain it in being just because

> it is a good shared by all, there is in so far a community. This clear consciousness of a communal life, in all its implications, constitutes the idea of democracy.[15]

The *political* problem is to determine how, upon given occasions of difficulty, to effect this fact and consciousness.

Finally, before shifting the analysis, one should recur to the notion of inquiry or method of intelligence. A condition for democracy in his (and, surely, our) time was widely diffused ability to be critically intelligent. The public requires this to rule itself, to select, inform, and judge those who will represent it. This is a necessity of the age, heavily determined by science, technology, and technological-industrial innovation. And, in this connection, one can say that it is a condition of the one *form* of democracy which does seem *to be implicit in the social theory of democracy:* viz., participatory democracy. To this point we will return.

III

As part of this paper, I want to criticize one particular analysis of Dewey's thought, partly to show that the above discussion is relevant to the current literature, and partly to show that one need not expect the three types of ploys to be so neatly isolated as my initial statement might unintentionally have suggested.

The particular analysis is found in Walter Feinberg's *Reason and Rhetoric.* Dewey is treated as one, although perhaps the central, figure in arguing a revisionist case; and it is solely upon his analysis of Dewey that I concentrate.[16] That I find this analysis very seriously flawed should not be taken to indicate anything pro or con about Feinberg's general thesis or his analysis of other so-called liberal thinkers. The general thesis does, however, set the context for the discussion of Dewey.

> The major oversight of progressive reform was a failure to fully understand the implications of its recognition that every social structure is an embodiment of a set of values and that the institutions in which these values are expressed have a strong influence on determining the desires and inclinations of the members of a society. Thus instead of a prolonged evaluation of the *principles* of social organization itself, the progressives insisted on evaluating institutions *merely* on the basis of their functional integration.[17]

One would expect to find that Dewey was excepted from this "the major oversight of progressive reform"; for, if there is anything evident (in the earlier quotes, for example), it is that Dewey did not make the mistake referred to by Feinberg. But Dewey is precisely the example chosen. Dewey, he writes,

> merely denied that the social interest was best served by the business establishment and proposed that insitutions be altered so as to free technology from its control. His alternative was to change the position of the science and engineering establishments for that of [the] business establishment assuming perhaps that as the interest of science was served so too would be that of society. Yet like the *laissez-faire* theorist, no criteria other than functional ones were established to judge whether or not the social interest was being served.[18]

The criteria of democracy and the concept of idealized community provide precisely the principles Feinberg says are lacking. Further, the whole notion of an elitist meritocracy is, as we have seen, repugnant to Dewey. Still, Feinberg also could write:

> Dewey was suggesting as did Plato before him, that the intellectual's place was within the power structure, guiding the political leadership in the governance of society. Unlike Plato, however, who felt there were definable limits under which such a role should be assumed, Dewey expressed no limits, and no alternatives.[19]

Now all of this is sheer error: Dewey flatly refused to let the functional arguments supplant his principles. Dewey's distinctions between social democracy (ethical and moral principles) and political democracy (*forms* of governing) are spelled out most thoroughly in *The Problems of Man*, particularly in the last three chapters; but, curiously, this is a volume to which Feinberg makes no reference in *Reason and Rhetoric*, although he did make use of it in an earlier article which is partially incorporated in the book.[20]

Looking more closely at Feinberg's account of Dewey, one finds some other curious things which deserve mention. For instance, in two quotations from Dewey, Feinberg supplies italics without indicating that he has done so. In the first case I judge that the effect is to make Dewey seem precisely to support functional arrangements rather than democratic principles. On the latter of these two occasions Feinberg even repeats, apparently for emphasis, just the passage to which he has added the italic emphasis, again not noting the italics are his, not Dewey's. I quote both passages.

> The Deweys' descriptive citation of the Gary School in *Schools of Tomorrow* provides some idea of the techniques that were available for this purpose.
>
> > They (the immigrant parents) are naturally suspicious of Government and social authority . . . and it is very important that their children should have some real knowledge on which to base a sounder judgment. Besides giving them this, the schools try to teach American standards of living to the pupils and to their parents. On entering school every pupil gives the school office, besides the usual name, age, and address, certain information about his family, its size, its resources, and the character of the home he lives in. This record is kept in the school and transferred if the child moves out of the school district . . . . By comparing these with any family record, it is a simple matter to tell if the family are [sic] living under proper moral and hygienic conditions . . . . If bad conditions are due to ignorance or poverty, the teacher finds out what can be done to remedy them, and sees to it that the family learns how they can better themselves. *If conditions are very bad, neighborhood public opinion is worked up through the children on the block.*[21]

The second passage:

> Dewey reported, it is still possible for a scholar to speak out on the controversial side of an issue if he approaches the problem "in such an objective, historic, and constructive manner as not to excite the prejudice or inflame the passion even of those who *thoroughly* disagree with him." The intent of the statement is puzzling since clearly issues of academic freedom will never arise if prejudice or passion are not inflamed, but its effect is to place the burden of proof on the academic style of the intellectual dissenter even to the point of holding him responsible for the reactions of those "who *thoroughly* disagree with him."

> Presumably a passionate reaction was to be taken as evidence of some kind of deficiency in the presentation. After all, Dewey reminded his readers, the scholar "needs tact as well as scholarship."[22]

Further, regarding this last passage, Feinberg does not note that Dewey goes on to qualify the importance and nature of "tact," Dewey saying that "'tact' suggests perhaps too much a kind of juggling diplomacy with the questions at issue."[23]

There is another passage I think one must note, although there are others still.[24] This one seems to presume on Dewey's intentions, however contrary to his democratic principles. In the context of a discussion of Dewey's account of evaluation and his ethical theory, Feinberg says,

> Part of the appeal of Dewey's argument lies in its philosophical ambiguity. For not everyone would agree that ethical behavior and evolutionary progress are the same thing or that the latter should serve as the criterion for the former. Some would even find peculiar the suggestion that our most cherished acts of altruism, such as caring for the old are best judged as preparations for war or other survival activity. If Dewey were putting forth only a factual claim, then all that could really be said is that at certain times in human history, there may be fortunate coincidences between ethical acts and evolutionary processes. But of course this watered down claim did not really suit his purposes and it was useful for him to leave the ambiguous quality alone. On the other hand, to suggest outright that evolutionary survival was to be the criterion for ethical activity would have been to provide some clear guidance as to how an ethical claim might be objectively judged. Yet precisely because such a criterion can be challenged on the other grounds, it was again best for Dewey to allow the ambiguity to stand. However, Dewey's claim does require some analysis.[25]

The passages in Dewey that are in question do not indicate to me that Dewey thought his best purposes would be served by ambiguity; indeed, this claim about what Dewey found "useful" and "best" seems merely to "poison the wells" and prejudge the very analysis which, Feinberg claims, is needed.

IV

Now I think that Feinberg's analysis does illustrate the three ploys. There is the attack upon Dewey's theory of democracy, which does not work because of a faulty statement of that theory. There is the attempt to discredit the practice of Dewey as not genuinely liberal or democratic in a number of instances, a discrediting which does not seem convincing in the particular cases dealt with here. Finally, there *might* be the suggestion that Dewey's theory is so confused or ambiguous that it could support almost any twist or turn Dewey wished to make. But I find this unconvincing.

Whatever the case, any ploy of revisionism in Dewey's theoretical thought has to start with a clear recognition of what he fashioned in his mature social and political thougnt on democracy. One can refer to Platonic and Hegelian influences on the early and middle years of Dewey, but the "bottom line," as youth today say, for Dewey resides in his mature work, *The Public and Its Problems*. Earlier I commented on the fact that one *form* of democracy seems to be implicit in Dewey's social conception of democracy. I deem it appropriate to quote him on that form, participatory democracy, as the bottom line of this paper. Any characterization of Dewey as a centralist, elitist advocate of corporate democracy will be most convincing if it can deal with these words in their context:

> The ballot box and majority rule are external and very largely mechanical symbols and expressions . . . . They are expedients, the best devices that at a certain time have been found, but beneath them there are the two ideas: first, the opportunity, the right and the duty of every individual to form some conviction and express some conviction regarding his own place in the social order, and the relations of that social order to his own welfare; second, the fact that each individual counts as one and one only on an equality with others, so that the final social will comes about as the cooperative expression of the ideas of many people. And I think it is perhaps only recently that we are realizing that [this] . . . idea is the essence of all sound education.[26]

NOTES

*I am deeply indebted to James D. Anderson, Clarence J. Karier, and Ralph Page--most particularly the latter--for numerous helpful comments on all aspects of the article. For helpful responses of a specific nature, I am most grateful to Patricia Amburgy, Jo Ann Boydston, John and Barbara Colson, Joseph L. DeVitis, Geoffrey Lasky, and Maxine Greene. These people share in any merit of the article; the shortcomings are my own.

All quotations from John Dewey's works are made by permission of The Center For Dewey Studies, Southern Illinois University Press at Carbondale, Illinois.

1. John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York: Macmillan, 1916), p. 96. Also see pp. 100-102.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 101.

3. *Ibid.*

4. John Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems* (Denver: Alan Swallow, 1927), p. 82. Italics are Dewey's.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 30-34, 84-109.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 207-208.

7. One can see why Dewey might be a bane of political philosophers. They are apt to criticize him for having no developed theory of power or domination and, hence, no genuine political philosophy. The point, however, is that Dewey has a theory of social democracy to which, given its nature, political philosophy is secondary and, in a very real sense, from which it is derivative. One suspects that they criticize him for not having something as basic (power, domination, etc.) which, in the nature of the case, he wants to argue is *not* basic. Probably A. H. Somjee's *The Political Philosophy of John Dewey* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1968) is the most understanding interpretation of Dewey's basic position from the perspective of a political scientist/philosopher. Even Somjee seems to lament the lack of a complete or fully-developed philosophy on Dewey's part, however, as though this were Dewey's object. (*Ibid.*, pp. 138-140, 175-178.) His Chapter 4, "Dewey's Mature Political Philosophy," is highly recommended as background to this article. Also recommended is Wayne A. R. Ley's "Dewey's Social, Political, and Legal Philosophy," in Jo Ann Boydston (ed.), *Guide to the Works of John Dewey* (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1970), pp. 131-155.

8. Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems*, pp. 211-212.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 208.

10. *Ibid.*, pp. 205-206.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 207.

12. Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, p. 140.

13. *Ibid.*, Italics added.

14. Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems*, p. 146.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 149.

16. Walter Feinberg, *Reason and Rhetoric* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1975). Feinberg says in a later work that he is not a revisionist, and that his "major concern in examining the works of John Dewey has been to understand the way in which liberal principles have been molded by the situation in which liberal thinkers have found themselves. Insofar as this has entailed a criticism of Dewey and other liberals it is for the purpose of understanding ourselves and our reaction to the present situation." Note: "On Reading Dewey," *History of Education Quarterly*, 4, 4 (Winter, 1975): p. 395. I apologize for the fact that my criteria force upon him a label which he would rather not have. See his discussion in "Revisionist Scholarship and the Problem of Historical Context," *Teachers College Record*, vol. 78, no. 3 (Feb., 1977), pp. 311-336.

17. Feinberg, *Reason and Rhetoric*, pp. 258-259. Italics are Feinberg's

18. *Ibid.*, p. 259.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 224. Feinberg has correctly pointed out to some of his critics that he never denied Dewey's concern for community. "In one paragraph I wrote about Dewey's concern to have people be able 'to recognize themselves as members of a community, each striving to enrich the lives of all.' And I mention that Dewey also believed that if 'the community was to be a democratic one . . . its members were not to be manipulated from above.'" Feinberg, "On Reading Dewey," *History of Education Quarterly* 15 (Winter 1975): 401. His reference is to p. 495 of his "Progressive Education and Social Planning," *Teachers College Record*, vol. 73, no. 4 (May, 1972), pp. 486-505. He also notes Dewey's concern in *Reason and Rhetoric*. But what kind of a concern can he be saying it is that Dewey has if he is convinced that Dewey expressed no limits and no alternatives to the intellectuals' role in the power structure? One can take these two contentions, to paraphrase John Wisdom, to mean that when Dewey said he really believed in democracy and community, he meant that he did not believe in democracy and community really. For Dewey's equating of democracy and community, see the last quotation in Part II, herein.

20. He does not there make the very strong charge, above, about the role of experts, but he does say: "In the last analysis his [Dewey's] concern for scientific intelligence is a statement of the need for experts in a highly complex technological society, and his appeal for democratic consensus is an attempt to create a citizenry that is able to see the wisdom of intelligence expertly exercised." Or, again:

> One factor that separated Progressive educators from others was an expressed concern for the well-being and integrity of immigrant and racial minorities. At its best this concern mirrored the appeal for diversity that was an explicit part of Dewey's notion of community. At its worst it expressed the belief in experts, in authority, and in unity that was hidden in that same notion of community.

Note: Walter Feinberg, "Progressive Education and Social Planning," *Teachers' College Record* 73 (1972): 485, 496.

21. Feinberg, *Reason and Rhetoric*, pp. 209-210. Italics are Feinberg's. Feinberg and Henry Rosemont, Jr., use substantially the same quote, ending with the same sentence (not in italics this time) in another work. After the quotation they remark: "If any parent had doubts about the validity of their [sic] instinctive distrust of public authority, Dewey's description of the role of the teacher would surely have reassured them that their doubts were firmly based in reality." "Teaching for the Welfare State," in Walter Feinberg and Henry Rosemont, Jr. (eds.), *Work, Technology, and Education* (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1975), p. 89. I do not think that this is an obvious conclusion except that the quotation ends where it does; had the entire paragraph in which it appears been included, the reader would have further read that:

> From time to time an auditorium period is devoted to showing these maps and pointing out the good and bad features of the blocks and neighborhoods. Children always carry the news home to their parents, and as rents and accommodation are freely discussed, these reports are often acted upon. The parents are encouraged to come to the school and ask for information, and on more than one occasion some newly arrived family has moved from an overcrowded rear shack to a comfortable flat with the same rent because through the children they found out that their bad quarters were unnecessary. Because the school does this work to help, and as part of its regular program, it is accepted by the children and their parents as a matter of course. Information about improvements, sanitation, the size and comfort of the houses, and the rents, is given to the parents. If a block is poor a good block nearby where conditions are better and the rents the same, is shown them. Thus the schools not only teach the theory of good citizenship and social conditions, they give the children actual facts and conditions, so that they can see what is wrong and how it can be bettered.

The complete paragraph appears in John and Evelyn Dewey, *Schools of Tomorrow*, "Introduction" by William Wolfgang Brickman (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1962), pp. 147-148.

22. Feinberg, *Reason and Rhetoric*, pp. 228-229. Feinberg's italics.

23. The exact sentence reads: "We may insist that a man needs tact as well as scholarship; or, let us say, sympathy with human interests--since 'tact' suggests perhaps too much a kind of juggling diplomacy with the questions at issue." From John Dewey, "Academic Freedom," in Jo Ann Boydston (ed.), *John Dewey, The Middle Works: 1902-1903* (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1976), 2, 60.

24. One of these is Feinberg's response to a passage in Dewey's *Impressions of Soviet Russia*. Feinberg quotes Dewey as follows:

> Nowhere else in the world is employment of it (propaganda) as a tool of control so constant, consistent, and systematic as in Russia at present. Indeed, it has taken on such importance and social dignity that the word propaganda hardly carries, in another social medium, the correct meaning. For we instinctively associate propaganda with the accomplishing of some specific ends, more or less private to a particular class or group and correspondingly concealed from others. But in Russia the propaganda is in behalf of a burning public faith. One may believe that the leaders are wholly mistaken in the object of their faith, but their sincerity is beyond question. To them the end for which

> propaganda is employed is not a private or even a class gain, but is the universal good of universal humanity. In consequence propaganda is education and education is propaganda. They are more than confounded; they are identical. (Feinberg, *Reason and Rhetoric*, pp. 207-208)

Feinberg then says George S. Counts "expressed a similar sentiment a few years later," and quotes Counts to the effect that, if progressive education is to "'emancipate itself,'" it must "'become less frightened than it is today at the bogeys of imposition and indoctrination.'" Feinberg then remarks that "The appeal that the early phases of the Soviet experiment held for these educators was as much an indication of their essentially managerial philosophy as it was an expression of their ideas on social justice" (*ibid.*, p. 208).

I am indebted to Paul C. Violas for pointing out that Feinberg errs in quoting Dewey to the effect that "'They [education and propaganda] are more than confounded; they are identical.'" Dewey uses the term "identified," not "identical," which would make for a weaker case. Dewey easily could hold that the Russians could incorrectly make an identification even if the two are not identical (John Dewey, *Impressions of Soviet Russia* (New York: The New Republic, Inc., 1929), p. 54). This and another passage in Dewey's work (*ibid.*, pp. 81-82) deserve more extended treatment than I can give them here.

Soviet education *at the community level* did appeal to Dewey for a period of time, although even initially he distrusted Soviet ideology and was not certain about what might happen when the ideology came more directly to bear on communal practices (*ibid.*, pp. 57-58, 113-114, 120-123, 127). The appeal is one thing; but, again, it is quite another to construe the quoted passage as saying that Dewey wanted or thought desirable an identification of education and propaganda. It hardly would be consistent with his other statements on education to say that its identification with propaganda "had appeal." See, for example, John Dewey, *Character and Events*, ed. Joseph Ratner (New York: Henry Holt, 1929), 2, 517-521, 587-591, 776-781; and his *The Problems of Men* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1946, pp. 37-38, 56, 82.

Feinberg and Henry Rosemont, Jr., use the same quotation (with the same error) in another work, introducing the quotation with: "Dewey's essentially laudatory description of Soviet education is perhaps indicative of his more general attitude about social control." With equal validity, I think, we can reply, "Perhaps not" (Walter Feinberg and Henry Rosemont, Jr., *Work, Technology, and Education*, p. 74).

One other point must suffice for this brief paper. Feinberg writes:

> One of the schools that Dewey reported on in the latter part of the book [*Schools of Tomorrow*] was P.S. 26 in Indianapolis. P.S. 26 was an all-black school in poor black slum. In view of the condition of the families in the neighborhood and the poverty that Dewey described, the school was carrying on some worthwhile programs and was rightly included. Dewey mentioned that the school was located in "the crowded district of the city and has only colored pupils," and he observed that the school was not attempting to solve the race problem but that it was developing good citizens. If the experiment were to succeed, it would "mean a real step forward in solving the race problem." Yet the program that Dewey then described was strictly a vocational program, albeit an excellent one where much of the school and the neighborhood served as a shop for students. At a time when much black labor was unskilled or employed as farmhands, a program of skill development was an advance forward. Nevertheless, black boys learned how to cook and black girls how to sew.

It might be said in the context of the purpose of the Deweys' book that it is unfair to criticize Dewey for merely reporting on what was a splendid vocational program without commenting on the social conditions that made being a cook one of the highest aspirations of a Negro child. Yet in view of the somewhat mild, but nevertheless serious, criticism [that the Deweys made elsewhere in *School and Society*] of Montessori, it would not have been too much to expect a comment on the implications of a strictly vocational program for black children. A more serious shadow is cast over Dewey's evaluation of the experiment as he suggests its greatest value to lie among the youngsters of Negro and immigrant parents. If it was realism that guided Dewey's attitude, it was realism of a peculiar kind, one that believed that the best way for a black man to cope with American society was to fit into it as best he could and as best it would allow. (*ibid.*, p. 110)

Let us look at the larger section from *Schools of Tomorrow*. I have added italics.

The supervising principal of public school No. 26 in Indianapolis is trying an experiment unlike any other known to us in an effort to make his plant a true school; that is, a place where the children of his neighborhood shall become healthy, happy, and competent both economically and socially, and where the connection of instruction with the life of the community shall be directly recognized both by children and parents. Mr. Valentine's school is located in the poor, crowded, colored district of the city and has only colored pupils. It is not an attempt to solve the "race question" nor yet an experiment suited only to colored people. *There is nothing in the school not entirely practical in any district where the children come from homes with limited resources and meager surroundings. A visitor when leaving this school cannot fail to wish that such ventures might be started in all our great cities--indeed in any community where people need to be aroused to a sense of their needs, including the fact that if they are to contribute to the best interests of the community, they must be taught how to earn a living, and how to use their resources for themselves and their neighbors both in leisure time and in working hours.* Mr. Valentine's school is a school for colored children *only in the sense* that the work has been arranged in relation to the conditions of the neighborhood; these modify the needs of the particular children who are the pupils. Yet the success of the experiment would mean a real step forward to solving the "race question" and peculiar problems of any immigrant district as well. Mr. Valentine is not interested in illustrating any theories on these points, but in making up for gaps in the home life of the pupils; giving them opportunities to prepare for a better future; in supplying plenty of healthy occupation and recreation; and in seeing to it that their schoolwork reacts at once to improve neighborhood conditions.

Mr. Valentine's school is really a social settlement for the neighborhood, but it has a decided advantage over the average settlement, for it comes in contact with all the children living within its district for a number of hours each day, while most settlements reach the children for only a few scattered hours each week. The school has a larger influence than most settlements because it is a public institution for which the people who use it are paying their share; they feel that their relation to it is a business one, not a matter of philanthropy. Because of this businesslike relation the school is able really to teach the doctrines of social welfare. In any settlement the work is always handicapped by the fact that the people who make use of it feel that they are receiving something for which they do not pay, that something is being done for them by people who are better off financially than they are. But giving a community facilities that it lacks for special classes and recreation

> through the public school of the district put the work on a different basis. The school is really the property of the people of the district; they feel that they are more or less responsible for what is done there. Any wider activities that a school may undertake are to a certain extent the work of the people themselves; they are simply making use of the school plant for their own needs. (John and Evelyn Dewey, *Schools of Tomorrow*, pp. 151-152)

(Feinberg's reference is to p. 207 of this work, which I think must be incorrect.) One can say that Dewey refers especially to youngsters of Negro and immigrant parents; but is it not equally or more correct to say that he refers especially to "any district where the children come from homes with limited resources and meager surroundings?" And, does the fuller passage indicate that Dewey is unmoved by a deep concern for all such children?

I venture that Feinberg's account does not do justice to what Dewey's account and context provide. And I single out the passage for lengthy treatment because Feinberg in four other publications uses the passage in an almost identical manner, with even less context (although with reference back to *Reason and Rhetoric*) in at least three of them. See his "Progressive Education and Social Planning," pp. 495-496; Feinberg and Henry Rosemont, Jr., *Work, Technology, and Education*, p. 90; Feinberg's review, "John Dewey: Lectures in China, 1919-1920," published in *Philosophy East and West*, XXV, 4 (Winter 1975), p. 368; and his "Educational Equality Under Two Conflicting Models of Educational Development," *Theory and Society*, vol. 2, no. 2 (Summer 1975), p. 209, ftn. 17.

The final chapter in the Deweys' *Schools of Tomorrow* (Chapter XI, "Democracy and Education") makes it patently clear that they are not in any sense advocating or accepting class or racist education from the purview of democracy. Silent (perhaps overly "tactful"), they are about specific situations which would gall or infuriate us today, but they do not equivocate on democratic principles. Perhaps this is an appropriate place to give one of the more moving statements of what democratic principles required for all children: "What the best and wisest parent wants for his own child, that must the community want for all of its children. Any other ideal for our schools is narrow and unlovely; acted upon, it destroys our democracy" Note: John Dewey, *The Child and the Curriculum* and *The School and Society*, with "Introduction" by Leonard Carmichael (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 7.

25. Feinberg, *Reason and Rhetoric*, pp. 52-53.

26. Dewey, *The Problems of Men*, p. 36.

RESPONSE TO BURNETT: PRINCIPLES AND POWER

Richard LaBrecque
University of Kentucky

John Dewey has not fared well in recent years on both sides of the Atlantic. In the United States he has been denounced by revisionist historians as being undemocratic and a servant of power. An English philosopher of education has denigrated Dewey, heaping on him the ultimate insult that he was an inept philosopher and never should have been held in high regard by the likes of Ernest Nagel and Sidney Hook.[1] On the continent, for the most part, he continues to be ignored; nevertheless, some European phenomenologists have discovered William James, and, primarily, Jurgen Habermas has displayed a strong infatuation with the writings of Charles Sanders Peirce. Currently, Habermas is espousing a Frankfurt form of the pragmatist's methodology of inquiry that he calls the Ideal Speech Situation. This, he contends, is a decision-making norm that an institution must be guided by if it is to legitimate itself.[2]

American pragmatists will be quick to note that Habermas's Ideal Speech Situation appears to be similar, both in intent and structure, to Dewey's methodological absolute--the problem-solving method. Habermas sees the Ideal Speech Situation, just as Dewey viewed the problem-solving method, both as a way of creating, maintaining, and improving democratic institutions and of legitimating their authority over the individuals who participate in them. The cultural significance of Habermas's Ideal Speech Situation and Dewey's methodological absolute is that both represent forms of social coercion appropriate for a democratic society.

Although Habermas fares rather well among many on the left, the same cannot be said for Dewey.[3] What we have witnessed in Professor Burnett's paper is a defense of Dewey as worthy of the admiration of persons committed to reconstructing institutions so as to make them increasingly more responsive to human development needs.

My response to Professor Burnett's critique of the revisionist attack on Dewey will fall into two basic parts. First, I will indicate my support for much of his critique and embellish that critique in ways that will shore up his argument against the revisionists. Second, I will argue that Professor Burnett's treatment of Feinberg misses the latent conservatism in Feinberg's social philosophy and social theory. Professor Burnett did not take the opportunity to demonstrate that, ironically, Professor Feinberg is, in effect, a closet liberal and that John Dewey's conception of equality of educational opportunity is far more radical than Feinberg's.

Before discussing three basic points that Burnett makes in his critique of the revisionists I do want to speak to one aspect of Burnett's treatment of Feinberg with which I feel uncomfortable. After explicating the "ploys" that revisionists enlist to discredit Dewey, which takes up much of the paper, Burnett then goes after Feinberg. I believe that Burnett's purpose would have been better served by restricting himself to a critical examination of Feinberg. If he had, I believe that Burnett would have ended up with a stronger case against Feinberg while at the same time acknowledging at least some of the real strengths of Feinberg's *Reason and Rhetoric*, such as Feinberg's cogent criticism of the revisionists' understanding of the dynamics of social control.

Burnett is undoubtedly correct that Dewey was not committed to the maintenance of the status quo. Dewey's philosophy, as that of Marx, properly understood, represents criteria for judging all societies--capitalist, socialist, or otherwise. Dewey's whole litany makes it difficult to accept the revisionist charge concerning Dewey and the status quo. Dewey's phrase

"reconstruction of experience" and his acknowledgment of the conservatives' correct perception that there is no telling what conclusions about a proper ordering of institutions one will arrive at through genuine inquiry belie the revisionist charge. Even as damning a critic of Dewey as C. A. Bowers has pointed out that Dewey's summum bonum--growth--called for a continual reconstruction of institutions so as to distribute that value more fully among all people.[4] Such an outlook is hardly the position of a person committed to the status quo. This revisionists' charge distracts us from the real weakness in Dewey's theory and strategy of social change.

Burnett is also correct that Dewey was not advocating that a scientific meritocracy replace industrial barons as the ruling elite. Only insufficient scholarship would lead to such a claim. Dewey, a Hegelian to the last, believed, as did Marx, that in order for a philosophy to affect the world it had to be embodied in a moving force for change. Marx said something to the effect that philosophy was the mind for social change and the proletariat the body. As C. Wright Mills pointed out, it was not the working class but the ascending professional class that Dewey saw as embodying the moving force to apply scientific inquiry to social affairs.[5]

Dewey, early and deeply influenced by Harriet Martineau's rendering of Auguste Comte's belief that science could provide a means for regulating a culture characterized by "disintegrative individualism,"[6] sought to socialize technocrats to use the methodological absolute in such a way as to distribute the fruits of technology more equitably. Dewey may have been naive in this regard, but given his reconstructionist philosophy, his faith in science as a regulative mechanism, and the absence of a broad-based, well-organized, and militant working class movement in the United States, his strategy is understandable.

The revisionists might retort that the above interpretation really supports their contention regarding Dewey's desire for rule by a scientific meritocracy. But the notion of embodiment of a philosophical idea must be appreciated for its recognition of the social realities that characterize the time in which a theorist lives. Ideas need a will. But Dewey also envisaged that the methodological absolute would become, in Wittgensteinian terms, a "form of life" for the entire culture. As a "form of life" the methodological absolute would be a Schutzian typification--a habit of habits--for resolving conflicts of interest among individuals and groups. A properly designed curriculum would help to insure that each person could participate in pragmatic decision making to the extent of his ability. Masses, as well as experts, would be involved with the masses through their phenomenological, lived-world experiences deciding upon the preferred consequences. The experts would inform the masses as to what course of action would best lead to the preferred consequences. As Dewey noted in *The Public and Its Problems*, the problem of the public is to establish methods of inquiry that will insure the broadest possible participation in "debate, discussion, and persuasion"[7] and which will involve experts and the "many" fulfilling their requisite tasks, respectively, as to means and ends in inquiry.

Dewey, then, as Burnett contends, was not a proponent of centralized social control. Dewey was contending with the problem of appropriate use of expert knowledge in a complex, technological, and democratic culture. If he were alive today, Dewey would applaud the work of the socialist Gar Alperovitz, who is grappling with the same problem in his concept of a "pluralist commonwealth," (one that provides for both local autonomy and a centralized guidance function).[8]

Burnett's most provocative challenge and telling point against the revisionist critique of Dewey, especially as developed by Feinberg, is Burnett's rightful insistence that Dewey employed democracy, not functional integration, as the criterion for evaluating institutions. Feinberg states, as Burnett notes, that "like the laissez-faire theorists, no criteria other than functional ones were established [by Dewey] to judge whether or not the social interest was being served."[9] Burnett is correct in his assessment that this charge is just plain wrong.

Feinberg has erred in two ways. First, he has failed to recognize that procedural rules often, if not always, entail substantive principles. Dewey's methodological absolute was designed to result in certain ethical outcomes consistent with his criterion of democracy. For if those persons who are adversely affected by the actions of other individuals or groups in society are sanctioned to participate in problem-solving procedures to resolve the problematic situation, then obviously Dewey's methological absolute is not simply a neutral unprincipled technique. Instead, it is an ethical norm and involves a process loaded with ethical consequences relevant to the issue of distributive justice. The methodological absolute, then, does look to the social interest. Relatedly, Dewey was a proponent not of technical intelligence but of *social* intelligence, so that the social interest would be better served. Thus, Dewey's argument for a particular process of inquiry is an argument for a principle.[10]

The problem is that when individuals and groups possess the power to prevent the employment of the problem-solving method in the manner intended by Dewey, the method is restricted to technical questions of import to those individuals and groups (witness the use of operations research and systems analysis by General Motors). The practical question, that which has to do with evaluating the consequences of the actions of some individuals and groups on others, is suppressed. But, that is not a problem of philosophical principle. It is one of political power.[11]

A second reason for rejecting Feinberg's contention that Dewey lacked a substantive principle is that the methodological absolute was a second order principle supportive of Dewey's first order principle of "growth." Thus, Feinberg is wrong in claiming that Dewey's philosophy of education was designed to accommodate the needs of technology in schooling. Dewey's notion of growth entailed a conception of equality of educational opportunity which called for the development of forms of technology that allowed industrial development to be more educative in its consequences. This is seen, for example, in *Individualism Old and New* where Dewey notes how the pecuniary principle of capitalist industrialism shapes the development of technology in ways that result in "mental poverty" for many workers.[12] Dewey exclaims: "We must wrest our general culture from an industrialized civilization . . . and industry must itself become a primary educative and cultural force for those engaged in it."[13]

With regard to Dewey's conception of equality of educational opportunity as access to an educative--that is, a growth inducing--social role, the most serious drawback in Feinberg's *Reason and Rhetoric* is the social philosophy contained in Feinberg's endorsement of Rawls's principle of social justice. Burnett, in veiwing Feinberg as just another revisionist, fails to note how Feinberg's use of Rawls lends itself to the maintenance of the status quo.

Social philosophers concern themselves with evaluating alternative notions of the principal features of the good society. Many of them are advocates of equality of educational opportunity, but there are significant differences among the proponents as to the meaning of this principal feature of the good society. Feinberg rejects the classical, *laissez-faire* liberal view wherein the ascriptive criterion is replaced by the achievement standard. With the achievement criterion a concerted effort is made to remove all discriminating barriers in order that the most talented may be brought to the top of society and make social decisions. This is Young's meritocracy cadre.

In its stead, Feinberg adopts John Rawls's notion of equality of opportunity wherein the value of efficiency, served by the meritocratic view, is accompanied by the value of fairness. Rawls's notion of justice as fairness required that the meritocracy not just be a function of a "genetic lottery," but also that it must benefit the least advantaged in society. A general norm in Rawls's good society, as Daniel Bell has pointed out, is not to seek gain unless one can do so in ways that further the interest of all others, especially the least advantaged.[14]

One of the chief criticisms Feinberg levels at Dewey and the other liberals is that their conception of equality of educational opportunity was functional to the needs of technology and the maintenance of the status quo. But is not the Rawlsian notion just as vulnerable to the same charge? Is not Rawls's justice as fairness really a formula for refining the welfare state and "humanizing" capitalism? The meritocracy would include industrial technocrats and welfare state bureaucrats. The former would be entitled to a "disproportionate share of the educational expenditure"[15] and their perquisites justified on the basis of the trickle-down theory of capitalist development. The welfare professionals would also be entitled to additional educational resources and privileges justified on the basis that their function as "helping professions" benefits the least advantaged and talented in society. The mass majority would be left in a dependent position, one which is hardly conducive to their potentialities for growth and development.

Feinberg certainly does not intend that his Rawlsian position have such an outcome. However, given existing power relationships and the vertical mobility orientation of many of those who make up the technostructure and the helping professions, it is hard to envisage any other result.[16] In retrospect, it appears that it is Dewey who is the radical. As Wayne Urban notes, "Feinberg's . . . principle may well fit under the label of liberalism."[17] *Justice as Fairness* may simply turn out to be the ideology of welfare capitalism.

Dewey would have rejected such a social design. He spoke against a policy of just trying to "humanize" capitalism, as such a policy did not promise to increase the "effective liberty" of the mass majority. Dewey's conception of equality of educational opportunity--his notion of growth--as access to an educative social role called for a transformation of capitalism and not just a tinkering with the system and aggrandizement of the human services megastructure. Dewey's conception of equality of educational opportunity entailed not only efficiency, fairness, and stability, but--more basically--educative justice. Thirty years hence will some critic look back and suggest a "darker side" to Feinberg's analysis?

This reminds me of the time I purchased a copy of Dewey's *Human Nature and Conduct* in Cincinnati second-hand bookshop. Written on the frontispiece by a former owner was: "John Dewey was no hooey." I am tempted to write on the frontispiece of my copy of *Reason and Rhetoric*: "Walter Feinberg from Illinois didn't know he was a liberal ploy."

In closing I would like to conclude with a more serious note by explaining the relationship of the title of this response--Principles and Power--to Professor Burnett's telling critique. What Dewey and Feinberg share is a faith in the potential of a philosophical principle to move society in a more humane direction. Oh, if it were only so. Dewey is right in at least one regard. Ideas are instruments--or weapons--in the perpetual struggle among individuals, groups, and classes. But they must not be substituted for power, or what Dewey called, "effective liberty."

Philosophy is concerned with the true, the good, and the beautiful. Politics, though, concerns itself with power, the means to realize these values more fully, however conceived. Only if power is more equalized will the methodological absolute or Rawls's justice as fairness make society more efficient, fair, stable--and educative.

NOTES

1. Antony Flew, "Democracy and Education," in *John Dewey Reconsidered* ed. R. S. Peters (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), p. 93.

2. On the Ideal Speech Situation, see Jurgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis* (London: Heinemann, 1976).

3. For a leftist critique of Habermas, see Goran Therborn, "Habermas: A New Eclectic," *New Left Review*, 67 (May-June 1971).

4. C. A. Bowers, *The Progressive Educator and the Depression* (New York: Random House, 1969), pp. 74-75.

5. See C. Wright Mills, *Sociology and Pragmatism* (New York: Oxford, 1966), p. 354.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 282.

7. John Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems* (Chicago: The Swallow Press, n.d., copyright by John Dewey, 1927), pp. 208-209.

8. See Gar Alperovitz, "A Pluralist Commonwealth," in Richard D. Edwards, *et al.*, *The Capitalist System* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972), pp. 524-539; Duncan Foley, "On Replacing Capitalism," in Massachusetts Institute of Technology Discussion Paper No. 64, 1970; and Staughton Lynd and Gar Alperovitz, *Strategy and Power: Two Essays Toward a New American Socialism* (Boston: Beacon, 1973).

9. Walter Feinberg, *Reason and Rhetoric* (New York: Wiley, 1975), p. 259.

10. I wish to thank Barbara and Donald Arnstine for their assistance in formulating this argument.

11. This point is elaborated upon in Richard LaBrecque, "What Is to Be Done?" Pragmatism at the Crossroads," *Studies in Philosophy and Education* vol. 8, no. 3 (winter 1974).

12. John Dewey, *Individualism Old and New* (New York: Capricorn, 1962, copyright 1929 by John Dewey) pp. 128ff. Dewey states that "the alleged fatalism of science is in reality the fatalism of the pecuniary order in which science is employed" (p. 134).

13. *Ibid.*, p. 133. Dewey played a seminal role in influencing the conceptualization of the notion of "culture as education" that Vincent Crockenberg and I developed in our introduction to the book we edited and to which we contributed essays. See Vincent Crockenberg and Richard LaBrecque, *Culture As Education* (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall-Hunt, 1978).

14. These distinctions are taken from Daniel Bell's *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1976),pp. 408-455.

15. This is Feinberg's language. See his discussion of Rawls in *Reason and Rhetoric*, the last chapter, entitled, "Against Equality of Educational Opportunity."

16. For a dissection of the motives of middle-class professionals see Burton J. Bledstein, *The Culture of Professionalism* (New York: Norton, 1976). I am indebted to Professor Richard Angelo for calling my attention to this important study. See also Christopher Lasch's review of Kenneth Keniston's *All Our Children* in *The New York Review* November 24, 1977, pp. 15-18.

17. Wayne J. Urban, Review of *Reason and Rhetoric*, *Harvard Educational Review*, vol. 45, no. 4, 1975. In support of this contention, Urban cites a review of Rawls's *Justice As Fairness*, entitled "New Argument" in *The New Republic* April 26, 1975, pp. 29-30.

RESPONSE TO JOE R. BURNETT

Robert L. Wilhoyte
University of Toledo

When I was first asked to respond to Professor Burnett's paper, I had heard only the title and a brief description of the contents. I accepted the challenge on the basis of my interest in the topic or issue. Of course, I also hoped that my task would not be too difficult; i.e., it would be nice if there were a few major errors of substance for me to point out. Or maybe the reasoning would leave much to be desired. Conceivably, there could be both. BUT WHAT IF THERE WERE NEITHER? I had not wanted to face that possibility.

But when I received the initial draft, I did not have any other choice. Where could I dig in? Maybe I could use the "straw man" attack: there are three possible ploys of revisionism which could be used to argue "that John Dewey's social and political philosophy can be interpreted as an instance of needed revisionism in American thought" (Burnett, p.). In other words, Professor Burnett has formulated three logical ploys of revisionism which could be used by anyone who chose to "reinterpret so-called liberal thinkers of roughly the first half of this century to show that they were in theory and/or in practice illiberal" (p.). The intent would be to show that the three ploys are empty categories, as it were.

But then we get to part III of Professor Burnett's paper and learn:
(1) that in practice the three types of ploys are not so nearly isolated as was implied, and
(2) that there is a real live person (Walter Feinberg) in whose works--particularly *Reason and Rhetoric*--we find the three types of ploys instantiated. Well, back to the drawing board.

What alternatives remain? In the tradition of dialectic there is the thesis-antithesis: viz., Feinberg is really right, and I will point that out. But since I do not believe such to be the case, I would have a difficult time building a convincing argument; so much for that idea.

Are the options exhausted? So it would seem, but maybe not. Will Feinberg read Burnett's paper and sigh Q.E.D.? If not, why not? It is likely that Feinberg will continue to write--possibly making more (mis) interpretations of Dewey's works? If so, is it reasonable to expect Burnett to do his philosophical duty to set him straight? Probably so. What then can we reasonably expect? Will Feinberg (and others) continue their attempts to either carry out *reductio ad absurdum* arguments on Dewey's works (liberalism carried to extreme is anarchy) *or* their attempts to show that Dewey was really just another metaphysician (illiberal) who differed only incidentally from their own philosophical persuasion? If so, then must the Burnetts of this world continue their relentless pursuit *ad infinitum* of setting the record straight by examining and re-examining Dewey's writings? I think there may be a way out.

We find clues in such statements as those of Feinberg's which Burnett quotes on p. .

> Part of the appeal of Dewey's argument lies in its philosophical ambiguity. For not everyone would argue that ethical behavior and evolutionary progress are the same thing or that the latter should serve as the criterion for the former.

To this Burnett replies, "The passages in Dewey that are in question do not indicate to me that Dewey thought his best purposes would be served by ambiguity." *What do we learn from this exchange?* Perhaps not that "the appeal of Dewey's argument lies in its philosophical ambiguity," but rather

that *Feinberg believes that it does*. So what then is Burnett's task? To correct the real problem--not merely the symptom of the problem. What is the real problem? The following should help clarify what is at least a hypothesis about the "real problem."

The idea of democracy is, of course, central to Dewey's works; and Burnett takes note of this in the last page of his paper, in general, and, in particular, when he accuses Feinberg of producing a faulty statement of Dewey's theory of democracy.

A few years ago (during the Kennedy administration) we heard claims that the intellectuals were over represented in Washington. Presumably, there were others who were under represented: labor, communists, Indians, gays, or whomever. What conceivably would correct this situation?

First, each group (set) would have to be identified according to logical type. Next a census would have to be taken (the elements in the sets counted). And, finally, a ratio of numbers of citizens to representatives would have to be established which would be invariant over populations. If we attempt to do this and do not suspect that something is wrong when advocates come forward arguing that psychopaths are under represented and that the rights of fetuses have been ignored, we should not be surprised when someone appears and says that his constituency is those yet to be conceived. Just because the absurdity is not always clear does not mean that the reduction is not occurring, even if it is arrested at a particular level.

We could take other process words such as "equality" and note that a non-process (substantial or referential) interpretation also leads to absurdity. That is, a society of "equal" people would be a plural society where the citizens could not be differentiated according to any criterion. If my emphasis on the absurd seems to obscure the point, let me hasten to add that it should clarify the states of affairs in which the absurdities are not yet explicated. Affirmative action programs and their correlative ratios are cases in point. Similarly, we do not solve the issue of equality by adding the phrase "of opportunity."

The context of democracy may be so complex that my point is obscured. Consider the same point in a simpler context. Suppose a second grade teacher taught the concept of subtraction by using only positive and negative reinforcement. If a pupil "happened" (by chance) to say "2" in response to the stimulus "What is 4 minus 2?" he would get a smile or an M & M, etc. If he responded "6," or "5," or some other incorrect response, he would be ignored. How long would it take the teacher proceeding in this way to teach the concept?

The problem, in this case, is the superordinality of the process or operation (subtraction) to the substance or terms (numerals and what they connote and denote). If we remove the placeholders *numerals* and *operators* in the context of arithmetic and replace them with individuals and relations between individuals, respectively, in the context of a (democratic) society, we may have a better handle on the problem. If further enrichment is needed, we should note that what we today call "value clarification" is nothing more than the clarifier and the clarifiee in exactly the same kind of educational predicament as the second grade teacher using behavior modification on the second grade student. All that differs is the content.

My thesis (or at least my hypothesis) then is that we could substitute "ethical behavior" and "evolutionary progress" for numerals in the educational context of the second grade pupil and we have a similar educational problem. To ask, as Feinberg does--Are they the same thing or does evolutionary progress serve as a criterion for ethical behavior?--is comparable to the second grade teacher's saying, "Is minus a name for another numeral or is that a way to relate two numerals?"

I hope the point is clear. The person who "has values" is *analogous to* the person for whom numerals are meaningful and operations are confusing. And each, in turn, is analogous to the revisionist who must undcrstand the works of John Dewey or any other process philosopher for that matter--Plato included--within their conceptual framework.

If my analysis is correct, Professor Burnett has two options: he can continue his role of gadfly on the neck of revisionists, in general, and Feinberg, in particular, or he can do with the vocabulary of process philosophy what is analogous to what the second grade teacher does with operators. I do not think the first option *could* accomplish very much. I doubt if the second option *would* accomplish very much. In any case, I wish him well.

67

PART III

PAPERS DELIVERED AT THE CONCURRENT SESSIONS

CULTURAL PLURALISM, CATEGORIES OF IDENTITY, AND DEFINITIONS OF ETHNICITY IN EDUCATIONAL DISCOURSE

Robert J. Skovira
University of Virginia

Perusing any recent article concerning the topic of Cultural Pluralism (hereafter CP) and education, a reader may find some of the following terms symbolic of the ideology and concept of CP: ethnicity, race, ethnic groups, racial groups, racial categories, ethnic categories, ethnic identity, racial identity, cultural identity, minority, Anglo, Afro-American, Black, white, Mexican-American, Chicano, Hispanic, Native American, Asian American, and white ethnics; of course, there are more, but this litany is enough.

The authors of such articles have followed the dictates of the ideology of CP (a concept Pratte has discussed elsewhere[1]). Influenced by such social forces as the Civil Rights Movement, ethnic revitalization movements, the Ethnic Heritage Act, and Affirmative Action policy, they have labored mightily. The concern of many has been focused upon the writing of non-discriminatory policies, the construction and implementation of multicultural or ethnic curricula, and many conference papers. A representative example of such labor is the policy statement of the University of Pittsburgh which does not discriminate "on the basis of race, color, religion, ethnicity, national origin, age, sex, or marital, veteran or handicapped status."[2]

The problem to be discussed in this paper is the definition of ethnicity or ethnic identity as revealed by statements of CP and by categories of identity consequential to such statements. Since CP is the perspective from which many people deal with ethnic identity, I shall present some principles of CP with the following questions in mind: What conceptualization of ethnic group is implied or used? and, consequently, How is ethnicity defined? These questions lead me to ask which categories of identity are used with significant frequency to represent ethnic groups, and why these particular labels, and not others, occur.

The ideology of CP (as it is now promulgated) assumes a certain definition of ethnic group and ethnicity. The essential aspect of this definition of ethnic group is culture; ethnicity, therefore, is a cultural identity. The principles of CP function as metacriteria and cause a descriptive definition to become a mixed, programmatic definition of ethnic group and ethnicity. These metarules are used to determine the categories of identity or labels of ethnic populations. The categories of identity represent what ethnic groups exist in a pluralistic landscape even as they limit our vision of the social arena. In educational literature a category indicates what is to be considered "ethnic" or to signify a "real" ethnic group. But since my discussion concerns an explication of a programmatic definition of ethnic group and ethnicity, What is to be considered a descriptive definition of such?

An examination of the anthropological and sociological literature suggests that there are two paradigms of ethnicity. One is the cultural paradigm of ethnic identity; it is a structural portrayal of an ethnic group. Briefly, if the essential attribute of a definition is the presence of a cultural system for the purpose of unifying the social structure and for deriving an identity, then the definition follows the cultural paradigm.

Schermerhorn's definition describes an ethnic group as a social collectivity existing within a larger social environing world and having a common ancestry and, therefore, a shared history. Besides these elements, the definition states that the principle of unification is a system of shared values and meanings: culture. The group's cultural system is highlighted by symbols which express the essential qualities of the group; these may be categories of kinship, regional identity, religion, language, national origin, tribal

affiliation, or somatic features. From this cultural system, the group's members derive a consciousness of kind--a like-mindedness or sense of peoplehood--which interplays with the intersubjective web of meanings expressed in mores and customs.[3]

This is in contrast to the organizational paradigm of ethnicity. Here, it is a case of an ethnic identification, which is self-ascribed, used to maintain social boundaries by organizing social networks of communication and interaction. A cultural system is a result of such a state of affairs. The self-ascribed identity is based upon origin and background and possesses an imperative status in regards to maintaining networks and boundaries. By imperative status is meant that boundaries are kept by sharing criteria by which "ingroup" behavior is judged or evaluated. Also, an ethnic identity is relativistic in terms of its context; it is either functional, neutral, or dysfunctional depending upon the situation.[4]

CP implies the existence of ethnicity or ethnic identity patterns.[5] Ethnicity is another way of speaking about a cultural identity. Gibson wrote that culture is an organizational principle in the notion of CP and provides the ground for an identity based upon a cultural group, as an ethnic group is presumed to be.[6] CP is consequential to individuals' using, as social roles, identities culturally shaped and bound within their social environing world.[7]

While the phenomenon of CP is signaled by the presence of a particular vocabulary and by cultural identities used as social roles, the ideological propositions of CP determine how an ethnic group is defined and what categories of identity are used.

The ideology of CP suggests the following educational practices:

> the teaching of values which support cultural diversity and individual uniqueness [and] . . . the encouragement of the qualitative expansion of existing ethnic cultures and their incorporation into the mainstream of American socioeconomic and political life . . . .[8]

The use of the terms "cultural diversity" and "ethnic cultures" indicate certain conceptualizations of diversity, culture, and ethnicity. Since the meaning of "diversity" has been discussed by Pratte,[9] my concern is with the sense of culture in these statements. What exactly counts as culture in terms of artifacts, behaviors, or values is not expressed; it is a commonsensical meaning that we then attribute to the use. One may assume that "culture" is understood to mean a system of commonly shared values and behaviors. These, somehow, act symbolically as differentiae of groups; hence, we have "cultural diversity."

The other term "ethnic cultures," besides highlighting the presence of culture as an essential aspect, suggests a type of social group. "Ethnic" reclassifies the type of cultural collectivity into a more narrow description; it prescribes that it is not the same, for example, as a class or an association or a religious denomination. What attributes, however, an ethnic group has are not clear except that culture appears to be most important. We do have some sense of its use, given the cultural paradigm of ethnicity which provides a descriptive definition. However, a hidden agendum is found in the statement that, as part of the ideology of CP, ethnic cultures are to be brought into the "mainstream of American socioeconomic and political life . . . ."[10] This is the principle of equality of opportunity which governs what an ethnic group is and who they are. This occurs when the principle of equal opportunity is translated into the metacriterion of victimization.

The *Curriculum Guidelines for Multiethnic Education* give another set of principles of pluralism for use in the schools. Use of the term "multiethnic" instead of "multicultural" reflects an attempt to narrow the scope of the ideology of CP which the guidelines follow. This is done in order to deal

with ethnic groups' contributions to society and their problems of victimization resulting from ethnic differences.[11] Such differences in ethnic identification do not solely reside in phenotypical features but also in attributes of heritage, nationality, and religion.[12]

The four criteria for ethnic pluralism are:

1. Ethnic diversity should be recognized and respected at individual, group, and societal levels.

2. Ethnic diversity provides a basis for societal cohesiveness and survival.

3. Equality of opportunity should be afforded to members of all ethnic groups.

4. Ethnic identification should be optional for individuals.[13]

The terms "ethnic" and "ethnic groups" are used in reference to a particular type of sociocultural group. Their use suggests that ethnic identification is a specific type of identity category; while many might say ethnicity is quite involuntary, here there is a chance it is voluntary. This poses some problems if pursued from the framwork of a cultural definition of ethnicity. However, these would require treatment in a separate paper to do them justice.

A cue as to how to understand the meaning of "ethnic" or "ethnic group" is found in Banks' "Implications of Multicultural Education for Teacher Education" where he presents a developmental model of ethnicity. The sequential stages are: ethnic psychological captivity, ethnic encapsulation, ethnic identity clarification, biethnicity, and multiethnicity (pan-humanism). These stages presume the phenomenological reality of an ethnic group. They also assume stereotypes, social and cultural boundaries (we-they dichotomies), consciousness of identity, and cultural normative systems in terms of symbols, values, customs, and mores.[14]

For illumination of the cue, we have to turn to his conceptualization of the formal socialization process by which the multiethnicity stage is arrived at. For Banks, the essential aspect of multicultural education is the centrality and meaning of culture. Not only does it mark an ethnic group but, in its manifestations, serves as a lightning rod for discrimination; hence the concept of culture is essential for policy development under the aegis of the principle of equal opportunity.[15]

Basing his argument on Kroeber and Kluckhohn,[16] Banks stipulates that culture refers to all those material artifacts, interaction networks and institutions which constitute the life-world of a given social population and which also function as differentiae of boundaries.[17] An ethnic group, then, is a particular type of cultural group which is conceptualized in the following manner: (1) it originated before or outside of a national government; (2) it is an involuntary social collectivity; (3) it has a historical sense of its ancestry; (4) there exists a sense of like-mindedness or peoplehood; (5) the group's members feel they share a similar fate; (6) it has a culture and behavioral configurations which are boundary markers; (7) it is an interest group; (8) the existence of the group influences the lives of its members; (9) membership is ascribed by self and by others.[18]

Although this definition appears similar to the one given earlier within the cultural paradigm of ethnicity, and appears to be descriptive, it is in reality a mixed definition or, more to the point, a programmatic one. The meaning of ethnicity becomes clearer when we return to Bank's discussion of multicultural curricula. Such school programs would not focus on all possible ethnic groups having cultural systems. By means of the metacriterion of victimization (in the language of CP, the principle of equal opportunity),

the curriculum would focus only on certain ethnic groups who have suffered prejudice. This furthers the argument for cultural differentials of identity because victimization is the ultimate embodiment of a basic we-they distinction. The reality of prejudice demonstrates the reality of culturally different groups. In Bank's own words:

> the focus of multicultural education will be on those groups which are victims of discrimination because of their unique cultural characteristics. . . . (as found in) the culture of females, the Black culture, the Amish culture, and the cultures of regional groups such as White Southern and Appalachian Whites.[19]

Culture identifies a group not merely as another ethnic group but as one which has been victimized because of its system of cultural values and symbols and behavioral patterns. The use of the cultural paradigm of ethnicity becomes understandable because it is the cultural system, or the symbolics of a group's beliefs and values, which draws discriminatory actions. Victimization creates definitions of ethnic group and ethnicity which are programmatic. These definitions rely upon the consequential actions devolving from cultural contact and conflict as essential to indicating a "real" ethnic group. Ethnicity, then, becomes a matter of suffering and recompense.

Indeed, in the literature dealing with ethnicity and ethnic group relations, some of the areas of investigation are the interrelationships of ethnic identity and social stratification, competition for resources, and intergroup conflict. However, while these represent the active circumstances of ethnicity, they do not represent ethnicity; not do results from the commingling of ethnic behavior represent ethnicity. To use such consequences to define ethnicity represents a programmatic definition. Whatever cultural values have been generated in reaction to victimization and incorporated historically into the process of identity socialization are the accommodative and adjustive features of any cultural system. But they have a different analytical and empirical status than do the discriminatory practices and results.

One cannot define ethnicity, however, in terms of the consequences of the interaction of the cultures within a society. One can speak of relationships and how they function in regard to the way a social fact functions and one can describe (or project) its consequences, but one cannot define a social fact by its consequences--it can only be found. That is, "if ethnicity, then discrimination" is a different statement from "if discrimination, then ethnicity."

Within the context of CP following the metarule of victimization, the definition of ethnicity becomes programmatic and results in the use of particular categories of identity symbolic of victimized ethnic groups. What are these categories of identity?

These labels are assumed, it seems, to refer to cultural identities (and ethnic groups) and to victimized groups. (This may be true generally except in studies or reports which compare "ethnic groups" on a particular issue. In such studies there is always one group which seems to be used as the standard of comparison.) As a result, we think that only a few ethnic groups exist. In the following section I shall do a content analysis of some documents to determine what categories are used and their frequency in the studies.

An information-gathering form entitled "Group Identity Data" gives a roster of identities: White but not Hispanic, Black but not Hispanic, Hispanic, Asian or Pacific Islander, American Indian or Alaskan Native. These are considered to be racial or ethnic categories.[20] Another fact-finding form called "Equal Employment Opportunity Information Request" admits that the categories of identity, which are the same as expressed above, are neither scientific nor anthropological but proceeds to gather "ethnic data."[21] An article in *The Washington Post* reported that federal employees were being categorized according to their ethnicity, i.e., origins and backgrounds.

Ethnic identities are translated into such categories as "Black/Negro; Hispanic or Spanish-speaking; American Indian; Asian American/Oriental; Aleuts; Eskimos or Non-Minority Caucasians."[22]

In an article dealing with cross-cultural multiethnic education, Banks used the categories of Afro-American, white, Black, and Anglo-American.[23] Another set of labels found in a piece on ethnic identity in curricular materials was: Mexican-American or Brown, Black American, and Anglo-American.[24] In a report of research findings about the effect of ethnicity on higher education, the terms were Black, white, Polish American Catholic, Mexican-American; reference was made to four ethnic groups: Black, Latino, Polish, and Greek.[25] An article on research concerning busing and ethnic identity yielded the categories of Black, Anglo, and Mexican-American.[26] A discussion of bicultural-bilingual programs used the labels: white, Chicano, Puerto Rican, Native American, and Asian American.[27]

A theoretical article focusing on the meaning of culture asked: "What constitutes Afro-American culture, Native American culture, Asian American culture, Chicano culture?"[28] In a preface of an issue of *Journal of Research and Development in Education* devoted to multicultural education, the categories used were Black, Spanish-speaking, and Native American.[29] Two articles, discussing the NCATE document mandating a multicultural component in future teacher education, used the categories of Asian American, Black American or Black, Mexican-American, Native American, Puerto Rican, and White.[30] Another piece reported on students' attitudes on racially linked symbols by hiding the concepts used among "nonethnic concepts." The categories of identity used were Black, Afro, Black American, White, Anglo, Anglo-American, Brown, Mexican, and Mexican-American.[31]

The frequency of occurrence of certain categories is significant. There were 67 instances of categories used in 13 separate documents. I shall give the number of times used for each category, then a total, and finally the percentage of times occurring. The categories are: Black: 10, Negro: 1, Afro-American: 2, Afro: 1, Black American: 3, for a total of 17 and occurring 25.37% of the time; Hispanic: 3, Spanish-speaking: 2, Mexican-American: 5, Brown: 2, Mexican: 1, Latino: 1, Chicano: 2, Puerto Rican: 2, for a total of 18 and occurring 26.86% of the time; White: 7, Non-Minority Caucasians: 1, Anglo-American: 3, Anglo: 2, for a total of 13 and occurring 19.40% of the time; Native American/Alaskan Native/Aleut/Eskimos: the total is 9 and occurring 13.43% of the time; Asian American/Pacific Islander/Oriental: the total is 7 and occurring 10.44% of the time; Polish/Polish American Catholic: 2 occurring 2.98% of the time; and Greek: 1 occurring 1.49% of the time.

It must be noted here that the percentage for the white/Anglo category of identity is due to its use in comparative studies done to demonstrate victimization. Although it seems to be the case here that this category of identity refers to an ethnic group, it appears to be a rhetoric definition. That is, white/Anglo symbolizes a cultural group because of the programmatic definition of ethnicity.

The above categories represent ethnic groups and ethnic identities; they indicate differential systems of cultural behavior. In following the programmatic outline of the ideology of CP, the "real" ethnic groups are those which can claim prejudice resulting from cultural conflict.

It appears that there is a contradiction among some of the tenets of CP. This happens when the principle of equality of opportunity is translated into the metacriterion of victimization. Such a translation, in turn, transforms the descriptive definition of ethnicity into a programmatic one and guides the selection of categories of identity which symbolize the real ethnic groups.

While this method follows the thrust of educational and social policy influenced by the ideology of CP, and conforms to the programs of some ethnic groups *qua* interest groups, such a manner of defining ethnic identity and group misses many.

In conclusion, what is needed is a new definition of ethnicity and ethnic group; it is the organizational paradigm of ethnicity. Anthropologist Ulf Hannerz in a paper, "Some Comments on the Anthropology of Ethnicity in the United States," suggests that if we were to use a strict anthropological definition of ethnicity (which is a self-ascribed identity maintaining social boundaries), then many studies of ethnicity, and curricular plans based on such studies, miss their mark. He is especially critical of any such definitions devised by donimant power or political interest groups. He suggests that ethnic boundaries and identities and, therefore, the presence of ethnic groups, are not as clearly marked, or differently represented, as the usual definition of ethnicity-ethnic group would have us believe.[32] As he explained it:

> This is where the ethnic boundary is recognized on one side of it but not on the other; more exactly, where the outside society is largely unaware of the existence of a group whose members have a shared identity among themselves.[33]

The point of this strict definition is that while it still deals with the various consequences of ethnicity, it is more precise about what constitutes ethnic phenomena. Furthermore, it does not depend upon a static conceptualization of culture. Bu this definition culture is a system of knowledge, values, and beliefs whose symbolic expressions are fluid; using it, one looks for self-ascriptive categories of identity and the social networks which are maintained as the means of demonstrating the long-range existence and continuity of an ethnic group.

NOTES

1. Richard Pratte, "The Concept of Cultural Pluralism," in *Philosophy of Education 1972* (Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society), ed. Mary Anne Raywid (Edwardsville, Southern Illinois University, 1972), pp. 61-78.

2. *University Times* vol. 10, no. 19 (Pittsburgh, June 8, 1978), p. 4.

3. R. A. Schermerhorn, *Comparative Ethnic Relations: A Framework for Theory and Research* (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 12.

4. Fredrik Barth, ed., *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1969), pp. 9-18.

5. Richard N. Pratte, "Cultural Pluralism and Its Relativistic Component," *Review Journal of Philosophy and Social Science* vol. 1, nos. 1 and 2 (1976), p. 20.

6. Margaret A. Gibson, "Anthropological Perspectives on Multicultural Education: Introduction," *Anthropology and Education Quarterly* vol. 7, no. 1 (November 1976), p. 2.

7. Crawford Young, *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976), p. 38.

8. AACTE Commission on Multicultural Education, "No One Model American," Journal of Teacher Education vol. 24, no. 4 (Winter 1973), pp. 264-265 as quoted in William A. Hunter, ed., *Multicultural Education Through Competency-Based Teacher Education* (American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education, Washington, D. C., 1974), p. 22.

9. Pratte, "Cultural Pluralism," p. 86; also: Richard Pratte, *Ideology and Education* (New York: David McKay Co., Inc., 1977), pp. 237-243.

10. Hunter, *Multicultural Education*, pp. 12-17, esp. p. 14.

11. James A. Banks, Carlos E. Cortes, Geneva Gay, Ricardo L. Garcia, and Anna S. Ochoa, *Curriculum Guidelines for Multiethnic Education: Position Statement* (Arlington, Virginia: National Council for the Social Studies, 1976), p. 6.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

14. James A. Banks, "Multicultural Education in Teacher Education" in *Pluralism and the American Teacher*, ed. Frank H. Klasson and Donna M. Gollnick (Washington, D. C.: Ethnic Heritage Center for Teacher Education, American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education, 1977), pp. 18-20.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

16. *Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions* (New York: Random House, Vintage Books edition, 1952).

17. Banks, "Implications for Education," p. 2.

18. *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

20. Affirmative Action Office, "Group Identity Data," Illinois State University, 1978.

21. "Equal Employment Opportunity Information Request," Indiana University, 1978.

22. Mike Causey, "U. S. to Resume Asking Employees' Ethnicity," *The Washington Post* (May 10, 1978), p. c2.

23. James A. Banks, "Multiethnic Education Across Cultures," *Social Education* vol. 42, no. 3 (March 1978), pp. 177-185.

24. Chester E. Youngblood, "Putting Black Into Brown in Early Childhood Curricular Materials," *Social Education* vol. 42, no. 3 (March 1978), pp. 188-190.

25. James M. Boland, Stanley I. Adelman, and Judith Stevens, "Ethnicity as a Background Factor in College Education," *Urban Education* vol. 13, no. 1 (April 1978), pp. 65-70.

26. Daniel S. Sheehan and Mary Marcus, "Busing Status and Student Ethnicity: Effects on Achievement Test Scores," *Urban Education* vol. 13, no. 1 (April 1978), pp. 83-94.

27. Anna G. Gonzales and Roberto E. Zuniga, "Bilingual-bicultural Education: A Survival Imperative?" *Educational Horizons* vol. 55, no. 4 (Summer 1977), pp. 196-197.

28. Jesse Hiraoka, "The Foundations of Multicultural Education," *Educational Horizons* vol. 55, no. 4 (Summer 1977), p. 177.

29. Cordell Wynn, *Journal of Research and Development in Education* vol. 2, no. 1 (Fall 1977), p. 1.

30. Hans C. Olsen, "Multicultural Education and Accreditation of Teacher Education," *Journal of Research and Development in Education* vol. 2, no. 1 (Fall 1977), p. 18.
Paul Mohr, "Accreditation Standards for Multicultural Education: The State of the Art," *Journal of Research and Development in Education* vol. 2, no. 1 (Fall 1977), p. 34.

31. H. Prentice Baptiste, Jr., Mira Lanier Baptiste, and Roosevelt O. Miott, "An Analysis of Upper Elementary Afro-, Anglo-, and Mexican-American Students' Attitudes Toward Race Belated Concepts," *Journal of Research and Development in Education* vol. 2 no. 1 (Fall 1977), pp. 46-51.

32. Ulf Hannerz, "Some Comments on the Anthropology of Ethnicity in the United States," in *Ethnicity in the Americas*, ed. Frances Henry (Paris: The Hague, Mouton Publishers, 1976), p. 434.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 434.

'TEACHING' AS A SUCCESS-CONCEPT

Dennis M. Senchuk
Indiana University

Does teaching imply success? Can there be teaching without learning? Is teaching a task or an achievement? These and other related questions in the philosophy of education seem especially amenable to study by means of linguistic analysis or, as it is sometimes known, the ordinary language approach to philosophy: an examination of ordinary uses of various forms of the verb "to teach" seems a promising way to decide the merits of alternative answers to the aforementioned questions. Furthermore, this approach enables us to state those questions with greater specificity--thereby helping to guard against possible misunderstandings of the correct answers, once found.

There is, of course, some justifiable opposition to regarding linguistic analysis as the one and only right method of philosophizing; but there is, as the consideration of whether 'teaching' is a success-concept should demonstrate, little reason to question the efficacy of this method in some cases.

One source of seemingly reasonable opposition to this method is the fear that it renders the task of the philosopher indistinguishable from that of the compiler of a dictionary; but the present case should show this particular fear to be groundless. Rarely, if ever, can we satisfactorily resolve a philosophical question merely by consulting a dictionary. And one possible reason for this fact is that although philosophic issues often concern concepts which the dictionary describes, the dictionary does not usually describe those particular features of a concept which excite the interest of various philosophers. Thus, for example, the dictionary does not tell us whether the concept of teaching is or is not a success-concept. This special piece of information would not do very much to help us understand the past or present acceptation of the word "teaching," so it is not surprising that the dictionary doesn't supply such information. The philosopher may sometimes rely on methods akin to those of the lexicographer, but always with different ends in view.

A somewhat vague and, no doubt, overly simplistic account of the philosopher's aim in inquiring whether "teaching" is a success-concept is that he or she is trying to fathom the nature of teaching. This may seem to be no more than the material mode of putting what, in the formal mode, could be expressed by saying that the philosopher is trying to give a definition of the word "teaching." But these two ways of speaking do not really amount to the same thing. It's not just humility that keeps the lexicographer from claiming to be inquiring into the nature of those phenomena the terms for which he or she is attempting to define; and it's neither vanity nor an unwillingness to acknowledge any kinship with lexicographers which leads the philosopher to lay claim to the deeper motive for examining the use of words. Of course, it goes without saying that not all aims are capable of being realized, so let's see whether anything of philosophical importance is to be gained by exploring the possibility that teaching is a success-concept.

Israel Scheffler appears to have been the first to examine this possibility from a distinctively linguistic standpoint. In *The Language of Education* he appeals to considerations of customary usage, not so much to disprove the educational slogan that there can be no teaching without learning but rather as a way of accounting for the plausibility of that slogan, taken as a literal doctrine. His suggestion is that some uses of the verb "to teach" imply success while others do not. And it is because of those success-uses of the verb, he goes on to suggest, that some people are wrongly led to believe that teaching is impossible without learning. What these people apparently fail to notice is that other uses of the verb do not imply success, that some instances of teaching do not involve learning.

Scheffler's suggestions on this topic have won ready acceptance, and, so far as I know, no one to date has successfully challenged his position. Nevertheless, it may be worthwhile to re-examine what seems, on the face of it, to have been an open and shut case; for even if Scheffler's final verdict is correct, there is some reason to dispute part of the evidence on which it is based.

Scheffler begins to build his case by observing that the question "What have you been teaching him?" amounts to asking, in effect, "What have you been trying to get him to learn?" This leads him to suggest that the original question contains an "intentional use" of the verb "to teach"--a use which does not imply that any learning has taken place. Another such use is said to be exemplified in saying, "I have been teaching my nephew how to catch a baseball," because saying this is not incompatible with the nephew's not having learned, or never learning, how to do so. And Scheffler claims, more generally, that "the schema '*X* has been teaching *Y* how to . . . ' does not imply success."[1] Now Scheffler might mean by this merely that *not all* locutions which fit this schema imply success; but since he later speaks of that schema as "representing . . . an 'intentional' use of the verb,"[2] I interpret him to be making the stronger claim that *no* locution which fits the schema implies success.

But this stronger claim runs counter to the following examples: "It's obvious that an expert has been teaching him how to play," and "She's been teaching me how to solve a number of problems which I had always assumed to be unsolvable." Both examples fit Scheffler's intentional-use schema, yet both clearly imply success.

Let's turn next to Scheffler's illustrations of success-uses of the verb "to teach." He suggests, to begin with, that the question "What have you taught him?" amounts to asking what you have been successful in teaching him. Accordingly, Scheffler proposes that this question be said to contain a success-use of the verb.

He further proposes that "*X* taught *Y* how to . . . " is a schema which does imply success, and he gives the statement "I have taught my nephew how to catch a baseball" as an instance of that schema.

It is because statements satisfying this schema would seem to imply success, he thinks, that there is normally thought to be something puzzling about saying, "Today I taught him how to catch a baseball, but he hasn't learned and never will."[3] But what about the following statement?--"I taught him how to do long division well enough; it's not my fault that he never mastered that skill." This statement fits Scheffler's success-schema but does not imply success. Moreover, even though the latter part of the sentence--" it's not my fault . . . "--expressly denies that success has been achieved, there is nothing especially puzzling about the statement taken in its entirety.

To sum up the case against Scheffler so far, it seems that neither his schema for intentional-uses nor his schema for success-uses is immune to counter example. Nevertheless, there is something rather ironic about my attempts to dispute Scheffler's evidence, since my very counter examples would seem to prove his main contention--namely, that there are indeed intentional as well as success-uses of the verb "to teach." My counter examples to his intentional-use schema exhibit success-uses, whereas my counter example to his success schema exhibits an intentional (or, at any rate, non-success) use of the verb. Defense attorneys would be ill-advised to impugn the testimony of a state's witness in any way that served to establish their own client's guilt; but philosophers like to think of themselves as impartial seekers after truth, ready and willing to abandon an indefensible case.

In point of fact, however, philosophers are rarely willing to concede that their own favored positions are indefensible, so their self-proclaimed impartiality is seldom put to any test. Being myself no more willing to concede defeat, I shall now try to defend the seemingly indefensible position that teaching is a success verb (of sorts!).

There is--or, rather, can be--something inconclusive about appealing to non-success uses of a verb in order to establish that it is not really a success verb. After all, any alleged success verb, even the verb "to win," will admit of some non-success uses--e.g., "trying to win." Of course this observation may seem beside the point, especially since Scheffler's own undisputed examples of non-success uses of "to teach" do not resort to the word "trying." But notice that this word does figure in his analysis of "What have you been teaching him?" as meaning "What have you been trying to get him to learn?" And while I am willing to concede that the initial question can, *in some contexts*, be taken to mean what Scheffler says it does, I am inclined to think that in other contexts this same question will amount to a success-use of the verb. Suppose, for example, that I marvel at the athlete's improved performance and ask his coach, "What *have* you been teaching him?" Or suppose, instead, that I am appalled at the retrograde political views espoused by the child and, so, ask his civics teacher, " *What* have you been teaching him?" Surely I mean to suggest, in both cases, that learning has, for better or for worse, taken place; I do not mean to be saying that the teacher has merely been *trying* to get learning going.

And this brings me to another point about Scheffler's procedure of citing non-success uses of 'to teach.' The very fact that he supposes it possible to provide us with success and non-success use schemata strongly suggests that he conceives of a *use* as a particular form of linguistic expression, as a locution in abstraction from its context of utterance. This is a perfectly respectable conception of a use, but it does tend to foster a view of linguistic philosophy as narrowly concerned with verbal affairs rather than substantive philosophical issues. An alternative conception of a use would also have reference to the particular circumstances in which the utterance was made; and this conception would make it more plausible to contend, as I should like to do, that an investigation of ordinary language use can shed valuable light on the nature of the phenomena which that language is being used to talk about. As suggested earlier, an ordinary language analysis of "teaching" is concerned not just with the meaning of the word "teaching" but also with the nature of the phenomenon of teaching.

Another possible reason for maintaining that "to teach" is a success-verb, even though there are non-success uses of it, comes from Ryle, who coined the terms "achievement words," "success words," etc. Ryle observes that it is often easy to overlook the special features of such words because:

> we very often borrow achievement verbs to signify the performance of the corresponding task activities, where the hopes of success are good. A runner may be described as winning his race from the start, despite the fact that he may not win it in the end . . . 'Hear' is sometimes used as a synonym of 'listen' and 'mend' as a synonym of 'try to mend.'[4]

So, too, we may concede that "teach" is sometimes used as a synonym of "try to teach," without being forced to conclude that "to teach" is a success-verb. And it might even be observed, in indirect support of the claim that "to teach" is a success-verb, that in those cases where the chances of success seem slim, we are not inclined to say that we have been teaching: trying? yes; teaching? just maybe. Moreover, in those cases where the chances are nor existent, we are positively disinclined to say that someone has been teaching. Thus, if the seemingly inattentive pupil turns out to have been dead, we could hardly insist that we *have* been teaching the poor devil to spell. H. S. Broudy appeals to own pecuniary interests in hoping to convince us of the falsity of the claim that if there is no learning, there is no teaching. He says that "no educator believes it to be true, or if he did he would in all honesty refuse to take most of his salary."[5] Yet even Broudy might have scruples against accepting money for teaching corpses how to spell.

Somewhat more direct support for the claim that "to teach" is a success (or achievement) verb might be obtained by examining whether that word meets Ryle's informal criteria for an achievement verb, whether it has the characteristics he mentions as typical of achievement verbs. First, Ryle avers that:

> One big difference between the logical force of a task verb and that of a corresponding achievement verb is that in applying an achievement verb we are asserting that some state of affairs obtains over and above that which consists in the performance, if any, of the subservient task activity. For a runner to win, not only must he run but also his rivals must be at the tape later than he . . . .[6]

Now if we are to regard "to teach" as a success-verb, then learning will be the state of affairs obtaining over and above the performance of the task-activity of trying to teach. Of course even Scheffler would agree that for a teacher to *have taught* a student how to do something, not only must that teacher have tried to teach this but also the student must have learned it; but Scheffler would deny that for a teacher to *have been teaching* a student how to do something, the student must have been learning it. And although the linguistic evidence does not provide unequivocal support for Scheffler's position, it must be conceded that the evidence also affords little support to the claim that "to teach" meets Ryle's first criterion for a success-verb. Nevertheless, the evidence is, as will be shown, at least consonant with this claim.

It is still possible to contend, in the face of the linguistic facts, that teaching is a success-concept (on the grounds that some uses of certain forms of "to teach" accord with Ryle's first point about achievement verbs and that even those uses which don't so accord may be interpreted, on the model of uses of other indisputable success verbs, as cases of achievement verbs pressed into service "to signify the performance of the corresponding task activity"). Besides, Ryle's first point does not have to be so narrowly understood that we construe his illustrative examples as potential schemata for testing our linguistic intuitions about various possible candidates for the status of success-verbs. Ryle also elaborates on this point about such verbs by saying: "An autobiographical account of the agent's exertions and feelings does not by itself tell whether he has brought off what he was trying to bring off."[7] And this is surely true about the teacher's efforts, for if we are only told what the teacher says, does, and even thinks, we do not yet know whether that teacher is teaching. Suppose a deranged teacher seems, for all his intents and purposes, to be teaching, but suppose further that the pupils he sees before him are not really there. Such a teacher is not really teaching, regardless of what he believes. And with respect to the issue of whether or not teaching is taking place, this case is different in degree but not in kind from the case of the teacher giving a lesson to a seemingly attentive but wholly oblivious class of real, live students: both teachers would wrongly claim to be teaching anybody how to do anything.

Ryle's second point, which is said to follow from his first, is "that it is always significant, though not, of course, always true, to ascribe a success partly or wholly to luck."[8] One reason for supposing this to be true in those cases where the achievement is attributed to a human agent is that the non-autobiographical state of affairs requisite for bringing off the achievement could occur fortuitously, could obtain in consequence of factors outside the agent's control. Thus, a slow runner could win a race through a series of mishaps--other runners might trip, be disqualified, suffer cardiac arrest, and so on, leaving only one runner to finish and, hence, win the race. But in suggesting that a success might sometimes be ascribed wholly to luck, Ryle seems to have overstated his point: in order for an agent to be described as winning, unearthing, finding etc., that agent's 'subservient task activity' must have played some role in bringing about the non-autobiographical state of affairs. Luck may help enormously, but it's no substitute for running the race.

Given the above qualification, however, Ryle's second point does hold true of teaching: it's always significant to ascribe the success of an instructional effort *partly* to luck. In this respect "teach" seems much like

"convince," a word which Ryle cites as an achievement verb, but which could not be used to denote a success ascribable *wholly* to luck. For me to convince you that teaching is a success-verb, I may need a lot of luck, but I also need to be the one to bring about your conversion to that view.

Ryle's third point is "that there can be achievements which are prefaced by no task performances."[9] This is certainly true of some of the cases he mentions-- e.g., "We sometimes . . . secure appointments without applying." But if Ryle means this to be true of some cases of every type of achievement denoted by an achievement-verb, then his own prior enumeration of such verbs proves him wrong. Again, convincing someone of something typically demands some prior task performance on the part of the person doing the convincing. This performance may not amount to that person's *trying* to convince, but it must amount to that person's *bringing it about* that someone's been convinced. Of course it should be observed, in partial defense of Ryle's contention, that a badly mangled body may convince me to drive safely--even though its being so mangled hardly qualifies as a task performance. But if this is the sort of thing Ryle is getting at, then it poses no problem for the case of teaching. A friend's untimely death may teach me not to smoke, even though his dying of lung cancer would not qualify as much of a task-performance.

Unfortunately, Ryle's fourth and last point about the things denoted by achievement verbs is not so easily dealt with. Such things are, he contends, "not acts, exertions, operations or performances, but with reservations for purely lucky achievements, the fact that certain acts, operations, exertions or performances have had certain results."[10] Accordingly, if "teaching" is to be understood as an achievement-word, then it should not denote an instructional activity which results in learning; rather, it should refer solely to the fact that some such activity has produced that result.

At this point in the argument it is tempting to concede a minor defeat, to admit that "to teach" lacks one of Ryle's four characteristics of achievement verbs, and to declare nevertheless, that three out of four constitutes a clear victory. The only trouble with this dodge is that Ryle's fourth point is the one he puts most philosophical stock in--it's the main reason he introduces the notion of an achievement-verb. Ryle is trying to wean his readers away from the idea that seeing, hearing, inferring, etc., are all oddly elusive and infallible cognitive activities. By getting us to view these things as achievements rather than activities, he hopes to persuade us that they are not the exercises of infallible mental faculties. Given this laudable aim, he could not be expected to look with favor on the suggestion that achievement verbs sometimes refer to successful *activities*.

Still, perhaps that suggestion is not really so inimical to Ryle's purposes: even if some achievement-verbs refer to successful activities, it is still an open question whether the ones which interest Ryle do. And even if seeing, hearing, etc., were successful activities, it still wouldn't follow that they were *infallible* modes of cognition. Despite his own apparent assumption to the contrary, Ryle's denial of the infallibility of seeing, hearing, etc., does not hang on his showing these things not to be activities.

The preceding is worth emphasizing in order to dispell a possible misunderstanding about the suggestion that "to teach" is a success-verb. Even if teaching is both an activity and a successful one, it doesn't follow that teaching is some sort of infallible technique for getting learning going. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that "teaching" means "an instructional activity resulting in learning." In that case we wouldn't *call* an activity "teaching" unless learning took place, but this wouldn't entail that any particular instructional activity was a necessarily efficacious way of producing learning.

Now although Ryle denies that achievements are activities, he does remark that achievements can sometimes be "more or less protracted proceedings."[11] So, for example, "the secret may be kept, the enemy held at bay, or the lead retained, throughout a long span of time."[12] But as F. N. Sibley has rightly

observed, "holding on for dear life is no less of an activity for the fact that, while it is being done, it is always being done successfully."[13] So there is no reason, in principle, why something cannot be both an activity and an achievement.

One might expect this to be welcome news to the defenders of the view that "to teach" is a success-verb, since it does seem rather absurd to establish this view only on pain of suggesting, further, that teaching isn't an activity. Nevertheless, at least one recent defender of that view does not shrink from the apparent absurdity. Thus, Helen Freeman insists that teaching is better understood as what she calls a "perficience" than as an activity. Modelled on J. L. Austin's notion of a perlocutionary effect, a perficience is supposed to be an effect on a respondent brought about by what someone does. So, for example, my interesting you (or, if you prefer, my boring you) would be a perficience. Integral parts of this perficience would be my writing and/or reading this paper as well as the effect my doing this has on you.

Freeman's reason for denying that perficiences in general, and teaching in particular, are activities is that perficiences may be either intentional or unintentional while activities must, so she claims, be intentional. According to her analysis, person *A* is teaching *X* to person *B* if and only if "*A* is engaged in a transaction with *B* in which *A*'s actions or activities in displaying, clarifying, exhibiting, exemplifying, eliciting, confirming or otherwise indicating . . . an *X* are instrumental in bringing about some learning or understanding of that *X* by *B* . . . ."[14] Where *A* is not involved in a transaction with *B* and/or *B* has made no "progress towards a fuller learning of that *X*," Freeman admits that we may still speak of *A*'s teaching *B*--but only in a derivative sense. "Teaching" in this derivative sense, she tells us, "is reducible in meaning to 'trying to teach,' and represents a perficient attempt"[15]--that is to say, an attempt in which the perficient outcome is deliberately sought. But this is surely a mistake for the bare fact that my displaying, clarifying, etc., all fail to bring about any learning or understanding does not serve to show that I was intending to produce such an outcome. So, too, if I don't succeed in boring you, it doesn't follow that I was trying to do so.

But leaving aside this sticky issue about the intentionality of teaching (and its status as an activity), the question still remains whether all uses of the word "teaching" which do not imply learning are reducible to 'trying to teach.' If so, then perhaps there's more merit to the suggestion that "to teach" is a success-verb than is usually admitted. For if the proposed generalization holds true, then it makes sense to suggest that those teachers who have made all the right moves and yet failed to produce learning have been *trying* to teach, but that they haven't really been *teaching* anyone anything. Moreover, it would be a red herring to suggest--as Scheffler, following Broudy, does--that if the teacher hasn't really been teaching, then "he has not earned his pay, has not fulfilled his responsibility."[16] After all, trying counts for something, even when no positive results are achieved.

Still, a critic of the view that "to teach" is a success-verb might retort that trying to teach really is, in cases where success is possible, *teaching*--that even if some uses of "teaching" may be replaced by "trying to teach," those uses can still be said to make reference to full-fledged instances of teaching. And at this point, the argument comes to seem excessively tedious on both sides--the whole issue begins to seem little more than a verbal dispute.

But there is another way to broach the issue from a linguistic standpoint--a way which seems far less trivial. This approach is to exhibit an independently plausible analysis of teaching and, then, to use this analysis to resolve the issue. Scheffler, it will be recalled, proposed that the question "What have you been teaching him?" amounts to asking "What have you been trying to get him to learn?" Thus, he views *A*'s teaching *B* (how to) *X* as *A*'s trying to get *B* to learn (how to) *X*. But one way of trying to get someone to learn something is to hire a qualified teacher, and hiring a teacher does not amount to teaching. Rather, teaching is a matter of being directly engaged in the

process of getting someone to learn something; so it seems preferable to view *A*'s teaching *B* as *A*'s being in the process of getting *B* to learn (how to) *X*. I am assuming, of course, that hiring a teacher is, at best, preliminary to this process.

But this raises another point: An unruly, wholly inattentive group of students is unteachable. Is getting some semblance of order teaching, or is it, too, preliminary to that process? Surely the latter; and notice, incidently, that trying unsuccessfully even to quiet such a group may be correctly described by saying, "I've been trying to teach all morning, but that group's just impossible!"--in other words trying to teach does not (always) amount to teaching.

Getting the attention of the would-be learner is a more bothersome case, since it seems difficult to divorce this from the teaching proper, which demands some measure of attentiveness on the part of the person being taught. Nevertheless, attending is not learning, so this case does not go very far toward showing that "to teach" is a success-verb.

What does tend to show this better than anything else is the fact that some teaching is an active, intentional process of getting learning going--a process which involves some measure of communicative interaction between the person doing the teaching and the person doing the learning. If the claim that teaching implies learning holds true anywhere, it holds true for this sort of teaching. Now while it is not the only sort of teaching, this sort does deserve special philosophical attention--if only because it has all the features characteristic of each of the other, less inclusive varieties of teaching. And while there is no special sense of the word "teaching" to correspond to this philosophically favored variety of teaching, it is still reasonable to restrict the thesis that teaching implies learning to that one variety.

To do so, it helps to restate that thesis as follows: If a person is actually teaching, not just trying to teach, someone something, then that someone must be in the process of learning that something. This particular formulation of the thesis may seem unfair, since it so explicitly blocks any interpretation of the word "teaching" as "trying to teach." But even if the offending qualification, "not just trying to teach," is removed, it is still not possible to parapnase the resulting use of "teaching" as "trying to teach," since *actually teaching* is no more the same as *actually trying to teach* than *actually building* is the same as *actually trying to build*. Admittedly, this formulation does not obviously limit attention to that variety of teaching which is a process of getting learning going; but let's assume, for the sake of argument, that it does.

The thesis, then, would amount to the claim that if a person is in the process of getting someone to learn something, then that someone must be in the process of learning that something. Thus formulated, the thesis may seem trivially true, but the fact is that it emphasizes an important feature of some teaching--viz., that is is not a process which can be adequately understood in abstraction from the correlative process of learning. There are not two, in principle, distinguishable tasks--one of teaching, one of learning--involved here, but rather, an interaction in which the teaching activity must needs be modified in view of the activity of the person being taught. Such teaching involves, essentially, some accommodation between itself and the responses elicited from the person being taught--such teaching cannot take place in a vacuum.[17]

This is not to say that success is logically assured if the favored sort of teaching is taking place, but only that if it is taking place, then success will be in the process of coming about--i.e., the person being taught will be coming to learn. Yet this is not to say, as S. C. Kapunan has suggested, that executing the task of teaching necessarily involves a series of achievements which contribute, however minutely, to the final goal--just as every brick laid contributes to the building of a house.[18] Progress in teaching is not always so steady, and many of the things done along the way may not contribute

to learning; they may even be counterproductive. Moreover, it may be somewhat misleading to suggest that every teaching enterprise presupposes some final goal--a fully formed conception of what would count as the subject's learning what's being taught. Accordingly, any achievements along the way may not be contributory; they may just be achievements pure and simple.

Freeman is led to propose that the 'outcome' sense of "teaching" is more central to our conception of teaching than is any 'task' sense because, as she puts it, "A task is only understood by an agent in terms of what would count as a successful upshot for him."[19] But unless we invent such nebulous upshots as general improvement in writing skills, smoother execution of dance movements, and so on, it is far from evident that someone consciously engaged in teaching has or needs antecedent criteria for success.

In this paper I have suggested that one particular variety of teaching is a matter of being in the process of getting learning going and that this variety requires someone's being in the process of learning. I have not suggested that any particular sense or use of the verb "to teach" corresponds to this variety of teaching--nor, for that matter, have I suggested that being in the process of learning logically implies learning: getting people to move in the right direction does not ensure their getting to the right place, but keeping them moving in the right direction will, eventually, ensure this.

Yet my own line of argument may have seemed to stray too far from the point in contention--viz., whether 'teaching' is a success-concept. So it remains for me to bring the discussion back to that point. I have sought to set the record straight about some of the linguistic evidence pertinent to the issue in question, to show that "to teach" does seem to meet most if not all of the informal criteria for a success-verb, and to chart a modest course in the direction of giving some sense to the claim that teaching is a success-concept. But by phrasing my remarks in terms of a particular *variety* of teaching, I may have seemed to get too far away from a linguistic approach to the issue, so I shall conclude by suggesting a connection between that variety of teaching and the ordinary concept of teaching. It is my conjecture that the intentional, interactive variety of teaching is particularly central to our ordinary concept of teaching and that although we countenance a wide range of things as teaching which are not of this type, the range itself is determined by that type. Intentional, interactive teaching is our paradigm of teaching, and we reckon other things as teaching only insofar as we can make out a plausible association between them and this paradigm. Thus, lecturing is teaching even if the lecturer does not interact with the audience--but only because we assume that the sort of activity (i.e., lecturing) which can play a successful role in interactive teaching can also succeed in cases where there is no evident interaction. Notice, however, that we would not be prepared to say that a lecturer who steadfastly refused to modify the lecturing in light of *any* of the audience's responses was teaching. Insofar as the lecturing can be assumed to be having an educative effect, it can be viewed as teaching. But if the responses of the audience make it all too plain that it is not having such an effect, the lecturer must either modify the lecturing or give up all claim to be teaching.[20]

NOTES

1. Israel Scheffler, *The Language of Education* (Springfield, Ill.: Charles D. Thomas, Publisher, 1960), pp. 42-43.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 43

3. *Ibid.*

4. Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* (London: Hutchinson, 1949), p. 150.

5. Harry S. Broudy, *Building a Philosophy of Education* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1954), p. 14.

6. Ryle, *Concept of Mind*, p. 150.

7. *Ibid.*

8. *Ibid.*

9. *Ibid.*

10. *Ibid.* p. 151

11. *Ibid.* p. 149.

12. *Ibid.*

13. F. N. Sibley, "Seeking, Scrutinizing and Seeing," in *The Philosophy of Perception*, ed. G. J. Warnock (Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 142.

14. Helen Freeman, "The Concept of Teaching," *Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain* (Oxford: Blackwell, Jan. 1973), p. 21.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 20.

16. Scheffler, *Language of Education*, pp. 41-42.

17. The parallel between these remarks on teaching and learning and Dewey's remarks on stimulus and response is both obvious and intentional. C.f. J. Dewey, "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology," *Psychological Review*, 3 (July 1896), p. 357-70.

18. Salvador C. Kapunan, "Teaching Implies Learning," *Educational Theory*, vol. 25, no. 4 (Fall 1975), p. 375.

19. Freeman, *Concept of Teaching*, p. 9.

SOME COMPARISONS BETWEEN GESTALT EDUCATORS AND PIRSIG'S VIEW OF PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHERS

Conrad Pritscher
Bowling Green State University

This paper will present selected similarities between Gestalt educators and Pirsig's ideas about pre-Socratic philosophers. The roots of Western education are often seen in the teachings of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. Some similarities between Gestalt educators and very early Greek thinkers will be explored with the possibility of finding roots of effective education in pre-Socratic thinkers.

This paper is an attempt to expand on the roots of Gestalt educators and existential thinkers in general so as to further ground and extend their endeavors. I will do this by first describing some of the basic principles of Gestalt theory which are rooted in existential thought. I will then briefly restate Robert Pirsig's view of pre-Socratic philosophers. Last, I will amplify some notions and draw some conclusions that may tend to promote effective teaching.

Highlights of Gestalt Theory

Gestalt theory may be simply stated with five ideas.

1. Man is total organism functioning as a whole.
2. This total organism is born with the capacity to cope with people, things, and events in life.
3. Organismic needs determine behavior.
4. The primary tool for effecting change is awareness.
5. There are three zones of awareness:
   a. sensory (hearing, seeing, etc.)
   b. inside body (tension, pain, etc.)
   c. fantasy (memory, ideas, imagination)

Ideas one, two, and three will not be given more attention, partly because of space limitations. Idea four will be expanded after idea five. Idea five states that there are only three zones of awareness, the last of which is fantasy.

Idea Five - Fantasy

Fantasy includes all that we remember--all ideas, all theories, all of what we imagine, and all concepts--in a word, all notions. Dave Denton in his "Feeling/Notion Epistemological Paradigm,"[1] relying on Camus, concluded that as a result of our feelings of dissonance, we use reason to manipulate symbols to create notions so that we can decrease our feelings of dissonance. These notions don't have substance in themselves, yet Western man has given these notions a life of their own. The result has been that man has waged war and murdered in the name of notions. As Denton and Camus have concluded, the constructs have become more real than the constructors. If we wage war or murder because of fantasy, it is best that we be aware of what we are doing.

Idea Four - Awareness

Gestalt theory idea #4 states that the primary tool for effecting change is awareness. This does not mean that reason is to be abandoned. It simply means that it is not man's primary activity. Van Cleve Morris in his Philosophy of Education Society presidential address spoke of man choosing to reason as a result of man's exercise of his free, responsible choice.[2] Morris made the distinction between thinking about lived reality and reality lived. Awareness helps us contact the reality lived so that we can, if we choose to think about it abstractly.

An underlying assumption is that if we must have a reason for every thing we do and every thing we experience, we will cut off our own awareness of those experiences for which we have no good reasons.

The Gestalt awareness notion may be conceived as a process with a cyclical movement from *confusion and/or anxiety* to an *excitement* stage where one mobilizes energy in a simmering of productive tension which leads to an *action* stage. Then a *resistance* stage is reached as we approach the next stage of *contact* (with a person, thing, or event). We then move to the *withdrawal* stage where there is completion or a hanging on. The hanging on may result in an incomplete Gestalt which leaves a situation unfinished in a way that interferes with other awareness which, in turn, can negatively influence intelligent behavior.

I will return to other ideas relating to Gestalt theory after a brief summary of Pirsig's ideas about the pre-Socratics.

A Selection of Pirsig's Ideas
About The Pre-Socratics

1. Plato hated the sophists because they did not compare with Socrates who was the greatest sophist of them all.

2. Socrates influenced Plato to the extent that Plato carried on Socrates's struggle for the future mind of man. In this struggle "Truth won, the Good lost, and that is why we have so little difficulty accepting the reality of truth and so much difficulty accepting the reality of Quality, even though there is no more agreement in one area than in the other."[3]

3. "Early Greek philosophy represented the first conscious search for what was imperishable in the affairs of man."[4] They searched by power of abstraction and so destroyed the old Greek myths, but failed to see that they created a new myth which led us to principles that moved us toward truth (new myths).

4. The pre-Socratics were early humanists who taught beliefs, and their object was not truth but man's improvement. The pre-Socratics held that man, rather than truth, was the measure of all things.

5. Until Socrates's time there were no such dichotomies as mind and matter, subject and object, form and substance. These distinctions are new myths that do not have substance in themselves. They are man's artistic creations as were the Greek Gods.

6. The pre-Socratics were professing *arete* which we translate in Plato to mean virtue. According to Pirsig who is relying on H.D.F. Kitto's *The Greeks*, the flavor of *arete* is lost when translated as "virtue," and *arete* should be translated to signify "excellence." According to Kitto, "*Arete* implies a respect for the wholeness or oneness of life, and a consequent dislike for specialization. It implies a contempt for efficiency or rather a much higher idea of efficiency, an efficiency which exists not in one department of life but in life itself."[5]

7. Plato didn't like the pre-Socratics' notion that good (or quality) was ever changing and ultimately unknowable in any kind of fixed, rigid way, so Plato changed reality itself to an unchanging static idea. *Arete*, the good, became the highest idea, but remained subordinate to reason itself.

8. The result in Aristotle is that *arete*--excellence, the good--became "a rather minor branch of knowledge called ethics; reason, logic, knowledge are his primary concerns. *Arete* is dead and science, logic and the university as we know it today have been given their founding charter: to find and invent an endless proliferation of forms about the substantive elements of the world and call these forms knowledge, and transmit these forms to future generations as 'the system.'"[6]

The Good and The True

Both the pre-Socratic philosophers and most Gestalt educators are concerned with the superordinality of excellence to reason. Both are concerned with balanced living. Both are concerned with wholeness and oneness and are willing to subordinate reason to wholeness and oneness. It is not that Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and the majority of Western educators are not concerned with balanced lives and the finding of virtue in the golden mean. It is simply that balance and virtue in the golden mean are not as golden as reason. To Western man, having a feeling of balance or a total experience of balance in life must be based primarily on reason. Balance, to the Gestalt educator and to the very early Greeks, was a balance between one's cognitive and affective sides (between classic and romantic, between apollonian and dionysian). Reason was in balance rather than acting as the instrument of balancing for the very early Greeks and for Gestalt educators.

The Gestaltists, as well as the pre-Socratics, believe they can tell the whole of the good without needing to define it. Related to this is Michael Polanyi's example that we can tell when one has a puzzled expression without being able to describe or explain in detail the facial configurations that go into making up the whole of puzzlement.[7] This, Polanyi explains, is so because we can know more than we can tell. But Aristotle, and Skinner, and the majority of Western educators, it is impossible to know some thing or event unless it can be described or explained in detail.

The Gestaltists hold with the pre-Socratics that our sense of duty includes as much, and perhaps even a bit more, a duty to self as a duty to others. The notion that we are either selfish or selfless is promoted by our dualistic Western reasoning. Gestaltists hold that we can go beyond this dichotomy between selfishness and selflessness to the point where what we do that is good for us is simultaneously good for those around us. As we meet our higher level needs, group interest and self interest can become indistinguishable.

Knowing Quality Without Defining It

Robert Pirsig seems to be a modern pre-Socratic. He rarely uses Gestaltist terminology in his book, *Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance*. However, a Gestaltist term which he does employ is the word "now." To a Gestaltist, to Pirsig, and to pre-Socratics of his kind, everything that happens, happens now or happens not at all. Right now we remember the past. Right now we anticipate the future. The past has been and the future is not yet. The dilemma that man is faced with is how to reconcile the present anticipations of a future that does not yet exist. The only time this reconciliation can be made is in the present. We can only choose in the present. Awareness is the route that must be followed to lead us to quality living, according to Gestaltists.

Awareness is a pre-intellectual state in which the object or event in one's awareness is largely undefined. To the majority of Western educators there is no formal difference between inability to define and stupidity. If we are unable to define quality in thought and statement, we are stupid about quality in thought and statement.

As a college instructor of English Composition in Boseman, Montana, Pirsig wrote his colleagues the following message, "Every instructor of English composition knows what quality is. (Any instructor who does not should keep this fact carefully concealed, for this would certainly constitute proof of incompetence.)"[8] The faculty became disconcerted at a junior faculty member's telling them what they should know. They replied by asking him whether quality resides in that which is being observed or whether quality is subjective, existing only in the observer? If Pirsig chose to respond by saying that quality resided in that which was being observed, he also would have to explain why scientific instruments are unable to detect it. If quality only resided in the observer, then quality would be "just a fancy name for whatever you like."[9]

Had Pirsig refused to define quality, he would have violated the bounds of academic freedom in that the notion "academic freedom" does not do away with all accountability for what faculty members say. Furthermore, reason rather than political power is the determiner of whether or not the bounds of academic freedom have been violated. Now "definitions are the foundation of reason. You can't reason without them."[10]

Pirsig refuses to define quality and he wonders what makes him think quality exists if he can't define it. This thought leads him to what he describes as the realist's position that "a thing exists if a world without it can't function normally. If we can show that a world without quality functions abnormally, then we have shown that quality exists, whether it's defined or not."[11]

Pirsig then proceeds to show that a world as we know it would function abnormally if we subtracted quality. The fine arts and humor would disappear. Sports, the marketplace, "applied science and technology would all drastically change, but pure science, mathematics, philosophy and particularly logic would be unchanged . . . . If quality were dropped only rationality would remain unchanged."[12]

Further Relations and Implications

Neither Gestaltists nor pre-Socratics were against the use of reason in ordering affairs of living. No sane person wants chaos, and chaos in the form of a jungle-type existence would follow if we did not reason.

The problem that I see is not whether reason ought to be used in our lives. The problem is that reason has become, for Western man and the majority of educators since the time of Socrates, the value that determines other values for us. Our Western culture has so conditioned us with the notion of the primacy of reason that questioning that primacy invites alienation and, in a sense, disagreement with the majority of Western educators.

Stuckness

The Gestaltist view and Pirsig's view of the pre-Socratics include the notion of permitting stuckness in our lives. This notion means that when it is difficult to look we would probably reap noticeable rewards by keeping on looking. That is tantamount to allowing oneself to be stuck and not running from the stuckness by explaining immediately before we allow dissonant parts to coalesce. According to Gestaltists and Pirsig's view of the pre-Socratics, we can't help but become unstuck if only we allow ourselves to be stuck. "Be what you are," say Gestaltists. "When you're stuck, be stuck." A problem arises when we avoid being what we are. The mental energy that could profitably energize our growth toward excellence or quality goes into the process of avoiding. Awareness is central to Gestaltists' and the pre-Socratics' activity, for we can't be another way (change or move towards more quality or excellence) until, paradoxically, we are what we are. Awareness of what we are and of what we are doing ignites change if we choose to change or to learn something significant. Being aware of avoiding and choosing to avoid removes the behavior from the category of "avoiding" as the term is employed here.

This notion of stuckness has been elaborated in my Ohio Valley Philosophy of Education Society paper, entitled "Teaching and Functional Discontinuity."[13] Functional discontinuity and stuckness are essentially the same process, and they are also sub-processes within the process of the continuous reconstruction of experience. In a freer, responsive atmosphere a teacher can help a student move to the student's limits. We grow from our limits. Bones, trees, and, as far as I know, every living thing grows from its limits. Helping people get out to their limits is an element of Gestalt education, and it is probably an element in the pre-Socratics' movement toward excellence.

Conclusions

The following conclusions make sense in a Gestaltist-Pirsigian, pre-Socratic framework.

The greater the primacy of reason in our already highly reasonable Western culture, the less we will be concerned with quality. A corollary to this is that we won't know (as much) what is good and what is not good, and we will need others to tell us these things.

The greater the primacy of reason, the more we will be like Alice when she asked the Cat, "Please tell me which way I ought to go from here?" And the less we will understand the cat's reply, "That depends a good deal on where you want to get to." Reason does not tell us what to hypothesize, although it is a useful tool in testing our hypotheses.

The greater the primacy of reason, the less we understand that, during a significant present experience, for every truth there is an equal and opposite countertruth.

The greater the primacy of reason, the less we will understand that we often make the present bad so that the future will be brighter. And the less we will understand that how to live in the future may, in the last analysis, be a function of living in the present.

For the Gestalt educator and for the pre-Socratics, living reality is superordinate to thinking about lived reality.

For the Gestalt educator and for the pre-Socratics, noticing (being aware of) what is going on in and around oneself is an activity that precedes and is vital to all other conscious activity. What is noticed is a "that." The "why" of the "that" is less crucial than noticing the "that." A Gestalt educator would more likely ask, "How is it to be as you are?" rather than "Why are you that way?" Strongly desiring a "why" of a "that" can prevent us from noticing a "that."

For the Gestalt educator and for the pre-Socratics, an excellent person or quality person or virtuous person is closely associated with noticing well. For the Gestalt educator and for the pre-Socratics, disinterested noticing is not noticing.

Trying to change and trying to grow is, in cases related to personality development, not change and is not growth. What we often learn by trying is how to try. We learn to change by changing, we learn to grow by growing. We facilitate this change by noticing what is going on in and around us.

Balance-Excellence-Quality

Excessive intellectualizing can be a way of resisting action and contact with a person, thing, or event. The resisting may interfere with completing experiences. Some experiences that remain unfinished can interfere with one's having new experiences. If we don't have new experiences, we repeat old experiences. Repeating old experiences, if done in an unaware and unchosen way, can lead to further imbalanced living so that one's primary mode of experience is fantasy.

When one's primary mode of experience is fantasy, contact with the world of phenomena is minimized. We primarily think about lived reality rather than living reality when our primary mode of experience is fantasy.

If I were to ask you to try to hand me your pen (assuming you are only a foot or two away from me), you would probably hand me your pen. Trying and doing would, in this case, be integrated. If I am trying to change my personality without changing it, Gestaltists would argue that my statement of trying to change my personality while not changing it is indicative of my unaware resistance to the changing. Becoming aware of what the resistance is, removes it from the category of resistance and puts it into the category of a root of an individual's free, responsible choice. An individual's free, responsible choice is central to existential-Gestalt thought, and it also seems to be central to Pirsig's view of pre-Socratic thought.

Pirsig's view of Socrates did not include Socrates's notion that the beginning of wisdom comes when we know that we don't know. I am including it here to note that this view has a Gestaltist flavor. It also has a Pirsigian flavor. Perhaps Socrates was a pre-Socratic after all.

NOTES

1. David Denton, 'Feeling/Notion Epistemological Paradigm," *Educational Theory*, vol. 18, no. 2 (Spring 1968).

2. Van Cleve Morris, "Detenta," in *Philosophy of Education*, 1965.

3. R. M. Pirsig, *Zen and The Art of Motorcycle Maintenance* (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1974), p. 365.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 366.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 372.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 374-375.

7. Michael Polanyi, *The Tacit Dimension* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1966).

8. Pirsig, *Zen and Maintenance*, p. 208.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 213.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 209.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 210.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 211.

13. Conrad Pritscher, "Teaching and Functional Discontinuity," *Proceedings of the Ohio Valley Philosophy of Education Society*, 1975.

COPING PATTERNS AS KEYS TO UNDERSTANDING KNOWLEDGE: An Essay in Educational Theory

Irvin K. Rice
Louisville Male High School

PROLOGUE AND APOLOGY

The theoretical understanding discussed in this paper both has and is a style of understanding. It is not linear and logical. It consciously undertakes to allow understanding to emerge rather than to be pronounced. Logical proofs and arguments are not offered. Rather comparisons, patterns, repetitions are used. The text seems circular and undirected. This is a conscious attempt to allow the paper itself to help illustrate the point aimed at by its content. The reader is begged to be patient and persistent, to read it all, and to remember that the point is not definition but understanding.

Because of the paper's conscious style this introductory prologue is offered here for the reader's relief. This paper proposes an idea which it calls a theory for education. The theory proposes that the search for control or power is the uniting element in cognition, will, adaptation-learning-development. The recognition of the desire to control as the experience of presentness to the world is mixed with ideas suggested by Piaget's observations, Dewey's unity of theory and method, and existential phenomenology's descriptions of being to form a "metaphor," or a metaphorical description, of knowing and developing. This metaphorical description unites our subjective experience of growth and cognition and will with our objective observations of behavior and with our cataloguing of emotive-based responses to environment to produce a homographic theory of educative development.

The Need for New Educational Skill

The dream of the 1940s is coming true in nightmare form. We are seriously attempting to educate all American youth. Only about twelve percent of our nation's youth fail to complete high school. Ironically, as we have seemed to approach our goal on the one hand, it has increasingly eluded us on the other. We find that the longer our enrollment lists become, the more complex the schooling task becomes and the greater the public's expectations. As the schools stretch to include and keep the non-conforming, the disenchanted, the untalented, the aberrant, the emotionally ill, the neurologically impaired, and perhaps other classifications of individual differences, teachers feel that they are being called upon to spin straw into gold. The traditional set of instructional circumstances--an authoritarian, albeit benevolent, adult quietly ordering the experiences of malleable, if somewhat resistant, youths--is simply not elastic enough to include that much variation and still fulfill its function. Special styles of schooling are needed. Alternative programs and special programs are developing. Even so, the most common expectation is that the teacher will find a way to mold even the most unusual child to fit the success norms without violating that child's uniqueness of personhood or his civil and human rights.

The meaning of this strain on the system, as far as teachers are concerned, is that teachers must possess new acuity and skill in dealing with students as individual people, not just as students. The notion maintained in this paper is new skill must be guided by and grounded in educational theory. Teachers need to become full-fledged professionals by acquiring a fund of knowledge which is the discipline of education--not psychology, anthropology, sociology, political science, or bits and pieces of philosophy. Education is the discipline or body of knowledge which concerns itself with the understanding and nurturing of human beings. It is the total science of people as people really live and exist, not as they are merely observed. It strives for an ever more complete understanding of the experience of human becoming. To meet the

modern challenge of diverse educational demands, teachers need a discipline which is fully-grown and integral, the discipline of education, to act as the integrator of narrower studies of human being such as psychology and sociology. They also need a philosophical orientation and theoretical grounding as a base for diagnosing and prescribing for the development of human beings. They need a clear and simple, yet adequate, description of the way in which human development occurs which is based on the lived experience rather than upon the observation of others alone. Since most teachers will not (or at least now do not) have the time and the depth of interest to pursue such knowledge fully, it is important that they learn a pithy, concise, yet adequate description of the lived experience of human development. With such a core idea as the basis for understanding, they can and will extrapolate and make appropriate choices as they seek to facilitate and cooperate in the development of other human beings. Another way of saying this is to suggest that teachers need a description of the operation of human development which can serve as a paradigm by which to recognize and understand the experience of others.

Observations of Effective Theories

The practice of drawing implications for education from philosophical theories which delineate reality or the nature of man and society has been laid to rest not only by abandonment but by the scholarly observations of Hobart Burns, who points out rather conclusively that no such implications can be drawn logically.[1]

The work of two particular theorists, however, may be cited as examples of how theories affect education paradigmatically. The thoughts of these theorists have had wide acceptance and are still shaping educational practice today. Both theories take as their basic model the notion of man as a biological entity, an organism in an environment. They assume the position of an uninvolved scientific observer, a third eye perspective, and from that vantage point describe human thinking and cognitive development. These theories are the educational philosophy of John Dewey, as he represents experimentalists in education, and the observational descriptions of Jean Piaget, who sought to trace and describe the evolutionary development of human cognition. There are elements in these theories which are paradigmatic and which inform us not only about human thought in general but about theory in particular.

Whereas Hegel practiced his idealism by establishing the dialectic (a model of human thought) as the basic reality unifying all existence, Dewey reified the scientific method (a human construction and model prescribed for thinking) as the way all thinking and human growth occur.[2] If growth in thinking and human living is the result of constant problem solving by an organism in its social environment, if living is only learning and learning is only living, then the method and structure of education seem clear. The experimental method is not only a method byt a description of the reality of human development. The theory, then, is not only a statement about education, it is also a prescription for action in education. This unity of thought and action is of interest for later discussion.

Unity of thought and action is a theme of great significance in the observations and thoughts of Jean Piaget. As the organism assimilates incoming experiences, accommodates itself to them, and equilibrates itself, the organism's thoughts take shape in and through the patterns of action available to it. Piaget's description of actions as analogous to sensorimotor conceptualizations suggests that thought and action share a unity which resembles the unity of form and content in objects.[3] His conceptualization suggests that the body is the filter (like stained glass filtering white light) which conducts the environment, thereby shaping its reception by the organism, into actionable schema by which the environment is cognized and re-cognized. "Every act of knowing includes a mixture of elements furnished by the object and by the action."[4] Thus, every thought has the shape, as it were, of action; and every action is the embodiment of thought. What Dewey utilized as the paradigmatic style of theorizing, Piaget finds at the very fundament of thought

formation itself. Dewey showed that the theory is not only a statement about the world but a prescription for manipulating it. Piaget finds that same unity of thought and action to be characteristic of all thought and development. Our thinking and our theorizing seem to be paradigmatic, occurring in patterns which are both understandings of the world and prescriptions or possibilities for manipulating it.

There are some very cogent perceptions contained in the ideas of these two theorists. One is that thinking and/or human development persists in appearing to pattern itself. Another is that the patterning of human thinking and development relates man to his world. That pattern seems to be the filter through which the world is perceived and, at the same time, the method by which the world is manipulated. Just as thought is the pattern for action and the shadow of action, so our pattern of thinking and perceiving is the point at which the world shapes itself for us, in us, and by us. The key point to be observed here is that we may describe human thought and perception as occurring and becoming in patterns. Three examples have already been alluded to--Hegel's reification of the dialectic of thought, Dewey's use of the scientific method as the pattern for all human thought, and Piaget's use of biological cell behavior as the pattern for human development. Another cogent example might be Thomas Kuhn's treatise on *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*,[5] in which he describes the end of one paradigm of thought as the beginning of another point of view, leading to new scientific theories. If this observed unity of thought and action is a good description of human development and human being, then it would seem appropriate to expect that any adequate theory about human knowledge would provide at one and the same time a description of human knowledge and a method for human action and perception with regard to the presentness of man in his world. This description of theory as paradigm is a central thought for the present essay. It will be elaborated with the understanding that theory is not only a paradigm for cognition, but a pattern for action. Theory is not only an objective description of what is, but is also a method for encountering it and manipulating it. At least, theory seems to be a method for repeating the experience.

Describing Theory

It is better to describe theory as metaphor than as law. Theory seems to be the most abstract form of a repeatable action pattern. To elaborate upon this understanding requires description of thinking and its content. What is the content of a thought? Is it sensible to speak this way at all? The content of a thought seems to be both a memory of an experience and an extrapolation of that memory into a repeatable pattern of action which constitutes a relationship between those things cogitated. Comparison rather than simple memory seems to be a constituent of thought. A deer is a dog with horns. A cow is a fat, lazy antelope. Lions, tigers, panthers are all cats, and all these animals are quadrupeds. There is no logical necessity for any of these to *exist as* any of these other classifications. Classification is a metaphorical operation, composed of the act of limiting. On a more fundamental level of illustration, all those quadrupeds are (in fundamental meaning content) actions I can perform: biting, looking, defecating, ambulating, etc. The point to all this is to evoke an understanding of the metaphorical character of all thinking. Further, the point is to establish a physical action base as the farthest point of regression in the metaphorical chain (or Gestalt) which composes the implicit and tacit content of a concept or thought. This body act as the beginning point for the complex pattern of metaphor which composes a thought can be lost, because our actions not only become complex but become abstracted. We speak of mental action. And mental actions also become abstracted into the pattern of metaphorical understanding which becomes the ground for a focal thought. As experience increases, a mind becomes more and more replete with comparisons (the fundament of patterns) which are imitative of and participatory in the "world" (that which one abstracts as other). Even that which is other is understood as "other" by the comparison that "other" performs actions as "I" perform actions. "Other," then, is a description of "actions which happened without my agency." This isn't intended as a logical

proof that theory is metaphorical. It is a description, a reminder of the consituency of thought to show that thought seems always to have a metaphorical parameter and that theory is the most refined of thoughts.

Reason, or reasoning, is related to theory. We have described theory as that aspect of thinking which constitutes the formation, information, or content of thought. Reason or reasoning seems to be the action of thought. Reason and action are related in two ways which have not been the focus of much contemplation. One is that to reason is an act (albeit that to what degree it is a physical act is subject to fruitless argument). The other is that an inseparable meaning of the word "reason" is the notion that a reason is a cause, a source, and a justification for action. We have trouble with the word when we forget its inevitable action connotations. When someone performs an act which we do not immediately understand we ask, "What were his reasons?" There is a strong sense in which reason connotes motive. On the other hand, when we use the word "reason" to refer strictly to logic and its abstract manipulations, we discover that however logical a notion may be and however true our conclusions, these "reasons" are never sufficient to guarantee action. We do not act upon our logical reasons, even though they are the pure shadow of repeatable actions available to us. The way reasons work in our lives is as motives, the methods for procuring what we desire. This is the reason why we reason. When we reason abstractly, or theoretically, it is either by reflecting upon past actions in order to abstract from them the repeatable aspects, or before an event to perform a recapitulation of the act of reflection upon events not yet having occurred in order to anticipate aspects which can most be expected to be repeated or to occur. Thus, reason and action inevitably inform one another. Theory relates to reasoning as policy does to actions. It sets out in advance the limits of understanding which may be applied in the area the theory pertains to.

Knowledge and theory are sometimes casually referred to as contraries, if not contradictories. Theory attempts to pass beyond what is known in particular instances to new knowledge of what may be depended upon in general. When theorizing, we move from that which is experiential to that which is patterned upon experience and abstracted from it. Theory attempts to refine and summarize that which is repeatable in instances of knowledge. Knowledge may be described as the patterns of repeatability in perception, comparison, and action, which do not disappoint us in their constancy, applicability, or repeatability. We speak of knowledge as a mental grasp of what is, in fact, the case. This description leaves out the action which is constituent of my presentness to the world. I am not really an "other" which visits the world, although this has been a characteristic style of describing my existence. I am, at least, "of" the world, and therefore, am the world. It is not I, and I am not it, else we could not distinguish between the two. But we are both each other. I am not as well described as "an organism in an environment" as I am by the phrase "that place where the world becomes conscious of itself." Consciousness of the world I refer to as "I." Consciousness develops and elaborates itself as experience multiplies and as patterns of repeatability of actions and experience are more and more woven into the tapestry of meaning. Action is part of knowing as becoming is part of being. Knowing something consists not only of holding a pattern of relationships (refined action patterns) in one's consciousness but of living as if that pattern "were, in fact, the case." There is an element of action in knowing if at no other level than that of committing one's safety to the belief that something is true. Knowing also contains action patterns in that every knowledge may be described fundamentally as a pattern of "what would happen if . . . ." From geometric functions to the concept of a stone, the meaning content of knowledge is metaphorically related to and grasped by patterns of actions.

Meaning is a function of limiting. One of the patterns which characterize all our metaphorical understanding is that of limiting. Actions and their objects seem to us to have beginnings and ends. Those beginnings and endings are determined by our presentness to the world by the action of limiting our perceptions. Man is fundamentally the choice maker. Nowhere is his choice

making more fundamental than in limiting his perceptions of encounters with "the world" in this act of metaphorical comparison of acts and repeatable action patterns. Why do we differentiate a stone from "the earth"? Why do we focus upon the movement of animals as characterizing a different kind of being than the movement of trees in the wind? How do we differentiate the wind from the air. Knowing, acting upon, and understanding our "being-in-the-world" is accomplished through a process of limiting, of defining, which is the basis of classification and comparison, which are the basis of metaphor, which is the pattern for interweaving concepts into understanding. Thus, knowing and understanding are active, choiceful, and are, themselves, actions.

This discourse on the parameters of thought and theory is to point out and clarify the understanding that theory is both reflected abstraction and the formula for repeatability of action. Action, or its shadow or pattern, is constituent of and inseparable from thought and theory; theory is both understanding and method.

"Repeatability," "choice," and "limitation" are words used here not to define, but to describe that experience of the emergence of meaning ... we call perception. They are patterns and parameters which seem inseparable from the moment of "re-cognition" of objects and ideas. They serve to remind us of our participation in the construction of ontology, even though we are not wholly its authors. When we "re-cognize" a stone or a tree (to use simple illustrations) our very language suggests that we "see" it as if we had seen it before. We "re-cognize" it, think it again, know it *again*. Without trying to formulate the process into a statement of natural law, these concepts used here offer a description of human awareness and thought which seems to proceed from originary participation in "the world" via one's body through metaphor-like comparisons of repeatable body actions and through wider generalization of comparable schema for repeatable actions by which objects and ideas are defined to a web of repeatable formulae for actions which have their limits and identity by the extent of comparability we assign to them and which form a complex of meanings. This complex of meanings reaches from the tacit to the thematic and is the perception base through which and by which we cognize and re-cognize our world. Limitation, choice, and repeatability are not automatic actions in the sense in which natural laws reflect expected repeatability. Rather, they are descriptions of the presentness of whomever and whatever the "I" in the circumstances may be. None of the emerging of patterns occurs without my presence, and my presence at its most fundamental level is choicefulness. A pattern or action has its beginning and its ending in my act of limiting. It is "I" who decides when to declare out of the constancy of movement which is "the world" a beginning, an ending, or a comparison, which constitutes a pattern. It is "I" who "re-cognizes" a pattern by comparing it to previous sensations and actions. My act of limiting, of placing beginning and ending points on actions by fiat, as it were, and my act of "seeing" one limited (by me) set of occurrences or actions as comparable to another is inseparable from my awareness of any and all events. We are able to speak of events occurring outside of consciousness, but not to experience them. Therefore, to reiterate the point of this paragraph, repeatability, limitation, comparability, and choice are used to describe the emergence of cognitions and recognitions into awareness. We, whatever "we" symbolizes, participate in the world to the degree that we are aware of it. Ontology is not unaffected by that participation, but rather has as its character a belonging to the process as an ultimate outcome.

Beginning a Theoretical Understanding

The foregoing outpouring of description, while seeming to move in circles, might serve as the context for a further description of human knowing, which is offered here as a theoretical understanding and a pattern for educational action. Certain descriptions are threads in the understanding pattern to be woven. This idea has significance when used as a paradigm. It helps to describe the relation of thoughts and action patterns. The idea of thoughts as fundamentally metaphorical, as related to actions, helps us see that a thought might be described as the fundamental possibility for repetition of

an action. Extrapolated to its most refined implication, this means that theory can be described as a paradigm for action, not just for the predicting of outcomes. This gives us an idea to hold on to about theory in general. Other of the ideas previously referred to form or inform the pattern for the theoretical understanding put forward here. Using the ideas of repeatable body actions, patterning, comparison, limiting, defining, repeatability of schema, choice, and classification (which are only separable from each other by our reflective distinctions, not by lived experiences), we have tried to offer a description of the phenomenon of human knowing. The purpose is to describe a theoretical understanding of human knowing which is a paradigm supplying not only the metaphorical referents in our understanding of knowing, but the action possibilities which can bring it about or affect its occurrence. If educators can understand knowing, it is implicit in that understanding that they know how to diagnose and prescribe concerning it.

Elements in the Theory

The point of the perceivers' participation in the world has been emphasized previously. It is an important one. This perspective seeks to describe man as the chooser, as that segment of the cosmic event called being in which being asserts its awareness of itself. It seems appropriate here to shift to the first person. I participate in every perception and in all construction of meaning which forms the tacit web of understanding by which I cognize and recognize the world. If I participate, I participate not just as a filter through which light is transformed. My presentness to the world in my awareness of it has an assertiveness and a willfulness which will be described here as "choice." As was said previously, I choose the beginnings and endings of the patterns which become my tools for understanding the world. I am not entirely passive even when I am most totally receiving the world. My body (if I choose artifically to differentiate it from the world) is in constant reaction and interplay with "the world" which is the "water in which it swims." I am choicefully present to whatever is translated to me as perception, even though that choicefulness may assume a tacitness as the web of understanding (repeatable action patterns interrelated) becomes the vehicle along with the body by which the world is conveyed to me. What prompts me to differentiate, to compare, to seek repeatable action patterns? What seems to remain when all other functions are phenomenologically stripped away? Not just shapes and pictures, but awareness. And awareness entails choice. Self-assertion is present in awareness. Awareness is acting and being acted upon, even if it is passive. There is that which we call "I" in awareness or there is no awareness. The "I" is desirous. Any description of the phenomenon of personal self-awareness must take that irreducible desire into account. I act even as I passively perceive, in that I participate in the shaping of my perceptions by means of the repeatable action pattern metaphors I use as the tools for grasping the perception present to me. Purpose, will, choice, the impetus for action, and action itself are present to the world, and I learn to call them "I." My participation as a chooser in the awareness of the world is a significant point for the theoretical understanding we seek.

The very fact that we do elaborate that choicefulness into something much more complex, just as we elaborate our action patterns into very complicated understandings, is one of the reasons why it is hard to think of choice as rudimentary desire or assertiveness. Even as our web of understanding grows, inevitably accompanying that growth is the development of that choicefulness into what we have called, ego, personality, mind. Choicefulness is inseparable from all our cognitions and re-cognitions. It seems important, in fact, to point out that it is more fundamental. It is more nearly the entity doing the shaping than the perceptions being shaped. It is better to describe the formation of patterns of perception and action as serving choicefulness than as merely accompanying it. I, whatever I am, shape, limit, compare, and act upon the world I perceive *for my purposes*. Schema are, for me, not just happenstance repeatabilities. They are possibilities for my action, for my becoming. It is the ongoing elaboration of choicefulness and its possibilities which we call development. We shape our actions and per-

ceptions into repeatable patterns in order that we *may* repeat them. Choice seeks control. Choice is the prote-action base of all action. It is elaborated, along with cognitive patterns, into *coping patterns*--the observable behavior which implies choice and expresses choice. These coping patterns may be the most significant patterns to understand in that they participate in the patterning of perception and action and, therefore, of cognition and recognition. It is important to recognize the inseparability of choicefulness and the presence of personhood in the constitution of any thought. Choicefulness shapes action which is patterned into repeatability. The repeatability is constituted by limitation, comparison, metaphor, and pattern. The patterning, itself, entails choice in that it creates and maintains the possibilitiy for my repetition of the action. The interweaving of these patterns into patterns of patterns creates the tacit web of metaphorical reference which allows understanding and recognition. This developed pattern constitutes the possibility of my acting, perceiving, and reacting. It allows me to see the possibilities for my being and becoming. It is the fundamental means by which I control my being in the world.

If man ("I") is the choosing being, he participates in the awareness of the world to manage his own actions and the world's reactions, to achieve control, to manage his own projects. Thus, his action upon the world may become patterned (not without the constant accompaniment of his fund of metaphorical referenced action patterns) into a style and a method of dealing with the world, of coping, of power management.

A theory for the understanding of education (which is the management of the development of human being) must be one in which there is some recognition and unity of reason, thought, action, and will. It must be one in which the person is allowed to exist and be present. This theoretical understanding attempts to describe human development in such a way.

Statement of the Theory: Its Germ Idea

Man's coping patterns are, schematically and thematically, metaphors of his cognition of the world. The body's translation of the "world" to one's personhood is not only the person's "picture" of the world but also his pattern of manipulating it.

Remember, when we cognize "the world" we do so in a manner much more akin to metaphor than to logic. Therefore, we should see our theoretical grasp of knowledge as a metaphorical description of knowing and developing rather than a definitive statement of "the way it is."

Present in "knowing" appears to be the irreducible awareness-with-desire which we learn to call "I." Development appears to occur by means of ever more complex and interrelated patterns of comparison, metaphor, and schema for the repeatability of action--which all evince elements of individual purpose, desire, or intent to control. Fulfilling "my" desires by controlling the repeatability of experience appears to be the method and the "reason" (both the coherence and the cause) for my elaboration and interrelation of schema. The styles of managing this take on patterns of repeatability and comparability, so that the pattern of one's development as a person can most clearly be seen if understood as the ever more complex elaboration of one's methods of power management, or coping patterns.

These coping patterns seem to have a unity of thought and action. One cognizes the world in comparison with repeatable patterns of body action reduced to schema. These "ideas" or thought patterns are both pictures of the world held by its perceiver and prescriptions for realizing desired possibilities by performing the actions of which the pictures are a pattern.

Recognition of the Striving for Power Management

Recognition of that which resembles power management at or near the center of cognition and decision making of knowing provides us with a metaphorical style of reference to the ongoing elaboration of cognition and action schema which we call development. This metaphor may serve us as an action schema or pattern for our attempts to understand, control, and react to control behavior and development. As educational theorists we wish for a theoretical perspective which allows us not only to understand but to manipulate and prescribe educational actions.

The idea of coping patterns or of systems of power management may be useful in an attempt to describe and recognize elements in knowing. It needs to be pointed out that the use of the term "system of power management" does not necessitate charts showing the flow of data or the usual trappings and language of systems analysis. Rather, what is needed is an understanding that each person constantly is attempting to manage whatever control he or she can muster over the world, and it is within the context of that struggle to control that knowing patterns itself (or takes shape). The repeated patterns of attempts at control of one's being in the world are the subject matter to be observed. Those patterns offer us the possibility of a homographic understanding of knowing.

Utilizing the Idea of Development

It seems that a thorough understanding of human knowing which allows us to cognize it and learn to form repeatable action pattern schema about it should place knowing in its pattern of relationships to the totality of the person knowing. One seems not to seek knowledge for its own sake, however appealing the notion may seem. Knowing has its place in the total becoming of the person. An understanding of that relationship is essential to an adequate description of knowing which can be relied upon as the basis of action. Thus, the idea of development is inseparable from the complete understanding of knowing as it relates to education.

Educators must deal with individual development, not just with knowledge. The scrutiny of knowledge as an entity removed from the life of the knower reduces it to less than its existential being and, to that degree, prevents our truly understanding the phenomenon. In education we need a theory of human development which allows us to understand human being, not just observable human actions. Educators must foster human becoming (development), not just impart information. The processing of information is inseparable, in lived experience, from becoming.

Coping Patterns as a Device for Understanding

We need both objectivity and subjectivity, yet not as separate perspectives, for the complete understanding of human knowledge, which is both objective and subjective. Coping patterns may be observed. To a reasonable extent they may be objectified by observers. A person's style of managing his world, protecting himself in personal relationships, passivity or aggression, may be watched, compared, classified, and understood. If choice is the source of human values, much may be learned about a person's value orientation, direction of development, and motivations by carefully understanding his patterns of attempting to manage personal power or to affect the environment. Such observation and understanding could lead to the development of comparison and classifications of styles of information processing; for it seems to be true that one processes information and forms thoughts as part of the process of becoming or developing or managing power. Focusing on a student's style of coping provides a frame of reference from which to see and understand his method and reasons for the processing of information. With such understanding a teacher must immediately decide upon desirable action patterns to open possibilities for the student. Such utilization of the metaphorical description provided by the notion of coping patterns might be elaborated into answers to such questions as: "What is happening when

'education' is taking place?" "What motivates one to learn?" "How can we develop a 'pathology' of human development by which to recognize the obstacles (diseases) which inhibit or distort desired development (becoming)?" "How can we diagnose and prescribe learning experiences for normal and abnormal individuals?" Surely, if we have an understanding of the becoming of individuals and the direction and intent of that becoming, we are better equipped to facilitate and cooperate in the proceedings. Our theory is our model for action.

In today's educational climate we have abundant evidence that the traditional classroom setting and authority relationships are not efficacious for a great and growing number of our youth. We desperately need strategies for maximizing teachers' effectiveness with each individual. If we can supply teachers with a coping pattern (a theory for education) to use in the adequate and accurate diagnosis of students' individual needs for becoming, we will have increased teachers' effectiveness and opened the channels of relevance for today's education.

In Praise of the Theory

The theory presented, although very incomplete, is homographic. It attempts to allow the person to be present and to be taken into account. It seeks not to reduce knowing to less than the lived experience. It attempts to see both from the outside and from the inside, to understand knowing as it occurs in its fullness and in its interrelationships.

The theory seeks to be consistent and true to the lived experience of thinking and knowing without reducing them to less than they seem to be. It seeks only to describe for the sake of understanding rather than to define for the sake of classification.

The theory reaches for an understanding which can be of and for education. It is not limited to logic, scientific method, sociology, psychology, anthropology, language analysis, or other disciplines which purposefully define themselves in such a way that they are not directly applicable to education.

The theory seeks an understanding of, not a detachment from, that upon which it is focused. Of necessity, any theory about knowing and educating must be a prime participant in the process or phenomenon it investigates. This theory seeks to be a pattern of and for action as well as a picture of that about which it purports to offer knowledge. It seeks to exemplify its own content and intent. The theory itself is paradigmatic of its meaning.

NOTES

1. Hobart W. Burns, "The Logic of 'Educational Implications,'" in *Philosophic Problems and Education* ed. Young Pai and Joseph Meyers (Philadelphia: J. H. Lippincott Co., 1967) pp. 35-46.

2. John Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, (New York: Macmillan Co., 1961) p. 150.

3. Hans G. Furth, *Piaget and Knowledge*, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc. 1969) p. 53.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 54

5. Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

ADDITIONAL REFERENCE

Dewey, John, "My Pedagogic Creed," in *Three Thousand Years of Educational Wisdom*, ed. Robert Ulich (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965).

PART IV

RECORDS AND REPORTS

MINUTES OF THE ANNUAL MEETING
OF THE
OHIO VALLEY PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY

Stouffer's Cincinnati Towers
Cincinnati, Ohio
October 20-21, 1978

1. The meeting was called to order by Gerald B. Reagan at 11:15 A.M., October 21, 1978. The minutes of the 1977 meeting, as published in *Proceedings* of OVPES, were approved. An interim Treasurer's Report was presented by Eleanor Roemer, Treasurer, and approved.

2. Old Business

   A. John Carter, editor of *Proceedings*, introduced the issue of a contract with ERIC. After some discussion, it was moved and seconded that a nonexclusive contract with ERIC be sought so that the present contract with University Microfilm could be continued. If only an exclusive contract with ERIC is possible, then the University Microfilm contract would be terminated. The editors of *Proceedings* were to work out the details. The motion passed.

   B. Richard LaBrecque moved that the editor of *Proceedings* be authorized to raise the institutional rate charged for *Proceedings*. The amount is to be left to the editors' discretion. The motion was seconded and passed.

3. New Business

   A. A motion for OVPES to contribute $150 to *Educational Theory* was made by Richard Pratte; it was seconded and passed.

   B. It was moved, seconded, and passed that a letter of appreciation be sent to William Bronson for his contribution as one of the editors of *Proceedings*.

   C. President Reagan announced that the Nominating Committee was composed of the following members: David Denton, Chair; J. Gordon Chamberlain; Richard Pratte; Phillip G. Smith.

4. Nominating Committee Report

   A. The Nominating Committee's slate of officers was unanimously elected. The officers for 1979 are:

David Engel	President
Richard LaBrecque	President-Elect
Eleanor K. Roemer	Secretary-Treasurer
Everett Jarboe	Executive Board Member (to 1980)
Gerald Reagan	Executive Board Member as Immediate Past President
Keith Raitz	Executive Board Member (to 1979)
Paul Black	Executive Board Member (to 1981)
Dennis Senchuk, Chair	Program and Resolutions Committee
William McKenny	Program and Resolutions Committee
Robert Wilhoyte	Program and Resolutions Committee
John Carter	*Proceedings* Editor
Richard Angelo	*Proceedings* Assistant Editor

5. President Reagan turned the Chairmanship of the meeting over to President Engel.

6. Discussion of the place and time of the 1979 meeting was followed by the members present voting to hold the meeting October 19-20, 1979, in Cincinnati at Stouffer's Hotel, provided that similar arrangements--i.e., no charge for meeting rooms--could be worked out.

7. It was moved, seconded, and passed that a letter of appreciation be sent to Gerald Reagan for his year of Presidency.

8. President Engel adjourned the meeting at 12:10 P.M.

OHIO VALLEY PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY

Treasurer's Final Report for 1978

BALANCE: January 1, 1978		1,486.78
Receipts		
Membership Dues Received Before the 1978 Annual Meeting:	65.00	
Sale of Proceedings:	142.50	
Monies Collected at the 1978 Annual Meeting:	220.00	
Contribution from Pittsburgh Theological Seminary:	150.00	
Interest on Savings Account:	49.06	
TOTAL RECEIPTS:		626.56
Disbursements		
Cost of Announcements:	67.14	
Cost of Bank Checks:	3.25	
Postage for Program Mailing (third mailing):	30.00	
Postage for Proceedings:	56.00	
Copyright fee for Proceedings:	6.00	
Cost of Printing Proceedings:	464.00	
Costs of 1978 Annual Meeting: Coffee	27.05	
Contribution to *Educational Theory*:	150.00	
TOTAL DISBURSEMENTS:		803.44
NET BALANCE AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1978		1,309.90

OHIO VALLEY PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY
LIST OF MEMBERS

Abrahamson, John T.
College Education
University of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40506

Aiken, William
Chatham College
Pittsburgh, PA 15232

Alexander, Richard T., Jr.
Ball State University
Muncie, IN 47306

Allen, David
Springville
Indiana 47462

Allred, Mildred
Scott Park Campus
University of Toledo
Toledo, OH 44606

Al-Rubaiy, Abdul
Dept. Ed. Foundations
University of Akron
Akron, OH 44325

Altenbaugh, Richard J.
17053 Burchfield Rd.
Allison Park, PA 15101

Ames, Russell E., Jr.
Educational Psychology
Department of Education
Purdue University
West Lafayette, IN 47907

Anderson, D.
606 Teachers College
University of Cincinnati
Cincinnati, OH 45221

Andris, James
Education Division
Southern Illinois University
Edwardsville, IL 62025

Angelo, Richard
1433 Taylor Ed. Bldg.
University of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40506

Baker, Bruce
School of Education
University of Missouri-Kansas City
Kansas City, MO 64110

Baldino, Peter
College of Education
Youngstown State University
Youngstown, OH 44503

Baldwin, Robert H.
44 Greenville Avenue
Clarion, PA 16214

Barnes, Donald
College of Education
Ball State University
Muncie, IN 47306

Berkeen, Emmet
Western Kentucky University
Bowling Green, KY 42101

Berlowitz, Marvin
606 Teachers College
University of Cincinnati
Cincinnati, OH 45221

Beversluis, Eric
Dept. of Philosophy
Leonard Hall
Capital University
Columbus, OH 43209

Bhola, H. S.
School of Education
Indiana University
Bloomington, IN 47401

Biacar, Byrant
School of Education
Ball State University
Muncie, IN 47306

Birkel, Lane F.
Teachers College
Ball State University
Muncie, IN 47306

Bishop, Jule
121 Ramseyer Hall
Ohio State University
Columbus, OH 43210

Black, Paul
School of Education
Slippery Rock State College
Slippery Rock, PA 16507

Blank, Kermit
University of Tennessee
Knoxville, TN 37916

Bleyer, John F.
126 West Point Drive
Greensburg, PA 15601

Broidy, Steven
Dept. of Teacher Education
Southwest Missouri State University
Springfield, MO 65802

Brosio, Richard
Teachers College 801
Annex 202
Ball State University
Muncie, IN 47306

Brown, Dennis
11117 Kirkwood
Tacoma, WA 98498

Brown, Glenn
Indiana State University
Terre Haute, IN 47809

Brownlee, Leon
Foundations of Education
College of Education
Memphis State University
Memphis, TN 38152

Brownson, William E.
1310 Statesman Towers West
Indiana State University
Terre Haute, IN 47809

Bruening, William H.
2317 Leroy
Fort Wayne, IN 46805

Buckland, Roscoe V.
Berea College
Berea, KY 40403

Bunyan, Ruth
University of Cincinnati
No. 38
Cincinnati, OH 45221

Burnett, Joe R.
College of Education
University of Illinois
Urbana, IL 61801

Burnside, Ronald
Sinclair Community College
Dayton, OH 45406

Calvert, John
3832 S. Kenilworth
Berwya, IL 60402

Campbell, David N.
Dept. Ed. Foundations
School of Education
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA 15213

Campbell, Malcolm B.
Dept. Ed. Foundations and Inquiry
Bowling Green State University
Bowling Green, OH 43403

Carey, Karen
723 Melrose Avenue
University of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40502

Chamberlin, J. Gordon
911 Ridgecrest Drive
Greensboro, NC 27410

Chweh, Christopher
University of Pittsburgh
Johnstown, PA 15900

Clark, Ralph W.
College of Education
East Tennessee State University
Johnson City, TN 37601

Clayton, Stafford
Dept. of History and
Philosophy of Education
Indiana University
Bloomington, IN 47401

Coffee, Betsy B.
207 Hiawatha
Frankfort, KY 40601

Coleman, Martha
20 University Apartments, East
Bloomington, IN 47401

Collins, Clinton
College of Education
University of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40506

Constans, Phil, Jr.
642 Cottonwood Drive
Bowling Green, KY 42101

Crabtree, Walden
College of Education
University of Akron
Akron, OH 44325

Craig, Robert P.
24824 Old Orchard Road
Novi, MI 48050

Deeb, Norman
Western Kentucky University
Bowling Green, KY 42101

Denton, David E.
144 Taylor
University of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40506

Derr, Richard L.
School of Education
Case Western Reserve University
Cleveland, OH 44106

Devitis, Joseph L.
R. R. #4
Courtright Rd.
Martin, TN 38237

Deyoung, Alan
University of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40506

Dickoff, James
Kent State University
Kent, OH 44240

Diulus, Frank P.
Dept. of Behav. & Humanistic Studies
Buffalo State College
1308 Elmwood Avenue
Buffalo, NY 14222

Dye, Charles M.
2999 Chamberlain Road
Akron, OH 44313

Edge, Findly
Southern Baptist Seminary
Louisville, KY 40206

Edgington, Lee
College of Education
University of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40506

Eisele, Christopher J.
602 H Allen
West Virginia University
Morgantown, WV 26506

Ellas, Joseph A., Dean
School of Education
300 College Park
University of Dayton
Dayton, OH 45469

Engel, David
Dept. of Ed. Foundations
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA 15213

Felker, Donald W.
822 N. Salisbury Street
West Lafayette, IN 47906

Ficht, Joseph
47575 North Avenue
Mt. Clemens, MI 48045

Finchum, George
College of Education
East Tennessee State University
Johnson City, TN 37601

Flesher, Caucus P.
Eastern Kentucky University
Richmond, KY 40475

Franz, Harold
322 Miniosa Circle
Aiken, SC 29801

Fraizier, Gordon E.
School of Education
University of Hawaii
Honolulu, HI 96822

Freiberg, JoAnn
554 Stinchcomb Drive, #8
Columbus, OH 43202

Gallagher, Carol
121 Johnston Blvd.
Lexington, KY 40503

Garrett, Candy
Institute for Child Study
Bypass 46
Indiana University
Bloomington, IN 47401

Geiger, John
Dept. of Foundations
School of Education
University of Dayton
Dayton, Ohio 45469

Gendreau, Bernard A.
Xavier University
Cincinnati, OH 45207

Gerogeoff, John
Department of Education
Purdue University
West Lafayette, IN 47907

Gibbs, Leonidas
1309 Woodlawn Avenue
Wilkinsburg, PA 15221

Gillespie, Patrick J.
Box 3013
University Station
Columbus, Ohio 43210

Glasser, Richard
Union College
Barbourville, KY 40906

Greco, Donald
930 Woodstock Avenue
Toledo, OH 43607

Grise, Robert N.
Eastern Kentucky University
Richmond, KY 40475

Hadjipolycarpou, C.
1094½ West Wylie
Bloomington, IN 47401

Hainer, Frank
617 Bigelow Street
Pittsburgh, PA 15207

Heiney, Terry
College of Education
University of Toledo
Toledo, OH 43606

Hendricks, James
Northern Michigan Universi*
Marquette, MI 49855

Hogle, Homer
309 Education Building
Indiana University
Bloomington, IN 47401

Holland, Donald
303 Peach
Dyer, TN 38330

Hughes, Roger A.
School of Education - #233
Indiana University
Bloomington, IN 47401

Bonnie Hume
Dept. of Education
Eastern Kentucky University
Richmond, KY 40475

James, Patricia
Kent State University
Kent, OH 44240

Jarboe, Everett
School of Education
Indiana University
Bloomington, IN 47401

Johnson, Henry C.
2213 Rackley Bldg.
Penn State University
University Park, PA 16802

Joseph, Ellis A., Dean
School of Education
300 College Park
University of Dayton
Dayton, OH 45469

Kay, Steve
Kentucky State University
Frankfort, KY 40601

Keleman, Steve
21314 Velicata Street
Woodland Hills, CA 91364

Kirchner, Frederick
College of Education
University of Toledo
Toledo, OH 43606

Kirchner, Joseph
School of Education
Youngstown State University
Youngstown, OH 44503

Klein, J. Theodore
Dept. of Philosophy and Religion
Urbana College
Urbana, OH 43078

Klein, Lawrence D.
Dept. of Curriculum Research
School of Education
Central Connecticut State College
New Britain, CT 06050

Knecht, Bruce
3526 Bowen
Toledo, OH 43606

Krause, Theodore
College of Education
University of Toledo
Toledo, OH 43606

LaBrecque, Richard
College of Education
University of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40506

Lester, Madge N.
44 Marion Drive
Fort Thomas, KY 41075

Lewis, F. W., Rev.
School of Education
Fairfield University
Fairfield, CT 06430

Lewis, Hal
1230 SW 9th Road
Gainesville, FL 32601

Lindsey, Richard A.
Box 381
Middle Tennessee State University
Murfreesboro, TN 37130

Lopez, Thomas
College of Education
University of Toledo
Toledo, OH 43606

Lowery, Gregory
303 East 16th Street
Bloomington, IN 47401

Lozier, Gilbert G.
Xavier University
Cincinnati, OH 45207

Maccia, Elizabeth Steiner
Dept. of History and Phil. of Ed.
Indiana University
Bloomington, IN 47401

Maccia, George S.
Dept. of History and Phil. of Ed.
Indiana University
Bloomington, IN 47401

Maguire, James R.
129 Ramseyer Hall
Ohio State University
Columbus, OH 43210

Makruski, Edward D.
121 Ramseyer Hall
Ohio State University
Columbus, OH 43210

Manning, Paul
5422 Gatehouse Drive
Memphis, TN 38134

Mason, Robert
Southern Illinois University
Edwardsville, IL 62025

McAnally, Michael
1379 Eigenmann
Bloomington, IN 47401

McKenney, William A.
Dept. of Ed. Foundations
Eastern Kentucky University
Richmond, KY 40475

Mehl, Bernard
College of Education
Ohio State University
Columbus, OH 43210

Mercer, Drewey, Jr.
Campbellsville College
Campbellsville, KY 42718

Merryman, John E.
I.U.P.
Uhler Hall
Indiana, PA 15701

Minter, Thomas J.
College of Education
University of Toledo
Toledo, OH 43619

Money, Richard W.
Indiana University-Purdue University
Columbus Center
Indianapolis, IN 46205

Moore, Thomas D.
School of Education
Kent State University
Kent, OH 44242

Norris, Ross A.
Dept. of Art Education
College of the Arts
Ohio State University
Columbus, OH 43210

O'Neil, John J.
Asst. Prof. of Philosophy
Boston State College
625 Huntington Avenue
Boston, MA 02115

Osborn, Gene F.
800 N. Smith Rd., Apt. 9X
Bloomington, IN 47401

Page, Ralph
University of Illinois
Urbana, IL 61801

Parkinson, Daniel S.
355 McGuffey Hall
Miami University
Oxford, OH 45056

Partridge, Milton A.
Education Department
Xavier University
Cincinnati, OH 45207

Patton, Ben K.
U.P.O. 805
Morehead, KY 40351

Petrick, Joe
121 Ramseyer Hall
Ohio State University
Columbus, OH 43210

Petrone, Louis
Dept. of Ed. Foundations
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA 15213

Petry, Joh
3120 Domar
Memphis, TN 38118

Phillips, Gene D.
Division of Education
Indiana University at Fort Wayne
2101 Coliseum Blvd., East
Fort Wayne, IN 46805

Phillips, Thomas A.
School of Education
Indiana State University
Terre Haute, IN 47809

Phillips, Trevor J.
Educational Foundations and Inquiry
College of Education
Bowling Green State University
Bowling Green, OH 43403

Popp, Jerome
1809 Monticello
Edwardsville, IL 62025

Porter, Marc
2430 Rockport Road
Bloomington, IN 47401

Pounds, Ralph L.
R. R. #2
Glouster, OH 45732

Pratte, Richard
145 Ramseyer Hall
Ohio State University
Columbus, OH 43210

Pritscher, Conrad
Educational Foundations and Inquiry
Bowling Green State University
Bowling Green, OH 43403

Quinn, Edward D.
Indiana University Southeast
4201 Grantline Road
New Albany, IN 47150

Raitz, Keith L.
Dept. Ed. Foundations
School of Education
University of Louisville
Louisville, KY 40208

Reagan, Gerald M.
145 Ramseyer Hall
Ohio State University
Columbus, OH 43210

Rice, Irwin K.
3507 Mount Ranier
Louisville, KY 40222

Rich, John M.
Dept. of Cultural Found. of Education
School of Education
University of Texas
Austin, TX 78712

Rider, Wanda
254 Buena Vista
Memphis, TN 38112

Riegle, Rodney
123 S. Orr
Normal, IL 61761

Rivage-Seul, Margaret
College of Education
University of Kentucky
Berea, KY 40404

Roemer, Eleanor K.
School of Education
Bowling Green State University
Bowling Green, OH 43403

Rosen, Bernard
Dept. of Philosophy
Ohio State University
Columbus, OH 43210

Ross, W. Gordon
College Box 2270
Berea, KY 40404

Rubin, David
930 Henderson
Indiana University
Bloomington, IN 47401

Russel, R. Terry
Christian Education Dept.
Scarritt College
Nashville, TN 37203

Saslaw, Rita S.
College of Education
University of Akron
Akron, OH 44325

Scahill, John
330 E. High Street
Lexington, KY 40507

Schultz, Frederick M.
Dept. Ed. Foundations
College of Education
University of Akron
Akron, OH 44325

Schweikert, Roman
Xavier University
Cincinnati, OH 45207

Scott, Linda P.
Institute for Appalachian Affairs
Eastern Tennessee State University
Johnson City, TN 37601

Senchuk, Dennis M.
Dept. of History and Phil. of Ed.
Indiana University
1316 Nancy Street
Bloomington, IN 47401

Shermis, Samuel S.
Dept. of Education
Purdue University
West Lafayette, IN 47907

Sherouse, Mark A.
2736 Bellwood Avenue
Columbus, OH 43209

Shunk, William R.
Dept. of Education
Purdue University
West Lafayette, IN 47907

Skovira, Robert
Dept. Ed. Foundations
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA 15213

Smith, J. Bernard
School of Education
Duquesne University
Pittsburgh, PA 15219

Smith, Philip G.
School of Education
Indiana University
Bloomington, IN 47401

Smith, Philip L.
145 Ramseyer Hall
Ohio State University
Columbus, OH 43210

Smith, William
Virginia Union University
Box 485, 1500 Lombardy Street
Richmond, VA 23220

Snyder, Samuel R.
College of Education
University of Toledo
Toledo, OH 43606

Sokolow, Michael H.
English Dept.
E. O. Smith High School
University of Connecticut
Storrs, CT 06268

Spangler, Mary Michael, Sister
Ohio Dominican College
Columbus, OH 43219

Spencer, Thomas E.
Teachers College
Ball State University
Muncie, IN 47306

Stanwyck, Douglas
Dept. of Ed. Foundations
Georgia State University
Atlanta, GA 30303

Steinberg, Ira A.
Dept. of Education
Oberlin College
Oberlin, OH 44074

Stephens, W. Richard
Vice-President for Academic Affairs
Greenville College
Greenville, IL 62246

Straumanis, Eric R.
337 N. Pearl Street
Granville, OH 43023

Swan, William O.
Youngstown State University
410 Wick Avenue
Youngstown, OH 44555

Tavell, David
College of Education
University of Toledo
Toledo, OH 43606

Thompson, Charles L.
School of Education
University of Tennessee
Knoxville, TN 37916

Thompson, Jerry
1437 Central
Memphis, TN 38104

Tuinman, Jaap J.
Institute for Child Study
Indiana University
Bypass 46
Bloomington, IN 47401

Tudor, Brenda
1367 Mulford Road
Columbus, OH 43212

Vail, Beth
Dept. of Elementary Education
Teachers College
Ball State University
Muncie, IN 47306

Varga, Kurt
121 Ramseyer Hall
Ohio State University
Columbus, OH 43210

Vaughan, William G.
Dept. of Foundations
Glassboro State College
Glassboro, NJ 08028

Walker, Lorraine
School of Nursing
University of Texas
1700 Red River St.
Austin, TX 78701

Wantling, Alberta Lowe
R. R. #4, Box 46
Edwardsville, IL 62025

Warren, Richard L.
Dept. of Social and Philosophical Studies
College of Education
University of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40506

Weaver, Janice F.
148 Pearl Croft Road
Cherry Hill, NJ 08034

Weaver, William
1108 South Washington
Bloomington, IN 47401

Wendel, Charles
700 Forbes Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15219

Wertheim, Sally H.
Dept. of Education
John Carroll University
Cleveland, OH 44118

Wheeler, Margaret S.
Teachers College, 218-C
Ball State University
Muncie, IN 47304

Wieder, Charles G.
Division of Art Education
340 Hopkins Hall
Ohio State University
Columbus, OH 43210

Wilhoyte, Robert
College of Education
University of Toledo
Toledo, OH 43606

Wilson, Roger A.
Banta F-127
Bloomington, IN 47401

Yeazell
West Virginia University
Route 7, Box 149B
Morgantown, WV 26505

Young, Bernadette
5090 Warwich Terrace
Pittsburgh, PA 15213

Zenker, William
1683 Marion Waldo Road
Lot 30
Marion, OH 43302

Zigler, Ronald
3228 Bishop Street
Cincinnati, OH 45220